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This dissertation is about a kind of memory that differs from 
commemoration or memorialization, a distinctively passionate commitment to 
and kind of remembering that, using the nomenclature of Marianne Hirsch, I call 
“postmemory.” Theorists like Hirsch, Saidiya Hartman, and Walter Benjamin, 
along with other memory scholars from Holocaust and transatlantic slavery 
backgrounds, suggest that an explanation of postmemory can be found in the 
idea of the “imagination.” But these scholars have yet to theorize the 
imagination’s mediating role in rendering ancestral trauma productively 
constituent of the present. My contribution to memory studies centers on 
describing the relationship between memory and postmemory, particularly the 
theorizable site wherein and the operations whereby a process of mediation 
occurs. I make this contribution by analyzing Micheline Aharonian Marcom’s 
Armenian Genocide trilogy which richly understands, explores, and narratively 
realizes the mediation of the imagination for the purposes of passionate 
remembering. Focusing on the life and work of Marcom, I uncover unique 
 ix 
aspects of postmemory for the Armenian diaspora that add nuance to 
theorizations of the phenomenon in both its particular and general appearances. 
My project also contributes to literary studies by offering the first sustained 
analysis of the under-discussed and yet highly decorated Marcom. By the end of 
Marcom’s trilogy and my analysis of it, literary studies emerges as a venue for 
productively exploring postmemory. 
Each of my analyses of Marcom’s three novels clarifies the imagination in 
its mediating role between memory and postmemory. In my chapters, I identify 
the inherited memory—the “source material”—and how a person who desires 
passionate remembering imaginatively vivifies the memory. Chapter One argues 
that Three Apples Fell from Heaven reinvigorates storytelling through a contrastive 
imagination which redeploys plot elements and characters from deep Armenian 
history to tell new stories about a denied genocide. Chapter Two argues that The 
Daydreaming Boy describes how an insufficient sentimental imagination attempts 
to reinvigorate a prelapsarian past only to repeat the past’s violences instead. 
Chapter Three argues that Draining the Sea depicts how an analogic imagination 
that reveals that sentience undergird conscience can forestall violence by 
encouraging victimized populations to feel solidarity with all mistreated others. 
The “Afterword” describes the pedagogic value of using literary studies and 
literature classes to examine postmemory. 
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 1 
INTRODUCTION 
“Never forget.” These words are uttered after horrendous events to ensure 
that they are inscribed into collective memory. With these words, remembering 
gains a moral imperative. By making sure the event is preserved in collective 
memory, the dead are honored and lessons are learned from their deaths. In this 
way, the surviving generations do their part by making sure the dead did not die 
in vain. They take heart in believing that memory redeems both those who 
remember and those who were victims—the former is saved from repeating the 
mistakes of the past; the latter is saved from the depths of obscurity. In its moral 
and psychic functions, then, the maxim “never forget” emerges from the moral 
obligation to remember and includes a promise to seek redemptive outcomes 
through the commitment to the act of remembering itself. 
This dissertation is about another kind of memory, a distinctively 
passionate commitment to and kind of remembering that, using the 
nomenclature of Marianne Hirsch, I call “postmemory.” Or, to state matters more 
accurately, the “theory” contribution of this project to memory studies centers on 
the relationship between memory and postmemory, particularly the site wherein 
and the operations whereby a process of mediation occurs, one whose functional 
feature and effects can be theorized. The contribution of this project to literary 
studies is the first sustained analysis of the under-discussed and yet highly 
decorated contemporary Armenian-American novelist Micheline Aharonian 
Marcom. Marcom’s family history, evolution as a novelist, and first trilogy not 
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only aspire to (what I will term) the effects of “postmemorial narrative”; her 
fiction is generated by the urgency of this special kind of passionate 
remembering. Moreover, her fiction explores the cognitive and affective 
negotiations that occur at the site of mediation, the place where the archives that 
inform the redemptive aspects of memory have, for those who passionately 
remember, become markers of an existential and affective deprivation. 
Postmemorial narratives, in the broadest sense, keep ancestral trauma 
productively alive, and they do so by vivifying some sustaining existential, 
affective, or critical truth that cannot be compartmentalized for psychological 
equanimity. This truth—which entails self-recognizing insights and an abiding 
possession of a trauma’s emotional content—serves to give affirmative meaning 
to the present rather than to lay a distant past appropriately to its honored rest.  
I develop my characterization of postmemory from two adjacent inquiries 
that I discuss briefly here but that I will expand upon in the next section of my 
introduction. In the first line of inquiry, I focus on the existence of the 
phenomenon itself as it is described and implied by thinkers of various 
disciplinary backgrounds. Focusing particularly on the works of Marianne 
Hirsch, Walter Benjamin, and Saidiya Hartman, I trace the way in which dual 
concerns with intuition and insight animate their attempts to “theorize” personal 
commitments to passionate remembering so as to conceive its character as a 
notably intense investment in the past, one within the province of a fundamental 
human experience occurring under the aspect—if no longer the experience—of 
ancestral trauma. These thinkers, as well as the larger community of memory 
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scholars, invariably—and perhaps inevitably—suggest that an explanation of 
passionate remembering is to be found in the idea of the “imagination.” This line 
of reflection is correct. However, I argue, its theoretic value—its capacity to move 
the conversation from personal hauntings to a general human understanding of 
different kinds of remembering—is unrealized because the concept of the 
“imagination” itself, relative to the issue at hand, is misconstrued. In short, the 
mediation between memory and postmemory—the generative and structuring 
preconditions of postmemorial narrative and its distinctive effects—requires a 
functional understanding of the imagination in the process of mediation. And 
while imagination’s functioning of course includes features of invention, 
figuration, and emplotment, its mediating role in rendering ancestral trauma 
productively constituent of the present has not yet been explained in the 
scholarly conversation. Its role has, however, been richly understood, explored, 
and narratively realized in Marcom’s Armenian Genocide trilogy.  
The adjacent line of inquiry includes my description of the conditions—
temporal and psychological—that inform the urgency of passionate 
remembering and my definition of the phenomenon of postmemory from three 
vantage points, all of which are engaged in Marcom’s fiction and, I would argue, 
need to be employed in a literary criticism appropriate to her novels. Marcom’s 
novels make clear a predicament that is an old story for some Jews, African 
Americans, and certainly Armenians, amongst others. As the time between a 
traumatic event and its remembrance increases, the character and effects of 
memory simply become inadequate, and apparently—in some way and for some 
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afflicted people beyond the survivor generation(s)—this inadequacy is perceived 
as requiring more than an elegiac sensibility. For those who must passionately 
remember, ancestral trauma must be brought to life so that it can exist 
significantly in the experience of living. In this vein, postmemory can be 
variously described in terms of a psychic condition, or explained in terms of its 
existential/affective/critical outcomes, or conceived methodically as a cognitive 
operation. Let’s take each of these features in turn. As a psychic condition, 
postmemory manifests itself as a deeply felt dissatisfaction. Instead of being 
contented because they have assimilated the lessons of the past and enshrined 
the dead in memory, those committed to passionate remembering feel 
dissatisfied with and detached from the archives and the profound emotional 
content they formerly communicated or otherwise monumentalized. For those 
significantly invested in remembering, we might say, this dissatisfaction occurs 
as the desire for a way of knowing and the possession of an affirming knowledge 
that, together, will prove distinctive for a self-recognizing sense of the past’s 
immediacy and plentitude. Think of this desire and its object, in our more usual 
parlance, as the commitment to a “living past,” one in which ancestral trauma is 
kept alive—not psychologically compartmentalized—so vividly that it functions 
as a crucial constituent for a meaningfully experienced present, and least for 
those who cannot do other than passionately remember. In this view, the 
outcome of the postmemorial experience—in my study, embodied in 
postmemorial narrative—is understood to contain self-informing existential, 
affective, and critical “truths” that make head and heart recognizable as such, 
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that make life in the present worth living. Perhaps unsurprisingly, the truths 
disclosed in the postmemorial environment are the products of the imagination. 
However, the function of the imagination in this instance is at once generative, 
transformative, and critical. And these three functions—(1) to generate a story-to-
be-told from a desire-to-be-fulfilled; (2) to structure a transformative narrative of 
a living past, one whose preserved emotional content significantly defines life in 
the present; (3) to hold the world forever to account by housing the facticity of 
the historical record within the affective tenor of life in the present—come from 
the operations by which the imagination enables a relationship between memory 
and postmemory.  
The orientation of my study within memory studies and toward Marcom’s 
work is highly imbricated with the personal, with my family’s history and my 
identity as an Armenian American. As a result, it is not quite accurate to say that 
I am applying the insights of memory studies to reading Marcom, let alone 
pragmatically deploying the term “postmemory” as a critical tool. It is perhaps 
more accurate to say that Marcom’s novels spoke to aspects of my subjectivity 
that already included both personal experience and intellectual preoccupation. In 
a kind of feedback loop, Marcom’s novels taught me how to recognize in 
memory studies a disciplinary ambition for methodical explanation that I am 
taking to be commensurate with the project that Marcom herself engages at the 
level of postmemorial narrative. For this reason, I am tempted to call my own 
critical enterprise here an expression and outcome of the phenomenon of 
postmemory.  
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Whatever the value of such critical self-consciousness, I trace Marcom’s 
sustained representation of and reflection upon the postmemorial narrative 
experience though her trilogy. This experience occurs for the author herself 
through the act of composition and in the experience of reading itself, which is 
formally and thematically summoned, either to complete postmemorial 
narratives unto their value-laden effects, or to witness the failure of such 
narratives when they are made manifest in inhospitable conditions. In every 
case, I take the exploratory dimension of the writer’s project to emerge from a 
proposition about the way imagination might be conceived to operate relative to 
its mediating function, its conversion of memory’s diminishing returns into 
postmemory’s living enrichments. Each of my readings of Marcom’s three novels 
in her Armenian Genocide trilogy clarifies the operation of the imagination in its 
mediating role between memory and postmemory. In my chapters, I identify the 
inherited memory—what I call “source material”—and how a person who 
desires passionate remembering transforms the memory so that it comes alive 
through varied imaginative methods. Ultimately, my dissertation, I hope, will 
make the case that it is within the evocative realm of literature and through the 
explanatory ambitions of literary analysis that the effort to “theorize” the 
relationship between a faculty of the mind and an urgency of the heart can be 
methodically pursued.  
In the following four sections of my introduction, I will summarize and 
synthesize theoretical and artistic conceptions of the phenomenon of 
postmemory; describe the unique position of the Armenian Genocide as an event 
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of memory; highlight the biographical details of Marcom’s life that exemplify the 
phenomenon and make her work particularly suited for an exploration of 
postmemory; and outline the chapters in which I analyze Marcom’s novels and 
their enactments and explorations of postmemory. 
Theoretical and Artistic Conceptions of Postmemory 
This is a dissertation about postmemory. To understand the phenomenon 
of postmemory, it’s best to acknowledge that it is an experiential outcome 
occurring at the intersection of a human capacity (for remembering) and a 
human need (to remember passionately for the living present). As such, this 
human capacity and need can be appropriately termed a way of knowing, one 
amenable to explanations that describe its psychic condition, outcomes, and 
operations. In this section, I summarize the way that scholars and artists have 
conceptualized postmemory’s main aspects in Holocaust studies (Marianne 
Hirsch, Henri Raczymow, Eva Hoffman, Cynthia Ozick), transatlantic slavery 
studies (Saidiya Hartman, M. Jacqui Alexander, Ron Eyerman), and philosophy 
of history and its traumas (Walter Benjamin). I see in these intellectuals a robust 
engagement with matters of conscience, historical reflection, and haunted 
personal remembrance that reveal the theorizable contours of postmemory and 
suggest a path to representing its methodical character. In these thinkers, then, 
we see a common intuition about the psychic conditions, 
existential/affective/critical outcomes, and cognitive operations that collectively 
occur in and therefore define the phenomenon of postmemory. Essentially, I offer 
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a map of the phenomenon of memory with its three major aspects—condition, 
outcomes, and operations—with the intent of locating its center. 
These intellectuals intuitively recognize the psychic condition of 
postmemory as one marked by a specific dissatisfaction. Novelist Cynthia Ozick 
tellingly reveals her dissatisfaction with the archive of the Holocaust in her 
responses to criticism that she took excessive liberty with the historical record 
when she wrote The Shawl, her novella about a genocide survivor based on an 
event she read in a history book.1 As Ozick sees it, “I want the documents [of the 
Holocaust] to be enough; I don’t want to tamper or invent or imagine. And yet I 
have done it. I can’t not do it. It comes, it invades” (“The Art of Fiction No. 95,” 
emphasis mine). Compelled to do something with the documents of the 
Holocaust that she intuitively felt were insufficient, Ozick took factual liberties in 
her novella in order to become more intimate with a subject matter that she 
believed she’d already internalized and assimilated. A similar dissatisfaction 
drove scholar Saidiya Hartman to write her book Lose Your Mother: A Journey 
Along the Atlantic Slave Route. In Lose Your Mother, Hartman explains that her 
project (which I’m here characterizing as postmemory) began after reading in the 
archive of transatlantic slavery, “the terrible utterances that condemned [the 
enslaved] to death, the account books that identified them as units of value, the 
invoices that claimed them as property, and the banal chronicles that stripped 
                                                
1 Ozick explains that “The Shawl began with a line, one sentence in The Rise and 
Fall of the Third Reich by William Shirer. This one sentence told of a real event, 
about a baby being thrown against an electrified fence. And that stayed with me 
and stayed with me, and that was the very explicit origin of The Shawl" 
(“Reader’s Guide to The Shawl”). 
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them of human features” (“Venus in Two Acts” 3). While one value of the 
archive was its overall message—it describes property, not human beings—its 
cumulative effect upon Hartman was despair, as if the document re-enslaved her 
ancestors and thereby disconnected her from them: it’s the old historicist 
problem, but now on a personal level. She tried diving into her own family 
history, but since “silences in my family were not unusual: slavery made the past 
a mystery, unknown and unspeakable,” she was still left unsatisfied (Lose Your 
Mother 14). Without much help from either the archive or her family, Hartman 
decided to journey to Ghana, a country that had been the crossroads for so many 
slave routes, “determined to fill in the blank spaces of the historical record and to 
represent the lives of those deemed unworthy of remembering” (Lose Your 
Mother 16). As Hartman’s experience makes clear, the archive can enable 
historical understanding or enforce existential disconnection from a subject 
matter, a professionally invested inquiry, or, as emphasized here, a deeply 
personal desire for human connection. 
Even theoretical descriptions of the phenomenon of postmemory have 
recourse to the psychic condition of dissatisfaction. Marianne Hirsch 
understands the phenomenon as a response to a psychic condition that occurs 
when the “archive, in the case of traumatic interruption, exile, and diaspora, has 
lost its direct link to the past, has forfeited the embodied connections that forge 
community and society” (The Generation 33). There is a difference, I submit, in 
being frustrated by one’s inability “to know” fully an important past, on the one 
hand, and feeling the need for a connection with the past, on the other. Literary 
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scholar Victoria Aarons notes this particular kind of dissatisfaction by arguing 
that “The post-survivor generation might be said to be plagued less by an 
absence of information (who did what to whom, when, and where) and more by 
an absence of immediacy, of felt sensation, the sights, sounds, and textures of 
experience” (142). The frustration and desperation that attend this dissatisfaction 
arguably informs the work of Walter Benjamin, and indeed is reflected in his 
pairing of two opposing figures: the Traditional Historicist and the Historical 
Materialist. In Benjamin’s “Theses on the Philosophy of History,” the Traditional 
Historicist views history as “telling the sequence of events like the beads of a 
rosary,” where events from the past are seen from the point of view of the 
“victor” and the story that is told shows that “all rulers are the heirs of those who 
conquered before them” (Benjamin 263, 256). Each victor is a bead on the rosary 
of the Traditional Historicist who forges “a causal connection between various 
moments in history” (Benjamin 263). The Traditional Historicist thus makes 
connections between events of history for the principal purpose of bolstering the 
current regime. As sociologist Michael Löwy explains it in his monograph about 
Benjamin’s famous essay, “the conformist pseudo-objective approach of 
[Traditional Historicist 19th century] writers like [Leopold von] Ranke and 
[Heinrich von] Sybel neutralizes and sterilizes the images of the past” (94). In the 
Traditional Historian’s hands, the past becomes a dead thing to be manipulated 
for the purposes of the powerful. In contrast, Benjamin introduces a figure who 
expresses extreme dissatisfaction with the deadening methods of the Traditional 
Historicist. Benjamin’s Historical Materialist expresses his dissatisfaction with 
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the homogenizing and totalizing narratives of traditional history by forging “a 
unique experience with the past” (Benjamin 262). The Historical Materialist relies 
not on the rosary beads of the Traditional Historicist but on the ephemeral 
“constellation which his own era has formed with the definite earlier one” 
(Benjamin 263). Not content with stringing victors like beads in a grand rosary-
narrative, the Historical Materialist uses a different method because their 
“objective is to discover the critical constellation formed by a particular fragment 
of the past with a particular moment of the present” (Löwy 40). The desire for an 
embodied relation of past and present; for a mutuality of historical 
understanding and orientation in the present; for recognition of those who lived 
and died as implicated in self-recognition—when these frustrated desires 
comprise the psychic landscape, one is in the land of passionate remembering. 
While these examples arguably suggest the manifestation of postmemory 
as a psychic condition, others describe this phenomenon in terms of existential 
outcomes. Ron Eyerman researched current generations of African Americans 
living in the shadow of slavery and coined the phrase “cultural trauma” to 
describe memories that transfer loss through generations in a cultural group. As 
Eyerman explains,  
Cultural trauma articulates a membership group as it identifies an 
event or an experience, a primal scene, that solidifies 
individual/collective identity. This event, now identified with the 
formation of the group, must be recollected by later generations 
who have had no experience of the “original” event, yet continue to 
be identified by it and to identify themselves through it. Because of 
its distance from the event and because its social circumstances 
have altered with time, each succeeding generation reinterprets and 
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represents the collective memory around that event according to its 
needs and means. (Eyerman 15) 
Eyerman’s generational scale suggests that the legacy of transatlantic slavery is 
reconstructed over time to significant existential effect. In other words, 
contemporary African Americans experience their lives and find life meanings 
within a trauma-inflected context. If postmemory as a psychic condition calls 
forth passionate remembering, postmemory in its existential character requires 
keeping trauma alive. 
Making life meaningful by keeping trauma alive is underscored by others 
in terms of affective outcomes. When writer Eva Hoffman argues that she feels a 
“living connection” with the past of her Holocaust survivor parents, she is 
actually articulating a relationship with the past that differs from her recollection 
and acknowledgment of the suffering of her parents, who hid in an attic before 
escaping to Canada (xv). Her “living connection” expresses an affective 
connection, a felt intimacy, that she knows by way of emotions more than as 
historical knowledge. The affective outcome of postmemory is also suggested by 
M. Jacqui Alexander when she describes her quest, in Pedagogies of Crossing, to 
know the life of a long-dead slave woman named Kitsimba who was later 
renamed by her owners as “Thisbe.” She tellingly notes that her usual method of 
“[r]eading against the grain to fill in the spaces of an absent biography was 
simply not sufficient” (Alexander 294). Ultimately, Alexander successfully finds 
Kitsimba by spiritually communing with her. Through the imagined narration of 
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Kitsimba, Alexander herself makes the transition from engaging with an object of 
knowledge to experiencing the tactile touching of two equal selves. She: 
had learned quite early, and in a way that did not serve her, that feelings 
had to be buried since they did not belong in the world of the living, except 
on auspicious occasions as when somebody died. So the ordinary feelings 
of daily life always eluded her; they came as a surprise to her. She found 
them excessive, almost always unexpected, out of the ordinary, for what 
was ordinary for her was to live devoid of feelings, having learned well to 
quietly predict the order of events, never their effects. I wanted her to feel 
the textured tapestry of my life in the soft markings of her flesh and 
through this feeling come to know it intimately, feel it as if she were the 
one who had lived it. She could no longer rely on what was written in 
books to convey or even arrive at Truth. What was written in those books 
was not even a faint shadow of me; it had nothing to do with me. They 
knew nothing about who I was. (315, emphasis in original) 
At the start of Alexander’s research, she excluded her feelings and the feelings of 
her subjects. By the end, after the insufficient value of her archival research had 
been revealed, Kitsimba was able to move from a ghost to a presence in a way 
that enabled Alexander to feel what Kitsimba had felt as a slave, “as if 
[Alexander] were the one who had lived it” (315, emphasis omitted). In the end, 
Alexander herself is readied to receive the emotional truth of Kitsimba’s story. 
This kind of affective knowledge is what I believe Hirsch is referring to when she 
speaks of the need to “reactivate and re-embody more distant political and cultural 
memorial structures by reinvesting them with resonant individual and familial 
forms of mediation and aesthetic expression” (The Generation 33, emphasis in 
original). 
My pantheon of postmemory thinkers includes some who focus upon its 
critical outcome. In the case of postmemory, the outcome is not a revisionist 
history that describes the agency of the powerless or the constituting erasure of 
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the victim in the interests of a master narrative. I’m speaking here about housing 
the facticity of the historical record within the affective tenor of present life. For 
example, Hartman discovers that “If this story of Venus has any value at all it is in 
illuminating the way in which our age is tethered to hers. A relation which 
others might describe as a kind of melancholia, but which I prefer to describe in 
terms of the afterlife of property, by which I mean the detritus of lives with 
which we have yet to attend, a past that has yet to be done, and the ongoing state 
of emergency in which black life remains in peril” (“Venus in Two Acts” 13, 
emphasis in original). Hartman tells a different story of Venus, a slave girl who 
appears in the archive as property and dead girl, and ends with the insight that 
postmemory is neither memory nor history. It inhabits, inflects, and interferes in 
the present. The past “has yet to be done” because it is embodied in all the 
variables and agents at play in the murders of Michael Brown, Eric Garner, and 
others (“Venus in Two Acts” 13). When Hartman calls this a “state of 
emergency,” she is asking for the attentiveness, the recognition of obligations 
demanded by the cumulative effects and emotional affects of history. From these 
acknowledgments we can understand how to attend to the “lives with which we 
have yet to attend” (“Venus in Two Acts” 13). This postmemorial “knowledge,” 
in Hartman’s view, enables us “to interrogate rigorously the kinds of political 
claims that can be mobilized on behalf of the slave (the stateless, the socially 
dead, and the disposable) in the political present. In posing the question of 
slavery in terms of the incomplete nature of abolition, we are concerned neither 
with ‘what happened then’ nor with ‘what is owed because of what happened 
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then,’ but rather with the contemporary predicament of freedom, with the 
melancholy recognition of foreseeable futures still tethered to this past” (Best & 
Hartman, “Fugitive Justice” 5). In this sense, Hartman echoes insights made by 
Benjamin’s Historical Materialist. This figure “recognizes the sign of a Messianic 
cessation of happening, or, put differently, a revolutionary chance in the fight for 
the oppressed past. He takes cognizance of it in order to blast a specific era out of 
the homogenous course of history—blasting a specific life out of the era or a 
specific work out of the lifework” (Benjamin 263). The Historical Materialist 
selectively chooses the temporary connections she makes between the past and 
the present. In fact, as Benjamin scholar Löwy reminds us, the crucial task of the 
Historical Materialist is not depicting the past “the way it really was” for the 
victorious (a phrase that Benjamin borrows from a Traditional Historicist 
offender, the German historian Leopold von Ranke); their task “is not mere 
restitution of the past, but also active transformation of the present” (Benjamin 
255, Löwy 34). This is the crucial maneuver of the Historical Materialist—
recognizing the past as alive in the present. Accessing the ideals of revolutionary 
France or the squashed hope of slaves in early America is not about historical 
accuracy, but about how new understandings of the past mandate new demands 
in the present. As David L. Eng and David Kazanjian remind us in their edited 
collection, Loss: The Politics of Mourning, the critical outcome of work like 
Hartman’s and Benjamin’s Historical Materialist is that “the past remains 
steadfastly alive for the political work of the present” (Eng & Kazanjian 5). 
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Therefore, it is this critical outcome that joins the existential and affective 
outcomes of postmemory, and, specifically in this study, postmemorial narrative. 
If postmemory yields crucial existential/affective/critical outcomes, it 
does so largely because of its particular cognitive operations, operations that 
scholars and creators of postmemory locate in particular aspects of the 
imagination. Many intellectuals have honed in on the imagination’s generative 
capacity. Jewish-French novelist Henri Raczymow is an example. He admits that 
he inherited a memory “shot through with holes,” a “memory devoid of 
memory, without content, beyond exile, beyond the forgotten” of his parents 
who escaped the Holocaust in Poland (Raczymow 102, 100). For Raczymow, his 
memory is full of gaps, not because he cannot remember the past, but because he 
never experienced that which he is remembering. He never knew the shtetl his 
parents came from, but he heard about it from his parents and he made the 
memory his own though he never experienced life in Poland while he was 
growing up in France. And yet, Raczymow intuitively knows that the “nostalgia 
of the generations of Jews born in France is not the same as the nostalgia of the 
generation born in Poland” (Raczymow 101). The generation from Poland relied 
on their lived experience to fondly remember the shtetl, whereas their French 
descendants “try to restore a non-memory, which by definition cannot be filled 
in or recovered” (Raczymow 104). Raczymow further articulates his own 
position as a writer whose works are set in the Poland, although he never lived 
there: “What is dead seems to me to be able to be restored only through the 
imagination, and not through history and bibliographical research, albeit they 
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have their own interest” (Raczymow 102; Raczymow, as quoted in Sicher 195). 
Knowing well that he desires something that he never experienced and that he 
can never actually experience, Raczymow instead focuses on the generative 
potential of his imagination to embody a meaningful reality, one whose 
communicated “truth” might even be counterfactual by regnant historical 
discourses. In the parlance of my study, Raczymow identifies one cognitive 
operation of the imagination as its capacity to generate a story-to-be-told from a 
desire-to-be-fulfilled.  
Another operation of the imagination is to transform the past in ways that 
make its meanings constitutive for life in the present. Eva Hoffman has this 
operation in mind when she identifies herself as one member of the “hinge 
generation” between the past and the present. By her description:  
The story of the second generation is, above all, a strong example of 
an internalized past, of the way in which atrocity literally 
reverberates through the minds and lives of subsequent 
generations. That is the way the story is usually told: as personal, 
affective, intricately psychological. But the Holocaust past, aside 
from being a profound personal legacy, is also a task. It demands 
something from us, an understanding that is larger than just 
ourselves, that moves beyond the private vicissitudes of the inner 
life. The second generation after every calamity is the hinge 
generation, in which the meanings of awful events can remain fixed 
at the point of trauma; or in which they can be transformed into 
new sets of relations with the world and new understanding. How 
we interpret the implications of our primary narrative, how we 
translate psychic information into information about the world, 
matters for more than ourselves. (Hoffman 103) 
Transferred memories of experiences are deeply felt by those who receive them, 
but for some this transference requires a real world response, the assumption of a 
purpose and the inhabiting of a point of view that stands, for the postmemorial 
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subject, as an inheritance and a birthright. The postmemorial imagination thus 
“transforms” by making a story of “loss” and pain into a story with personal and 
social content, a “gain” that keeps the pain usefully intact.2 In Hoffman, then, we 
see a compelling call for the transformative narrative of a living past whose 
preserved emotional content significantly defines life in the present.  
Along with the generative and transformative aspects of imagination, 
scholars and creators of postmemory have marked a third cognitive operation: 
the critical operation of the imagination. As Hirsch explains, those who 
experience the psychic condition of postmemory are motivated “more and more 
by affect, need, and desire as time and distance attenuate the links to authenticity 
and ‘truth’” (The Generation 48). In this sense, the critical operation discussed here 
is the same as the critical outcome of postmemory previously discussed. This 
overlap in my theorizing project might well be taken to imply that postmemory 
is the imagination under the aspect and duress of historical trauma; that 
postmemorial narrative is the enactment of the urgencies within such an 
encumbered imagination in stories. Such may be the case. Nevertheless, the 
process of theorizing a phenomenon that is all at once intimately personal, 
behavioral, and cognitive requires that I separate the elements within this 
bewilderingly imbricated phenomenon. This requirement simply comes with the 
disciplinary territory, and one can see its power in the subject matters and 
writing styles of thinkers of postmemory trying to render profound experience as 
                                                
2 Jazz, for instance, is one way that the African American community kept their 
pain usefully intact. 
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self-affirming and socially-responsible knowledge. In fact, the focus of this 
study—Marcom’s postmemorial trilogy—will demonstrate that the author is 
exploring the possibilities of various imaginative operations, as well as enacting 
them. Therefore, she herself is pragmatically conceiving the imagination as a 
separate entity, a means to an end. In any event, postmemory is not 
circumscribed by the limits of factual or documentary truth. In fact, postmemory 
responds to the “attenuation” of links to truth by housing the facticity of the 
historical record within the emotions of life in the present. So, this is not the past 
as it was; it is the past as we feel it now. Benjamin’s Historical Materialist similarly 
locates the past’s “truths” in their own present, an action which, as Jeanne-Marie 
Gagnebin argues, “transforms the past because the past takes on a new form, 
which could have disappeared into oblivion” (Gagnebin, as quoted in Löwy 41). 
In this sense, the past exists only in the transformed form the Historical 
Materialist gives it; the past’s “truths” are located in the Historical Materialist’s 
own affective inflections. Along with Hirsch and Benjamin, Hartman’s 
articulation of her process of “critical fabulation” further illuminates the way that 
the imagination operates critically in postmemory. Since my study ultimately 
focuses upon postmemorial narrative, Hartman’s description of the writing 
process she used in Lose Your Mother is particularly apt:  
By flattening the levels of narrative discourse and confusing 
narrator and speakers, I hoped to illuminate the contested character 
of history, narrative, event, and fact, to topple the hierarchy of 
discourse, and to engulf authorized speech in the clash of voices. 
The outcome of this method is a “recombinant narrative,” which 
“loops the strands” of incommensurate accounts and which weaves 
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present, past, and future in retelling the girl’s story and in narrating 
the time of slavery as our present. (“Venus in Two Acts” 12)  
Borrowing from visual artist Stan Douglass’s concept of “recombinant 
narrative,” Hartman allows the cacophony of voices, both imagined and 
unsatisfactorily documented, to clash with one another such that the facticity of 
the “official” version as documented in historical texts becomes more 
questionable than that of the imagined version. The “truth” in Hartman’s work is 
that which locates “the time of slavery” in our present. Along with Hirsch and 
Benjamin, Hartman subscribes to the powerful critical operation of the 
imagination in postmemory which places facticity not in the storehouses of 
history, but in the affective and emotional tenor of life in the present.  
The phenomenon of postmemory is wonderfully and exasperatingly 
amenable to mixed metaphors. It is a place we inhabit, where we stand, when 
our human capacity for remembering seems unequal to the need for passionately 
remembering an ancestral trauma. It is a potential-laden psychic condition of 
absent belonging, one that encourages us to envision our desires in existential, 
affective, and critical ways that both enable and require us to keep the trauma 
alive. It is the curse of an inheritance that we nonetheless cherish, in part because 
it ennobles, as well as calls forth, the perhaps uniquely adaptable power of the 
imagination to transition fading or routinely horrific experiences of memory to a 
differently invested kind of remembering, the formal, thematic, and affective 
features of which occur in the postmemorial narratives of Micheline Aharonian 
Marcom. 
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The Armenian Genocide as Event of Postmemory 
In the previous section my ambitions were definitional and descriptive, 
particularly as they occur in the context of scholarly conversation. My interest 
now turns to the historical. My purpose is to represent how the phenomenon of 
postmemory organically emerges from the 1915 Armenian Genocide in Anatolia. 
Not only is the Armenian Genocide a living trauma in the consciousness of 
diasporic Armenians today; its character as an historical event included, from the 
start, fragmentary documentation, willful disruption of the paths of oral 
transmission, and a conspiracy of silence, which even today is the basis for the 
denial of its occurrence. No concentration camps were liberated; no perpetrators 
were identified; no baseline facticity was established. 
As with the trauma of the Middle Passage, the Armenian Genocide was 
generationally transmitted through fragments. The degree and implications of 
the extreme “fragmentary” are significant here.3 Following Hirsch, we know that 
survivors of traumatic events have various responses to their experiences which 
affect whether the experience is recounted, and if so, how it’s told. For this 
reason, a now-unacceptably belated experience, postmemory if you will, is 
“shaped, however indirectly, by traumatic fragments of events that still defy 
narrative reconstruction and exceed comprehension” (The Generation of 
                                                
3 Prominent memory scholars Katherine Hodgkin and Susannah Radstone 
remind us of memory’s fragmentary nature in their work: “the characteristic 
features of ‘traumatic memory’—its elisions, interruptions and reinventions—
need bear no specific relation to an event, but rather can be seen to characterise 
the workings of memory in general” (97). Like the Holocaust, survivors of the 
Armenian Genocide told partial stories of their experiences because of the 
fragmentary nature of memory itself. 
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Postmemory 5). Implied here is the idea that something significant occurs in the 
relation of the survivor generation to successive generations. And this relation is 
as relevant to contemporary lives as the relation of the survivor to the atrocity 
itself is. To be sure, the relation of the victim to subsequent generations is 
characterized by often extreme reticence. Marilyn Charles and Michael 
O’Loughlin explain that “trauma fragments memory, [such that] telling the story 
is impeded by what is unknowable and what is unspeakable” (3). What is 
“unknowable” here could mean any kind of unknown: about the dead, about the 
perpetrators, about specific forgotten or repressed details of the experience. 
Adding to the “unknowable,” is the “unspeakable”: stories deemed too shameful 
or horrific to recount. In the case of the survivors of the Armenian Genocide, this 
expressive debilitation was more than individual; it was and is cultural. 
“Silences” do not just hinder the process of generational transmission; “silence” 
is the content of that transmission. Yes, Donald E. Miller and Lorna Touryan 
Miller are correct in noting that oral histories display survivor repression of their 
traumatic experiences “when they dream about the massacre but try to suppress 
thinking about it during waking hours, when they refuse to tell their children 
and grandchildren their stories, when they remain silent while other survivors 
speak of their experiences, and when they avoid situations which require them to 
deal openly with the events of the massacre” (“Armenian Survivors” 61). Yes, 
Adam Jones correctly explains how survivors repressed the “unspeakable” by 
trying to forget in a manner that dulls the process of remembering, “convinced 
that no one will listen respectfully to their stories. Such was the case with many 
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survivors of the Armenian and Jewish holocausts, who spent decades after the 
events seeking to consign them to the historical past and build new lives” (Jones 
350).4 But these scholars are principally concerned with the challenge of 
rebuilding lives and forging a new identity, especially in the persistence of 
feelings of shame. As Miller & Miller explain, “One reason events are repressed 
is surely that they are too horrible to contemplate. But we also suspect that in 
some cases survivors’ life histories are tinged with guilt and shame: memories of 
rape, forced nudity, humiliation of parents, the abandonment of siblings, coerced 
conversion to Islam, and so on” (“An Oral History Perspective on Responses to 
the Armenian Genocide” 192). However, if we shift focus to the issue of 
generational transmission, we ought to acknowledge that the massive silences of 
individual survivors also occurred as a cultural silence that reproduced the 
fragmentary historical record as an “experience” of the fragmentary for curious 
successor generations. In other words, in the Armenian diaspora case, 
subsequent generations were not only left with an incomplete historical record; 
they “knew” the archive itself as evidence of a fragmented survivor 
consciousness, and this is why the gaps register so powerfully on personal and 
cultural levels for those predisposed to passionate remembering. As one of the 
first survivors to document his experiences, Vahram Dadrian has lamented this 
fact by asking his fellow survivors:  
                                                
4 For more on how Holocaust survivors told or withheld stories of their 
experiences, see Hillel Klein & Ilany Kogan’s “Identification Processes and 
Denial in the Shadow of Nazism” and Arlene Cahn’s The Capacity to Acknowledge 
Experience in Holocaust Survivors and Their Children. 
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We, the survivors, what have we been able to contribute to that 
blood-tainted story? The slaughter of our brothers who were 
victims of the Genocide, in all its hellish details; the epic tragedy of 
thousands of our compatriots, in all its heart-rending episodes; the 
struggle of our heroes as they drew their last breaths, in all its 
horror; none of these…have ever been presented to us in their strict 
entirety. A few articles in the press, memoirs, impressions…a few 
books and booklets, and that is it! Everything has been forgotten. 
(2)  
In Dadrian’s criticisms of survivors during the decades following the genocide, 
afflicted survivors transmitted silence to subsequent generations.5 In the 1960s, to 
commemorate the 50th year anniversary of the start of the genocide, this afflicted 
cultural consciousness became visible to successor generations as survivors not 
only offered to their children and grandchildren fragmented accounts of their 
traumatic pasts; they revealed their fragmented cultural selves.6 And this 
                                                
5 Even silences are inheritances. As Hirsch argues about the Holocaust, 
“nonverbal and non-cognitive acts of transfer occur most clearly within a familial 
space, often in the form of symptoms” (Hirsch, “The Generation” 112). 
6 Of course, there are the notable exceptions of prominent writers like Zabel 
Yesayan, who wrote about the earlier massacres of Armenians in Among the 
Ruins. Grigoris Balakian’s Armenian Golgotha is another example of survivor 
testimony from pre-1965. Both of these texts were written in Armenian and later 
translated. Rouben Paul Adalian has described the situation as such: “Eyewitness 
and survivor accounts of the Armenian genocide were audiotaped and 
videotaped more than a half century after the events. That means the recorded 
testimony was provided by persons in their 70s and 80s who were reflecting 
upon a life that took a sudden turn when they were still children or very young 
adults. Hence, the problem of the great length of time that passed since the 
events of 1915 and the fact that those events were seen through the eyes of 
children who were looking at the world from their very narrow frames of 
reference needs to be kept in mind when dealing with testimony of this type” 
(“The Armenian Genocide” 76). And, as Razmik Panossian argues, “The 
diaspora had been commemorating the Genocide since the late 1910s. But after 
1965 the commemorations were reformulated. Explicitly politicised in the 
diaspora, and implicitly in Armenia, the Genocide became the core of what it 
meant to be Armenian in the political domain (it was already central in the 
cultural, religious and psychological do- mains). Henceforth the personal 
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revelation, for those like Marcom, inaugurated the commitment to passionate 
remembering. 
When it comes to the matter of the fragmentary as a characterization of 
consciousness, Saidiya Hartman’s reflections upon transatlantic slavery are 
instructive.7 In Hartman’s view, their “archive is, in this case, a death sentence, a 
tomb, a display of the violated body, an inventory of property, a medical treatise 
on gonorrhea, a few lines about a whore’s life, an asterisk in the grand narrative 
of history” (“Venus in Two Acts” 2). In this sense, the archival documents of 
transatlantic slavery inscribed the slave into its materials when marking her as 
property or criminal or object of experimentation. In the case of the Armenian 
Genocide, the archive is also more than unsatisfactory, too, but for a different 
reason. At the time of the genocide, the still-nascent technology of photography 
wasn’t easily available to capture atrocities, and, as Tessa Hofmann and Gerayer 
Koutcharian have discovered in their research, any photographs that were taken 
                                                                                                                                            
experiences of a dying generation were passed onto the younger generations in a 
systematic and coordinated manner (annual commemorations, history texts, 
literature, etc.). In addition to the traditional realm of ‘grandmother stories’, the 
Genocide was placed squarely in the realm of collective identity. Private grief 
was transformed into a key symbol of Armenianness on 24 April 1965” (322, 
emphasis in original). See also Harutyun Marutyan’s “Museums and 
Monuments: Comparative Analysis of Armenian and Jewish Experiences in 
Memory Policies.” 
7 The Native American context of the fragmentary as a characterization of 
consciousness would also be useful here. For information about the Native 
American experience of transferred memories of traumatic resettlement and 
massacre, see Shelly A. Wiechelt & Jan Gryczynski’s “Cultural and Historical 
Trauma Among Native Americans.” For more on the experience of the inheritors 
of transatlantic slavery, see Saidiya Hartman’s Lose Your Mother: A Journey Along 
the Atlantic Slave Route and M. Jacqui Alexander’s Pedagogies of Crossing: 
Meditations on Feminism, Sexual Politics, Memory, and the Sacred. 
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to document the genocide were destroyed or not allowed to leave the empire.8 
And, as mentioned earlier, many genocide survivors did not document their 
experiences until decades later. As a result, the absent archive in a sense enabled 
the continuation of the genocide over three years because, in the absence of 
photos, it was just “rumor.” And this same absence of documentation, even now, 
in modern Turkey, functions as negative proof that no such even occurred.9 The 
                                                
8 As Hofmann and Koutcharian summarize, German engineers and officials were 
forced by the Turkish military commissar Nizami to turn in all photographs and 
prints they’d made in 1915 while working on the Baghdad railroad which made 
them privy to the mass deportation of Armenians. Their research led them to a 
starting fact: “Ahmed Jemal Pasha, commander of the Fourth Ottoman Army in 
Syria—the primary deportation area for Armenians—imposed a strict ban on the 
photographing of deportees” (Hofmann & Koutcharian 54). Further, the 
photographs themselves were hard to take in the first place, as “For technical 
reasons too the number of visual documents directly related to the genocide of 
1915 are relatively few: automatic cameras were still not available during World 
War I. At that time photography meant still photography and involved the 
arduous, time consuming adjustment of photographic plates” (Hofmann & 
Koutcharian 54). 
9 For more about the Republic of Turkey’s official policy of denial, see Fatma 
Müge Göçek’s Denial of Violence: Ottoman Past, Turkish Present, and the Collective 
Violence against the Armenians, 1789-2009, Vahakn N. Dadrian’s The Key Elements 
in the Turkish Denial of the Armenian Genocide: A Case Study of Distortion and 
Falsification, Richard G. Hovannisian’s “The Armenian Genocide and Patterns of 
Denials,” and Israel W. Charny & Daphna Fromer’s “Denying the Armenian 
Genocide: Patterns of Thinking as Defense-Mechanisms.” The teaching of the 
Armenian Genocide also reflects its denial. In most countries, the Armenian 
Genocide is omitted from history lessons. In Turkey the events of 1915-1917 in 
Central Anatolia are deliberately taught and denied. As Belinda Cooper & Taner 
Akcam’s research has shown, “Where schools previously provided no 
information on Armenians, in 2002 the Ministry of Education [in Turkey] 
mandated a grade-school curriculum that actively denied the genocide, calling 
Armenian claims ‘baseless’ and emphasizing Armenian separatism and the 
massacre of Turks under the Ottoman Empire. A 2003 directive encouraged 
student participation in essay contests on the ‘Armenian Rebellion during the 
First World War.’ Teachers were required to attend seminars on the ‘Fight 
Against Baseless Claims of Genocide.’ At one seminar, a teacher who questioned 
this formulation was briefly jailed and suspended” (Cooper & Akcam 86). For 
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fragmentary is not just a consequence of the genocidal event; it perpetuated the 
homicides and legitimizes denials of its occurrence. I’m here extending the work 
of Armenian scholars Marc Nichanian and Marie-Aude Baronian, who describe 
the Armenian Genocide’s archive as being compromised from the beginning due 
to the cover-up of its perpetrators. Nichanian has argued that genocide 
perpetrators had only committed genocidal acts because they knew the lacunae 
they created in archival records would ensure they would not be forced to 
account for their crimes.10 As Baronian explains it, “The denial of the Armenian 
Catastrophe starts with the very work of the archive. In other words, the deniers 
of the genocide have always already infected the archive with negation, and 
afterwards use the authority of the same archive to pursue their politics of 
denial; this is what I consider to be vicious and perverted in the discussion and 
treatment of the archive” (Baronian, “Image, Displacement, Prosthesis” 206). 
Essentially, the lacunae of the archive corrupted the evidentiary facticity of 
historical narrative, but in a manner that also generated a communal 
consciousness defined by the fragmentary and oppressed by silence, at least until 
the 1960s. And then the process of remembering began, for children and 
grandchildren as well as the still-living victims. Marcom represents all those who 
experienced this affliction of the fragmentary, the paradoxical complicity of the 
absent archive in the continuation of the tragedy, and the primal urge, at least as 
                                                                                                                                            
more on the pedagogical status of the Armenian Genocide, see Jennifer Dixon’s 
“Education and National Narratives: Changing Representations of the Armenian 
Genocide in History Textbooks in Turkey.” 
10 See Nichanian’s The Historiographic Perversion and David Kazanjian & Marc 
Nichanian’s “Between Genocide and Catastrophe” for details. 
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I see it, to deploy and investigate the imagination as a way of productively 
keeping the trauma alive, not as an affliction of the fragmentary, but in and as 
the postmemorial narrative of passionate remembering. 
I would provisionally contend that, for a century now, Armenians have 
subscribed to the notion that they must use their imaginations to passionately 
remember the Armenian Genocide in order to access and live with its emotional 
truths.11 As David Kazanjian observes: 
[Emotion] is usually in devalued opposition to logical, rational 
truth, and yet this particular Armenian truth, this genocide, as the 
historian [Justin McCarthy] pointed out, cannot be separated from 
its highly charged emotion. It is precisely the history with this 
emotional charge contained in the name genocide which is in some 
way the strategic mistake to hold on to. It violates traditions of 
historical objectivity enough to enable the possibility of a self-
consciously interested historiography. On one level there needs to 
be a shift here away from standards of consistent truth in history 
and towards an interested truth that could free up this quest to 
follow other agents of this history, other “subjects.” (Kassabian & 
Kazanjian 37, emphasis mine) 
Micheline Aharonian Marcom’s Life and Work as Exemplar for 
Entering and Inhabiting the Phenomenon of Postmemory 
I want to tell the story of the writer whose life and work exemplifies the 
phenomenon of postmemory as experienced in the Armenian context, an 
                                                
11 The famous Armenian poet Հովհաննես Շիրազ [Hovhannes Shiraz] wrote a 
poem, “Հայոց Դանթեականը” [meaning “The Armenians and Dante’s Hell” and 
pronounced “Hi-oats Dan-teh-ah-gone-uh”], describing the plight of Armenians 
who must remember: “Սգա, Հայաստան, այս ժայռաշրթունք աշխարհը վկա` / 
Քո հին եղեռնը նոր շրթունքով էլ սգացող չկա, / Դու որ չսգաս` քո 
մարմնացավը ո՞վ է սգալու” (“Mourn, Armenia, the stone-faced world is a 
witness, / There are no new mourners to speak of your old colossal catastrophe, 
/ For who shall mourn and feel your body’s pain if you do not?”) (Shiraz stanza 
7, lines 5-7, translation mine). 
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engagement with the history and historical consciousness that define the 
Armenian Genocide. As my biographical sketch of Armenian American novelist 
Micheline Aharonian Marcom will attest, Marcom intuited those emotional 
understandings characteristic of the phenomenon of postmemory, in part, 
through the process of becoming a celebrated writer. Understanding each of the 
aforementioned aspects of postmemory—its psychic condition, its cognitive 
operation, and its outcomes—Marcom eschewed the genre of the family saga we 
see in texts of the Armenian diaspora. This genre emphasizes identity in the 
context of family belonging. Although an important and perhaps adjacent subject 
matter, identity formation does not necessarily put keeping trauma alive in and 
constitutive for the present, and it does not regard the function of the 
imagination in producing postmemorial effects as the privileged understanding. 
Marcom’s literary career over the past decade and a half is full of 
successes and struggles. She was awarded a Lannan Foundation Literary 
Fellowship and joined the ranks of rising contemporary writers who had won the 
fellowship previously, like Edwidge Danticat, Lorrie Moore, and George 
Saunders. She has been the recipient of the Whiting Writers’ Award previously 
won by Christina Garcia and William T. Vollmann. She has won the PEN/USA 
Award for Fiction, joining her mentor Maxine Hong Kingston on the list of 
writers who have distinguished themselves in literary excellence. She was one of 
six writers in 2012 to win a United States Artist Award, alongside her peers 
Aleksandar Hemon, Cherie Moraga, Helena Maria Viramontes, and Harryette 
Mullen. Her novels have been named among the Best Books of the Year by Los 
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Angeles Times, the San Francisco Chronicle, the Washington Post, and the New York 
Times. But it is true that her writing career had an inauspicious beginning. As 
Marcom recounts: “I never thought I’d become a writer, and I certainly never 
thought I’d be writing about the Armenian Genocide. But I started writing in my 
early 20s, a relationship ended—that’s what heartache does, I suppose, [it] 
pushed me, in any case, to express in language what I was experiencing 
internally” (Marcom, “Of Political Violence and Lost Love”). So, she began “to 
write (badly, [Marcom herself has] stressed,” and was twice rejected by San 
Francisco State University’s MFA program (Polain 293; Kiefer). The truth is that 
Marcom’s eventual ascent to literary heights required her internalization and 
assimilation of the experience of postmemory. 
It took two separate, foundational events to create the dissatisfaction—the 
psychic condition—that would motivate Marcom to look at the genocide her 
grandparents survived from a postmemorial point of view, one that would resist, 
as indicated earlier, the “never again” agenda. In her late twenties, Marcom 
began “teaching a group of disadvantaged teenagers—whom she describe[s] as 
African-American, Latino, Asian—who never stopped talking about their 
identity, which made her seriously consider, it seems for the first time, her own” 
(Polain 293). Working for Berkeley public schools as a “bilingual tutor and 
teacher” (which she remembers as the “most stressful thing I’ve ever done”) and 
running the Upward Bound program at Oakland’s Mills College reminded 
Marcom of her Armenian heritage and forced her to attend to her own specific 
identity as an Armenian American descended from genocide survivors (Kiefer). 
 31 
The intense shame Marcom felt for not having a genuine emotional investment in 
her own ethnic background encouraged her to see her hazy Armenian past not 
only as a shortcoming of respect for family, but also as an absent part of her own 
make up. A second foundational event made her feel even greater shame for not 
knowing enough about her family’s past: Marcom “ran headlong into denialism” 
that the genocide ever happened (Polain 293). In 1995, six years before she 
published a novel set in Central Anatolia during the Armenian Genocide, 
Marcom had a passionate argument with her former husband’s friends from 
Istanbul. During a meal with the Turkish couple, Marcom mentioned the 
Armenian Genocide that her own grandmother had survived in 1915. As soon as 
she brought up the genocide, their night of mirth and merriment was ruined, and 
as Marcom describes it, “a great chasm opened up in the middle of the table” 
(Marcom, as quoted in Krikorian). The Turkish woman, Meltem, began a “tirade” 
and “said all the usual stuff. ‘There was a civil war. It was not genocide. Many 
Turks died too’” (Marcom, as quoted in Krikorian). The argument with Meltem 
was the first time that Marcom was called upon to respond to the demeaning 
designation of “civil war” for the events of 1915-1917 in Central Anatolia that she 
had always known as genocide. In one sense, she felt called upon to set the record 
straight one disbeliever at a time, and Marcom believed she’d ultimately failed in 
changing Meltem’s mind. But, in another sense, she also realized that she was 
being called to defend herself, to express who she felt she was as a person, with a 
history, in a culture. Six years after the argument, Marcom still describes the 
experience in a Los Angeles Times article publicizing her newly-published novel 
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with “a lot of shame”: “All I knew was she was wrong, but I didn’t know much 
more than that. I couldn’t back it up” (Marcom, as quoted in Krikorian). The 
“more than that,” of course, reflects the enormity of the stakes. She could no 
more agree to disagree over the reality of the genocide than to agree to disagree 
about whether she existed at all. At the time of the argument, the Armenian 
Genocide was something Marcom intellectually knew about in a general way. 
She knew the contours of the story from the handful of sentences she’d heard 
about her family’s experiences from her mother, and yet the event was mythic in 
proportion, perhaps beyond imagining: the Turks killed 1.5 million Armenians in 
Central Anatolia. She had no specific details to offer Meltem to convince her that 
the experience of Marcom’s ancestors was real. Dissatisfied with how the 
evening ended, ashamed that she didn’t know more about the genocide her own 
ancestors had survived, Marcom left the table in search of historical knowledge, 
the stuff of documents and monuments. She read survivor memoirs, consular 
reports, and histories of the Armenian Genocide, and after “poring through it all, 
she decided to write a novel” (Krikorian). 
Marcom’s choice to write a novel instead of a history self-evidently 
indicates she sought to work in the realm of imaginative literature, but it doesn’t 
quite explain how she came to realize that her interests would be resolved within 
the orbit of postmemorial concern, including an interest in narrative structure 
that would be informed by the postmemorial operations of the imagination. 
Marcom explains her reasoning for writing a novel instead of a history: “The 
novel (especially, perhaps, the post-modern novel) can embrace any kind and all 
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kinds of narratives: the historical tracts, the newspaper article, letters, myths, etc. 
as does Three Apples Fell From Heaven. It is perhaps a more-inclusive narrative 
than the historical one, more truthful, even, if I can be so bold” (Marcom, in 
Merjian 8). It took Marcom a while to discover the kind of truth—the need to 
keep trauma alive—she was aspiring to when she set out to write her first novel 
while a student in the MFA program in Creative Writing at Mills College in 1997. 
Initially, Marcom wanted to use the novel to tell her grandmother’s story of 
survival, to “write about my grandmother, fill in the handful of sentences I had 
inherited from my mother” (Marcom, “Armenian Genocide Commemoration 
Speech”). Since the last time that Marcom saw her grandmother alive was when 
she was five, Marcom did not have her grandmother’s guiding narrative to help 
her tell the story (Marcom, “Armenian Genocide Commemoration Speech”). In 
her grandmother’s stead, Marcom turned to published works, like the one she’d 
been given by her grandfather about Ambassador Henry Morgenthau’s 
eyewitness account, to learn about the place her grandmother lived in Turkey 
before the Armenian Genocide (Marcom, “In Her Own Words” 51). She describes 
the project’s beginning as a time when she “did a tremendous amount of 
research to write the book, and wrote scenes that were often directly inspired by 
my research” (Marcom, as quoted in Davis-Van Atta 142). But the source 
material she encountered stimulated Marcom’s imagination. As the novel 
emerged, Marcom’s writing experience shifted: “While writing the book, I also, 
inexplicably to me at the time, wrote pieces which were more in the 
mythical/fantastic realm. Basically, I wrote where I felt inspired and/or 
 34 
obsessed” (Marcom, as quoted in Davis-Van Atta 142). Marcom’s description of 
the process of writing Three Apples Fell from Heaven reveals her own surprise at 
how the novel turned out. She admits that, “although I thought, when I first 
began, that I would only write about my grandmother, I realized very quickly 
that novels take on a life of their own. So while I began with the character 
Anaguil, based on my grandmother, soon other characters in the town showed 
up, inspired by what I read, by the memoirs, and historical accounts, and 
photographs, even, as if they too wanted to be written. I learned to let their 
voices be heard” (Marcom, “Armenian Genocide Commemoration Speech”). In 
this sense, while the source materials Marcom encountered in her research 
generated her imaginative constructions, her imagination worked to transform 
the received stories and images toward felt rather than dramatic urgencies. 
Elsewhere, Marcom explains that “Three Apples Fell From Heaven is not the novel I 
set out to write; I could never have predicted its final form. The form emerged as 
the novel evolved, a form determined by the subject matter itself, a stop and start 
movement which in some ways mimics the movement of memory and of 
forgetting” (Marcom, “In Her Own Words” 52). The story that Marcom’s 
polyphonic novel tells wasn’t the story she thought she’d write. She had 
researched the Armenian Genocide and the town of Kharphert (now called 
Harput) in Central Anatolia so that she could fill in the details of her 
grandmother’s story of survival, but other voices, characters, and stories barged 
in uninvited. Bewildered and surprised by her novel, Marcom ultimately arrived 
at a realization: though her “obsessions” and her “mythical/fantastic” vignettes 
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were inspired by and launched by her research, they diverge from their 
inspirations in unexpected ways. Crucially, her process of learning about the 
Armenian Genocide inadvertently required imagining a self-recognizing 
intimacy with the past, one so authentic that, even before the formal and 
thematic dimensions of craft were secured, she knew that her imagined story 
was “truer” than history, that  
fiction is unconstrained by “the facts” and consequently freer to do 
its work, to tell the truth, because truth is not always found in “the 
facts” you see. The best fiction gives us insight into being, seeks 
meaning and pattern and beauty. And there is the way in which 
these grand sweeping “histories” always leave out what actually 
happened to the people. Where would you read about the tattoos 
on your grandmother’s neck that the Bedouin gave her in a history 
book? Or me, where would I find my grandmother saving her 
brothers and sister and hiding with a Turkish family and escaping 
to Beirut? (Marcom, as quoted in Merjian 7) 
These unexpected imaginary diversions turned out to be the afterlife of a desire 
for a passionately remembered truth possessing existential, affective, and critical 
importance. Marcom ultimately concluded that “the making of stories and books 
[is] the way in which I feel most alive. That it is something I have to do” 
(Marcom, “Armenian Genocide Commemoration Speech”). Elsewhere, Marcom 
has admitted that, for her, “The novel is a form that can contain all my 
obsessions, and it can have an absolute truth. It can help you figure out how to 
live” (Marcom, as quoted in Kiefer). Writing a trilogy that enables and enacts 
passionate remembering is what, I believe, Marcom means when she says: “art 
makes things meaningful” (Marcom, as quoted in Kiefer). Truly, Marcom’s 
trilogy acknowledges the insight that one of her characters discovers in her third 
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novel, Draining the Sea: “Because if the dead cannot live, neither do we” 
(Marcom, Draining the Sea 190). In her trilogy, Marcom achieved lifelong 
existential, affective, and critical payoffs that were only available to be accessed 
through the passionate remembering of postmemory.  
Part of understanding Marcom as a literary exemplar of the postmemorial 
narrative is noting her uniqueness among contemporary writers of the Armenian 
diaspora. The problems of the Armenian Genocide as an event of memory I have 
already described—its fragmented transmission, its relative lack of archival 
material, and the denial of its occurrence—have been variously addressed by 
other writers of the Armenian diaspora in their fictional works. As Marie-Aude 
Baronian has argued, “fiction is an appropriate response to a genocide that is still 
considered to be a fictional event or an event that did not leave any traces” 
(Baronian, “Image, Displacement, Prosthesis” 206). Given the frustrations and 
debilitations that occur for people whose genocidal trauma is denied, writers 
from the third generation following the Armenian Genocide understandably 
chose the fictional “family saga” to write their stories. These writers include 
Nancy Kricorian (who wrote Zabelle), Carol Edgarian (Rise the Euphrates), Chris 
Bohjalian (The Sandcastle Girls), Aline Ohanesian (Orhan’s Inheritance), Marcella 
Polain (The Edge of the World), Peter Balakian (Sad Days of Light), and Gregory 
Djanikian (So I Will Till the Ground: Poems). These Armenian writers tell different 
personal stories, but they share the aesthetic choice to depict the interrelations of 
three generations (the survivor, their children, and their grandchildren) in a 
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single “family saga.”12 I call this genre the “family saga” because these authors 
often address the problems of the Armenian Genocide by asserting the truth of 
inherited family stories while simultaneously depicting the struggle of members 
in surviving generations who variously attempt to assimilate the stories into their 
own diasporic existence.13 These are stories of the struggle to preserve Armenian 
identity through memories of the Armenian Genocide that diasporic Armenians 
carry within them as they negotiate their assimilation into a larger, dominant 
culture.14 For this reason, scenes of discovery appear throughout the narratives: 
                                                
12 Zabelle was published in 1998, Rise the Euphrates was published in 1994, The 
Sandcastle Girls was published in 2012, Orhan’s Inheritance was published in 2015, 
Սեմեր was published in 1994, The Edge of the World was published in 2007, Sad 
Days of Light was published in 1983, So I Will Till the Ground: Poems was 
published in 2007. All were originally written in English. And all but The Edge of 
the World were written by Armenian Americans (Polain is a half-Armenian who 
lives in Australia). All but Sad Days of Light and So I Will Till the Ground are 
novels (the aforementioned two are poetry collections). Astute readers of 
contemporary Armenian literature would note a large omission in this list. This 
notable omission is the fantastically innovative and important work of Krikor 
Beledian, an Armenian French intellectual and novelist, whose novel written in 
Western Armenian, Սեմեր [Thresholds, pronounced “Sem-ehr”], also tracks three 
generations of Armenians living in the shadow of the Armenian Genocide. 
Marcom emerged as the English-language equivalent of Beledian for my 
dissertation, but I intend to analyze Beledian’s work in my subsequent scholarly 
and intellectual work. 
13 Though the family saga is the privileged form for many writers of Armenian 
descent working today, their concerns with identity are shared by writers who 
also create different genres of postmemory outside the Armenian community. 
Recent work in postmemory from those writers who inherited memories of the 
Holocaust—writers like Art Spiegelman, Eva Hoffman, Henri Raczymow, and 
Marianne Hirsch—exhibit a similar focus on asserting identity. Because “To 
grow up with overwhelming inherited memories, to be dominated by narratives 
that preceded one’s birth or one’s consciousness, is to risk having one’s own life 
stories displaced, even evacuated, by our ancestors,” these writers had to assert 
their own selves or risk disappearance (Hirsch, The Generation of Postmemory 5). 
14 As Jennifer Manoukian reminds us, “The daily struggle to carry on faced by 
the first generation in exile was replaced by the second and third generations’ 
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the assimilated grandchildren of the survivors find out about their grandparents’ 
pasts through fits and starts, through research or prodding, or through an 
accidental turn of events.15 Theirs is a memorable, touching, and legitimate 
approach to capturing the human dimension of the Armenian Genocide, for the 
purpose of forming an ethnic or diasporic identity by honoring a traumatic past. 
Ethnic or diasporic identity are probably adjacent concerns of my study. 
Nevertheless, Marcom’s trilogy itself focused my interest on imaginative 
transformations of the past that allow for passionate remembering. When I 
looked at the spectrum of third generation diasporic Armenian novels, I could 
not find such a project as Marcom’s. Her choice to diverge from the family saga 
structure with her trilogy was a deliberate one, since she herself has admitted in 
interviews that “she didn’t write the Genocide survival story in a conventional 
three-generational structure, implying that structure is too obvious” (Polain, 
“Micheline Aharonian Marcom” 293). Not only was the structure “too obvious”; 
it might not be the best form if the event was never personally lived through by 
the writer, since “I didn’t have that experience, so it is a leap of the imagination” 
(Kiefer). The novels in her trilogy separate the generations and do not make 
                                                                                                                                            
emotional, abstract struggle over identity and belonging. This is the second stage 
of suffering that diasporan Armenians experience. It is how they feel about what 
they have absorbed and imagined from the stories about the first stage” 
(Manoukian). 
15 The Sandcastle Girls includes a writer who researches her ancestors’ past after 
encountering a photograph of an emaciated woman who shares the same last 
name in an exhibition of materials on the Armenian Genocide. Both Rise the 
Euphrates and Zabelle depict the transfer of stories from grandmother to 
grandchild. Orhan’s Inheritance stages the scene of discovery differently, to 
describe how a Turkish man learns that his deceased grandfather loved an 
Armenian woman whose family house he eventually took as his own. 
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explicit family connections between the characters. Marcom separately imagines 
the experiences of survivors and infant orphans of genocide, and even their 
assimilated grandchildren. But the informing principle of structure is not the 
recognition of a family-centric belonging. Marcom instead focuses on the efforts 
of different characters to passionately remember the Armenian Genocide 
through various imaginative means. Essentially, in her novels, Marcom enacts 
and explores different methods of investing personal meaning into a historical 
trauma never personally experienced. Because of my interest in the relationship 
between memory, postmemory, and the imagination, I found Marcom’s 
groundbreaking trilogy especially compelling amongst the available choices of 
Armenian texts I could examine in my dissertation.  
Marcom’s unique novels and her life story together identify the mediating 
imagination between memory and postmemory as the focal point of her creative 
and personal investments in a novelistic practice, one that I term the 
“postmemorial narrative”: 2001’s Three Apples Fell from Heaven, 2004’s The 
Daydreaming Boy, and 2008’s Draining the Sea. In other words, to write about the 
leap of imagination necessary for postmemorial effects and affects, Marcom had 
to take such a leap herself. 
Chapter Summaries 
In this final section of my introduction, I describe my interpretations of 
Marcom’s trilogy based on the crucial insight I learned from Marcom about the 
mediation of the imagination between memory and postmemory. In each 
 40 
chapter, I identify the inherited memory—what I call “source material”—and the 
way in which a person who desires passionate remembering imaginatively 
transforms the memory such that it comes alive in and for the present. 
In Chapter One, I argue that Marcom’s Three Apples Fell from Heaven 
proposes an imagination that operates by redeploying plot elements and 
characters from deep Armenian history to display a contrastive model for 
passionate remembering. Specifically, I divide Marcom’s imaginative method 
into three parts: (1) establishing an “archive” from various collected source 
materials that unsatisfactorily describe some feature of the past the novel helps 
its eavesdropper passionately remember; (2) using the contrastive imagination to 
transform each of these slender archives such that they keep the traumatic past 
meaningfully alive in the present; and, (3) producing postmemorial effects of 
ideational and affective import for the eavesdropper to live by through the 
operation of the contrastive imagination, which posits salutary “truths” 
immanent in the preserved feature of the trauma. This novel thereby discloses 
rumor-mongering’s ability to defeat the genocidal ambition to destroy stories; 
despair’s transformation into an energizing, implacable anger that refuses “false” 
stories of genocide denial; and postmemory’s commitment to keeping trauma 
alive as a way to recognize the historicity of the present for both self-reflexive 
and self-reflective purposes. In this way, Three Apples Fell from Heaven begins 
Marcom’s enactment and exploration of the mediating imagination in 
postmemory by realizing in form and affect its positive effects. 
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Chapter Two argues that, with The Daydreaming Boy, Marcom moves from 
the positive depiction of successfully mediating imagination to an incompletely 
functioning imagination, which produces an unrealized postmemorial 
experience that corrodes sentience and confines vision. These negative effects are 
shown in Marcom’s second novel to be largely the consequence of a desire to 
passionately remember that founders upon the inability of the protagonist’s 
imagination to reconfigure the available archive such that he can escape its 
haunting silence. As a result, the novel’s troubled main character suffers a 
destructive attempt to passionately remember that repeats the degrading 
experience of the past. His ambition for existential plentitude is indeed impelled 
by the sense of frustration I have posited as an informing psychic condition of 
postmemory. However, the protagonist attempts to transform his slender archive 
by employing a “sentimental imagination” whose operation cannot produce life-
enriching effects and affects. Feeling anxious and degraded in modern Lebanon, 
he distorts a foundational conviction beneath any diaspora situation—though 
you might not be able to physically return “home,” you can always “return” in 
passionate remembering—such that he repeats the violence. 
My argument about Draining the Sea in Chapter Three is that Marcom 
provides a corrective to The Daydreaming Boy’s insufficient sentimental 
imagination by placing analogy at the center of the imagination’s mediation 
between memory and passionate remembering. The protagonist of Marcom’s 
third novel interrogates the malaise that characterizes his prosperous American 
life by way of an analogic imagination, ultimately acknowledging his diasporic 
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existence in a manner that invigorates his conscience, his sense of his life’s 
implication in his own Armenian history and in genocidal massacres in the 
contemporary world. The man eventually recognizes the ever-present sadness of 
the past that lurks beneath his comfortable malaise and then transforms that 
sadness into an emotional portal, one that opens him up to a sense of connection 
and a call to principle that encompasses a pan-ethnic and pan-national attention 
to human rights. This becomes the way to avoid a repetition of violence and 
subjugation and to find an expansion of transnational consciousness. In fact, the 
man in Draining the Sea makes good on the promise of postmemory: that a deeply 
felt past encourages victimized populations to feel solidarity and affinity for the 
mistreated other, ultimately forming transformative and long-lasting affective 
affiliations that could forestall violence in the present and the future. 
In my concluding “Afterword,” I describe the pedagogic potential for 
engaging the phenomenon of postmemory in the undergraduate classroom. My 
observations derive from my experience teaching an upper-division literature 
course, “Not Even Past: Imagining Painful Histories,” in the summer of 2014 
with funding from the College of Liberal Arts. 
In my dissertation’s focus on the life and work of Marcom, I uncover 
unique aspects of postmemory for the Armenian diaspora that add nuance to 
theorizations of the phenomenon in both its particular and general appearances. 
But, because the imagination is at the center of Marcom’s trilogy and my analysis 
of it, literary studies emerges as a venue where postmemory can be productively 
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explored. At heart, this dissertation makes a case for the value of literature and 
its study for understanding the phenomenon of postmemory. 
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THE PAST REDEPLOYED: STORYTELLING & CONTRASTIVE 
POSTMEMORY IN THREE APPLES FELL FROM HEAVEN 
Three Apples Fell from Heaven, Micheline Aharonian Marcom’s 2001 novel 
set during the Armenian genocide of 1915-1917 in Central Anatolia, begins with a 
dedication page made of two parts: the words “For Nane and Dede,” and the 
lyrics to an Armenian love song: “Նորից գարուն եկաւ, գարուն աննըման” 
[“New spring arrived, a spring unlike any other”].16 The diminutives “Nane and 
Dede” for “grandmother” and “grandfather” reveal Marcom’s intimate 
connection with the maternal grandparents to whom she dedicates her book. The 
song lyrics on the dedication page highlight the connection, since the lyrics are 
plucked from a song that Marcom associates with her grandmother. As Marcom 
tells it, when she started Three Apples Fell from Heaven, “I’m 27: I think I am 
depressed,” but “a tune started running in my head, and this tune stayed with 
me for days, like the ghost of something, as if someone had erased a black 
charcoal drawing on paper but the faint outlines were still there” (Marcom, 
“Armenian Genocide Commemoration Speech”). The ghostly tune wouldn’t 
leave Marcom alone. The unrecognized sound kept hounding her. She didn’t 
know the lyrics to the song in her head, but the melody had taken up permanent 
residence in her mind. On a whim, she sang the unrelenting melody to her 
mother, who burst into tears. Marcom’s mother tearfully explained that the song 
                                                
16 Throughout this chapter, I will provide rudimentary phonetic pronunciation 
guides for Armenian words in Western Armenian, the dialect I speak. Here’s 
how to pronounce “Նորից գարուն եկաւ, գարուն աննըման”: “Nor-eetz kah-
roon yeh-gahv, kah-roon an-nuh-mahn.” The translations provided here and in 
the rest of the chapter are my own. 
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was a favorite of Marcom’s grandmother, Anaguil, who survived the Armenian 
genocide and died in Beirut when Marcom was 9. To Marcom, “when that song 
came back to me from the ether, it felt like a sign. As if my grandmother were 
trying to tell me something almost two decades after her death, that I must 
remember, that I must write it down and make a book of it. That I could do it. In 
any case, I made a promise to her then that I would try my best” (Marcom, 
“Armenian Genocide Commemoration Speech”). Marcom interpreted the 
recalled song about a lover who reappears every spring as a message from her 
grandmother, a call to write her grandmother’s experience of surviving the 
Armenian genocide in Central Anatolia at the beginning of the twentieth century 
by gathering her four younger siblings and escaping to Beirut. She heeded the 
call. 
Yet the book that Marcom wrote to heed that call is a polyphonic tapestry 
wherein her grandmother’s story of survival is just one of the threads. Indeed, 
Marcom already signals her departure from a strict retelling of her family’s 
experience with the song lyrics that she reprints on her dedication page. The 
song lyrics are the first lines of the folk song, “Ճէյրանի Պէս” (“Like a Doe”), a 
song whose history itself combines old and new.17 According to Armenian 
ethnomusicologist Sylvia Alajaji, “Ճէյրանի Պէս” was an Armenian folk song 
“that at one point had been harmonized by the choir directors” of Lebanon who 
strove to preserve traditional Armenian culture in a new diasporic community 
                                                
17 “Ճէյրանի Պէս” is pronounced “Jey-rahn-ee Bes.” 
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(Alajaji 210). This older folk song became an international Armenian hit in the 
1970s when superstar Lebanese-Armenian singer Adiss Harmandian made it one 
of the “traditional Armenian folk songs that were updated and sung in a 
thoroughly Westernized pop setting” (Alajaji 203).18 Further, as reprinted on 
Marcom’s dedication page, the first lines of “Ճէյրանի Պէս” highlight the song’s 
simultaneously old and new nature. Readers of Armenian would notice the 
idiosyncratic spelling of the word “աննըման” (“unlike”).19 Where contemporary 
Western Armenian speakers would write “աննման,” in Marcom’s dedication an 
extra “ը” appears between the two letters “ն”.20 With the added letter, the 
spelling takes on a decidedly nostalgic bent, since it is the way that the word is 
spelled in older songbooks.21 When Marcom uses the older spelling of the song, 
                                                
18 Sylvia Alajaji’s 2009 dissertation, “Diasporic Communities and Negotiated 
Identities: Trauma, Recovery, and the Search for the Armenian Musical Voice,” 
on Armenian diasporic music, summarizes well the iconic function Adiss 
Harmandian played in the Beirut Armenian community as part of the estradayin 
music movement (see, especially, pages 178-216). 
19 “Աննման” is pronounced “ahn-nuh-mahn.” 
20 The letter “ը” is called “uht,” and the letter “ն” is called “noo” in the dialect of 
Armenian that I speak, Western Armenian. For Eastern Armenian speakers, the 
letters are often called “uh” and “nuh.” See J.J.S. Weitenberg and John A.C. 
Greppin & Amalya A. Khachaturian for information about Armenian dialects. 
21 While there is some controversy about whether or not epenthesis, or the 
addition of one or more sounds typically to the interior of a word, was an active 
process in Classical Armenian, I’m most interested in the orthographic and not 
phonological side of the debate. In the case of orthography, Avedis K. Sanjian 
insists that the “letter ը ǝ [pronounced “uh”] is rarely written, even though shwa 
is the most common vowel in spoken Armenian” (360). Further, Armenian 
linguist Amalia Khachaturian has posited that “In most instances, irrespective of 
its historical origin, ǝ has the function of a vowel prothesis in consonant clusters. 
In word building it is apt to phonetic shortening up to its full reduction. In these 
cases ǝ has the function of a syllabic vowel, and since it is not conveyed in 
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she brings an outdated orthography into her modern, English book. 
Interestingly, the older orthography actually aids pronunciation in the present. 
The added letter more closely resembles how an Armenian speaker would 
pronounce the word (pausing between the two twinned letters), akin to writing 
out kibosh as “kiybosh” to help with saying the word out loud. For multiple 
reasons, the song is an apt representative for Marcom’s project in Three Apples 
Fell from Heaven: the song was a traditional one popularized by a pop singer in 
his cosmopolitan moment; the older spelling of part of its lyrics unexpectedly 
makes the pronunciation of the lyric easier; and, the song was the manifestation 
of Marcom’s grandmother’s haunting voice calling her to write about the past in 
her present. In all three cases, the past is redeployed in the present to achieve 
enriched and enriching effects. These aspects of the song reveal an investment in 
the past’s role in the present, an investment in passionately remembering the 
past in the present moment because it offers new emotional and intellectual 
insights. Essentially, the song and Marcom’s experience with it—its initially 
haunting arrival in the present, its unusual reprinting in the novel to more 
closely align with its pronunciation—encapsulates the phenomenon that 
                                                                                                                                            
orthography, it is often called ‘a secret syllable’ (gałtnavank). Examples: tǝxur ‘sad’, 
kǝrknel or kǝrkǝnel ‘to repeat’, kǝṙunk ‘crane’, kǝtur ‘ceiling’, dǝproc ‘school’, 
xǝlurd ‘mole’, t‘ǝmbuk ‘drum’, kǝṙiv ‘war’, etc.” (Khachaturian 56, emphasis 
mine). For more information on the phonological and lexical debate, see 
Frederick W. Schwink’s and Marc Pierce’s articles. In any case, “աննըման” is far 
less commonly used than “աննման” in current writing. After checking 
numerous dictionaries, I couldn’t find a single entry of “աննըման” or “նըման.” 
In my research, the only examples of the spelling with the extra “ը” are in older 
songbooks. 
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theorists have called postmemory, including my emphasis on keeping the content 
of ancestral trauma alive. 
I use the song’s enactment of postmemory as a model for explaining the 
way that Marcom’s polyphonic, fragmented, and formally difficult novel about 
the Armenian Genocide treats storytelling itself as the access to and realization of 
postmemorial effects, and does so in a manner that explores the potential of an 
imagination that operates by contrast. The novel is polyphonic in that each 
chapter is narrated from a different character’s point of view. In one chapter, a 
deceased baby named Dickran offers three possible scenarios for what happened 
to him in the Deir al-Zor desert to his unnamed listener. Another chapter is 
narrated by Rachel Eskijian, who never admits that she committed the crime of 
suicide, but who lists all the reasons why she did anyhow. Still others are 
narrated by a young scholar named Sargis who slowly goes mad in an attic 
hiding from the gendarmes, while another pair of chapters are told by the 
personified character of Rumor, who offers the long history of the Armenians in 
the Anatolian plains. A trio of chapters end with the Anatolian storytelling 
convention the novel is named after, “And three apples fell from heaven: one for 
the storyteller, one for the listener, and one for the eavesdropper.”22 Taken 
                                                
22 Marcom names her novel after the terminal storytelling convention used by 
Anatolian—Turkish and Armenian—storytellers. Armenian storytelling has its 
equivalent of “once upon a time” with “կար ու չկար,” which is pronounced 
“gahr oo chuh-gahr” and roughly translates to “there was and there was not.” It 
also has its version of the terminal convention of “And they all lived happily ever 
after.” Armenian stories end with a variation of the formula that begins with 
“Երկինքէն երեք խնձոր ինկաւ” (translated as “Three apples fell from heaven” 
and pronounced “yer-geenk-en yeh-rek khun-tsor een-gahv”). Depending on 
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together, these multiple voices represent the telling of stories and their 
deployment for transformative postmemorial ends that are existential, affective, 
and critical rather than commemorative and redemptive. In Three Apples Fell from 
Heaven, the mediating function of the imagination works by contrast: Contrasting 
iconic images and plots from an ancient Armenian past with their perversion in 
the genocidal moment, Marcom transforms the recollection of stories and 
fragments into a new ownership of their enduring emotional and defiant 
contents, which ultimately belong to the author herself when the reader—who 
takes the apple that falls to the eavesdropper—assumes his or her role as 
required, in the present moment, by the ancient storytelling convention. 
In one sense, then, trauma is kept productively alive because the 
storytelling convention is kept alive in altered form: i.e. the convention now 
exists in reference to the specific demands for survival posed by the threatened 
extinction of the Armenian people, whereas earlier it served such traditional 
functions as celebrating heroism and affirming cultural identity. Nevertheless, 
“aliveness” by definition occurs in the present, and as the convention asserts, 
such a present culminates when all parties are present to one another in and 
through the experience of storytelling. Assuming the readerly role of 
                                                                                                                                            
who is telling the story, the storyteller can choose to distribute the apples to 
whomever they like. Amongst its variations, archivist Anne M. Avakian found 
that the “standard distribution” is the one where the apples are given in the 
following pattern: “one for the teller, one for the listener, and one for the one 
who gives heed/ear” (Avakian 95). Some storytellers distribute the three apples 
amongst the characters in the story they’re telling. Others distribute the apples 
inequitably, with the listener receiving two apples. Still others give an apple to 
God. There are plenty of variations to choose from, but the beginning of the 
terminal formula always mentions three apples. 
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eavesdropper is therefore affectively to become a character in the story Marcom 
owns by virtue of her passionate remembering. In an interview with literary 
scholar Shushan Avagyan about the publication of her fourth novel, The Mirror 
In the Well, Marcom insists that “the books that I love, which I think of as 
masterpieces, have, in a manner, taught me as I read them to read them—books 
like The Sound and the Fury, or The Street of Crocodiles, or The Rings of Saturn—so 
perhaps in that way books cultivate readers, and books also, by the way, ‘make’ 
writers into the writers that they are. My books in some ways have made me as 
much as I have them” (Marcom, Interview by Shushan Avagyan). Elsewhere, 
Marcom elaborates upon the affinity she has for books that teach readers how to 
interact with them in terms of a principle both aesthetic and performative: that 
“books do allow for a deep connection: the consciousness of a reader with the 
text and story of the book—and that is amazing and radical and very particular 
to the mode of reading” (Davis-Van Atta 136). Marcom, in my view, is not 
referring to the way in which a narrative trains responsive readers for moral, 
ethical, or empathetic purposes. Rather, she is interested in the connection 
established when an author’s way of writing becomes consonant with the 
reader’s way of reading, such that a shared consciousness—not ideational or 
emotional training per se—becomes the primordial experience of connection 
within which various postmemorial effects occur and as various kinds of 
“knowledge.”  
In my chapter, I argue that the shared consciousness that Marcom forges 
between her writing and the reader’s reading occurs in three vignettes—
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“Mardiros,” “The History of Bozmashen as Iterated by the Local Dogs,” and “As 
To Where Are the Bootmakers and the Town of Kharphert”—that end with the 
“three apples” convention. In each of these vignettes, Marcom takes herself and 
her eavesdropper through a sequence of maneuvers. First, each vignette 
establishes an “archive” from different sources. I use “archive” here to include 
those collected source materials that unsatisfactorily describe some feature of the 
past the vignette eventually helps its eavesdropper passionately remember.23 
Second, the contrastive imagination transforms each of these slender archives 
such that they keep the traumatic past meaningfully alive in the present. Third, 
the operation of the contrastive imagination, by positing salutary “truths” 
immanent in the preserved feature of the trauma, produces postmemorial effects 
of ideational and affective import for the eavesdropper to live by. Though each 
vignette is created by making all three maneuvers, they complete each maneuver 
in a distinctive way. In “Mardiros,” the archive is epic narrative, and it is 
transformed by an imaginative contrast between the ancient past and the 
genocidal present to obligate the eavesdropper to assume the role of rumor-
mongerer in order to defeat a genocide bent on destroying stories. In this 
vignette, the formulaic narrative is rendered differently useful and adaptable, 
such that in its contemporary inspirational character it denies to the genocidal 
ambition—a strategy to exterminate a people by disabling their capacity to create 
                                                
23 Holocaust writing might not call this assemblage of fragments an “archive” 
because the physical archive of the Holocaust is staggering in its size and scope, 
but in the case of the Armenian Genocide and transatlantic slavery, the 
fragmentary assemblage as “archive” is par for the course. 
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self-affirming stories—its own chosen mode of endgame action. In “The History 
of Bozmashen as Iterated by the Local Dogs,” the archive of a consular report 
and a folktale are transformed by ironic juxtaposition, the effect of which is to 
transform the despair of the eavesdropper’s principled and aesthetic 
demoralization into an energizing, implacable anger that refuses “false” stories 
of genocide denial. In “As To Where Are the Bootmakers and the Town of 
Kharphert,” the archive is an allegory, but one that serves a perverse purpose, 
that delivers its victims to their own worst natures rather than warns them of 
such a danger. By creating surprising continuities—between past and present, 
between Turkish and Nazi genocides—the contrastive imagination converts the 
allegorical into a parable. This parable warns the eavesdropper of two dangers: 
fear of one’s own weakness, and the limitation of the historical understanding 
based on memory, the kind famously expressed by George Santayana. The 
parable instead extols postmemory’s commitment to keeping trauma alive as a 
way to recognize the historicity of the present, and for purposes both self-
reflexive and self-reflective. As the allegory-turned-parable affirms, and as the 
commitment to passionate remembering presumes, the past and present are 
mutually constitutive and this is the challenge addressed through a historical 
imagination functioning within postmemory and as postmemorial narrative. 
Taken together, the significant effects and affects of the three vignettes emerge 
from and occur on the narrative terrain where postmemory’s ambitions to 
passionately remember are realized. For these reasons, I claim that Marcom’s is 
an exemplary postmemorial narrative. 
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What happens after this Story, Mardiros? 
I begin my analysis of Three Apples Fell from Heaven with the first chapter 
that uses the phrase the novel is named after. Marcom first narratively deploys 
the entirety of the Anatolian storytelling convention cited in the title of her 
novel—“And three apples fell from heaven, one for the storyteller, one for the 
listener, and one for the eavesdropper”—after almost a hundred pages (Three 
Apples 97). The convention ends a chapter called “Mardiros,” a chapter which 
follows an Armenian man called Mardiros during his torture by Turkish soldiers, 
his abandonment in a pile of corpses, his “resurrection,” his encounter with a 
pair of Armenian women on the way back to town, and his final verbal 
confrontation with the Turkish Commander at the army barracks. “Mardiros” is 
the first chapter of three in the novel to end with the traditional Anatolian “three 
apples fell from heaven” storytelling convention, so it announces the content also 
for the two subsequent storytelling chapters, each of which similarly conclude 
with the same recitation. In this first storytelling chapter, Marcom redeploys 
Armenian stories of martyrs and religious figures to contrast them with the 
genocide story she is telling. The temporal contrast between the ancient and 
genocide-time stories is significant. 
It is useful to recognize Marcom’s probable source material for 
“Mardiros” although it is comprised of any number of stories about tortured and 
murdered men in the memoirs and the histories. Based on Marcom’s 
“Acknowledgements,” some sources are more likely inspirations. She cites 
Henry H. Riggs’s Days of Tragedy in Armenia: Personal Experiences in Harpoot, 1915-
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1917, in which she likely read about the following event during the Armenian 
Genocide:  
When [the Armenian captives] were all seated, bound as they were, 
their guards with their rifles and bayonets, fell upon them and 
commenced a butchery that the imagination refuses to picture. So 
huge was the task of slaughter, that three or four men succeeded in 
escaping from the ravine while the gendarmes were busy with the 
horrid labor. These fugitives scattered and hid, but were pursued 
and hunted out by the relentless guards, who found and butchered 
them in their hiding places only one escaping, so far as known. This 
young man, whose name I dare not reveal as he is still living in 
Turkey, succeeded in evading his pursuers and hiding till nightfall. 
Then he started out to try to return to some place of safety but lost 
his way in the dark and wandered all night long, not knowing 
which way he was going. At last, as dawn began to break, he found 
his bearings again, and in the gray light, stole in to the American 
hospital and to safety. (Riggs 124) 
The hallmarks of Mardiros’s story can be found in this excerpt from an American 
Christian missionary who witnessed a bloodbath. Like the singular man at the 
end of Riggs’s testimony, Mardiros in Marcom’s novel manages to escape from 
the site of slaughter. Like this man, Mardiros also returns to the town. But the 
similarities stop here. In her chapter, Marcom imagines what Riggs called a scene 
“that the imagination refuses to picture” and appends her own narrative to that 
story. In the rest of my chapter, I explain how this source material is transformed 
by Marcom’s application of a contrastive imagination such that it becomes the 
enabling feature of the trauma in the present. 
Marcom begins “Mardiros” by ironically referencing the Armenian 
tradition of telling martyr stories. The first line of the chapter begins in media res, 
in the moment that the Turkish Commander “called him Mardiros while pissing 
on his face and buttocks” (Marcom, Three Apples 93). In this introduction to the 
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main character, the chapter’s storyteller does not mention the man’s real name in 
favor of telling the listener—eventually to become eavesdropper—how the man’s 
torturers referred to him. The Commander calls the tortured man “Mardiros,” an 
Armenian word often used to name males; in Armenian, “mardiros” means 
“martyr.”24 Using the Armenian word “mardiros” instead of its Turkish 
equivalent, “şehit,” signals that the Commander had a particular nationality of 
martyr in mind, the Armenian martyr. The Commander knows that, in the 
diaspora, Armenians told and continue to tell stories about martyrs throughout 
their long history. Diaspora scholar Khachig Tölölyan has described Armenians’ 
storytelling about martyrs as one “Of the elements which give that Armenian 
cultural tradition [of the diaspora] its cohesion and shape” (“Cultural Narrative” 
222).25 As part of “a ubiquitous cluster of stories,” stories about martyrs are 
passed down by Armenians “at Church, in Sunday school, in kindergarten and 
elementary school” (“Cultural Narrative” 222, 222).26 According to the 
                                                
24 The Armenian spelling for “martyr” is “մարտիրոս.” The name comes from 
the Greek word for “witness.” 
25 Armenian historian Sebouh D. Aslanian has also pointed to the Vartan story as 
foundational. He further explains: “Contrary to what one might initially think, 
this framing of Armenian history as social drama about the preservation of an 
endangered identity was not born with the Genocide of 1915, even if it was 
reinforced by the Catastrophe in powerful ways that still shape our popular 
conception of Armenian history today. Rather, this root paradigm of survival 
was probably first given shape to in one of the ‘classics of Armenian literature,’ 
Yeghishe Vardapet’s The History of Vardan and the Armenian War, which 
chronicled the revolt of the Armenians and their church in the fifth century 
against the rule and religion of Sassanian Iran” (Aslanian 132). 
26 While Tölölyan’s argument about the importance of stories in keeping 
Armenian culture alive was made in the context of Armenian terrorists and their 
pamphlets, Tölölyan’s assertions ring true for Armenian culture more broadly. 
As the terrorists’ pamphlets “reveal minds steeped in a recognizable Armenian 
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comparatist Leonardo Alishan, “The prime example of the Armenian in the 
context of martyrdom is the warrior-saint Vardan Mamikonian, and the prime 
event is the Battle of Avarayr” (Alishan 28). The martyr Vartan Mamigonian 
fought alongside “his 1036 martyrs [who] died on the battlefield of Avarayr in 
AD 451, fighting overpowering Persian troops sent out to force the Armenians to 
give up their Christian faith” (Björklund 342).27 Armenians who hear the word 
“mardiros” immediately connect it to Vartan’s refusal to renounce his 
Christianity against all odds at an epic battle where the Armenians were 
outnumbered almost 4 to 1 by the Persians. In calling the tortured man 
“Mardiros,” the Commander ties the tortured man to the mythic nationalistic 
history Armenians told each other for more than a millennium. Stories of martyrs 
like Vartan have connected Armenians to each other through a shared sense of 
national pride, so it’s telling that this “mardiros” is not a martyr like Vartan—he 
is not fighting to the death on a battlefield, he is being tortured in an army 
barracks. Recalling that the Commander labels the man “Mardiros,” (he’s not 
called a “mardiros” by his own supporters after he dies) reveals that the 
Commander’s label is intended to verbally demean the Armenian man as part of 
his torture. Unlike Vartan who was called a martyr after his death and whose 
story was preserved for the sake of cultural solidarity, the Commander never 
                                                                                                                                            
idiom that has roots, not in a [then-] 68-year old genocide, but in 15 centuries of 
both learned and popular discourse, in ecclesiastical ritual and popular narrative, 
and, perhaps most importantly, in living song,” so too are the minds of readers 
familiar with the centuries-long cultural traditions and stories of Armenian life 
(“Cultural Narrative” 221). See Khachig Tölölyan’s article, “Cultural Narrative 
and the Motivation of the Terrorist” for details. 
27 See Nersoyan’s “The Battle of Avarair” for details on the important event. 
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intends that Mardiros’s story be preserved in song as Vartan’s had (and has) 
been. In truth, the Commander assumes the power of naming in order—by 
tactical juxtaposition with Vartan—to deny his victim a story. The Commander 
thus perverts the function of the epic narrative for tactical ends. Eventually, I 
contend, the epic narrative is repurposed to defeat a crucial commitment of the 
genocidal will. 
While the contrast between Vartan and Mardiros highlights Mardiros’s 
deplorable inability to be preserved in story and song, a second contrast between 
Jesus and Mardiros invests the victim’s existence with a substantiality that 
inspires remembrance. When Mardiros is brought back to life in the 
“Newresurrection,” the sole question he asks of his “Newgod” is “What made 
you forget me, Effendi Bey?” (Marcom, Three Apples 94, 94). The two conjoined 
words, “Newresurrection” and “Newgod,” tie the sixteen-century-long 
Armenian tradition of Christianity to Mardiros’s present. The past is 
grammatically malleable: Christian tradition can be modified by the prefix 
“new.” Mardiros’s question also reveals a redeployment and modification of 
Christian stories, as his inquiry echoes Jesus’s question to God of “Why have you 
forsaken me?” when he’s suffering on the cross. Jesus’s question reveals his 
concern with physical suffering, while Mardiros’s shows a concern with being 
lost to memory. “Forsaken” has been replaced with “forgotten.” The timing of 
Mardiros’s question further reveals his concern with memory. Mardiros asks his 
question after his resurrection, while Jesus asks his during his crucifixion. “After” 
is more important than “during” for Mardiros. Immediately after Mardiros asks 
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his Newgod this question about memory, he “pondered and reviewed the lesson 
he knew the Newgod was teaching him until finally he came upon an answer: I 
must return to town” (94). Mardiros’s return to the town he had once lived is a 
direct response to the question he asked of Newgod. Mardiros’s actions while in 
town occur in the context of his concern about being forgotten, not merely 
forsaken as Jesus had been. The contrasts among the older stories of Vartan and 
Jesus, on the one hand, and the more recent story of Mardiros, on the other, 
establish that although Mardiros’s expected and planned future is physical 
oblivion, his utmost concern is making sure he is not lost to memory. 
In his encounter with the pair of Armenian women on his way back to 
town, Mardiros demands that he be remembered. Instead of the looping 
narrative chronicled in Riggs’s testimony—about an escaped captive who had 
lost his way and found it in the morning when he successfully steals away to the 
safety of the hospital—Marcom imagines the escapee encountering others along 
the way. When Marcom’s Mardiros meets a pair of women on the road, he urges 
them, who had been left with “only boys under eight years of age,” to “Look at 
my bare chest and feet, touch and see me. I am a man above the age of eight” 
(95). Mardiros knows his uncanny presence post-resurrection can be a comfort to 
the women who thought they had been abandoned. He tries to quell their fears 
by making them affirm his presence. Though the women don’t touch Mardiros as 
he asks them to, they “fell to their knees in joy and moved to wash and kiss 
Mardiros’s feet” (95). The women want to show their gratitude and respect to 
Mardiros by washing his feet, a custom most commonly associated with Biblical 
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times and, particularly, with the story of Jesus whose feet were anointed by 
Lazarus’s sister, Martha of Bethany, after Jesus had resurrected him.28 Though 
the women “moved” to begin their biblically-resonant foot washing ceremony, 
they are so distracted by Mardiros’s mutilated feet, they instead “created a 
newritual: They smoothed and patted the ground around the halo of his present 
and missing toes” (96). Instead of touching Mardiros’s feet, the women create a 
new way to show their immense gratitude for being comforted because 
Mardiros’s feet are oozing with pus. Though the women don’t touch his body, 
the festering sores make way for a new mode of interaction. By calling their 
action a “newritual,” the women express their investment in passionately 
remembering Mardiros through their ritualistic actions. With the newritual, 
Mardiros’s sores are now a part of these women’s lives. His experience will 
continue to live on in and through the repeated rituals of these two survivor 
women. In this instance, Mardiros successfully finds a place for his story to be 
passionately remembered through the personal embodiments of his existence in 
the two Armenian women’s newritual, which emerges for them by the contrast 
between the existence of Mardiros and the story of Jesus. In this way, Mardiros 
successfully invents the context within which his story will survive in and for the 
future. Collectively inventing Mardiros’s story with his disfigured form, the 
women invent the object, the idiom, and the sense of devotion to sustain 
passionate remembering, and all in response to an existential need to keep alive 
one of the few men over the age of eight. Founding a “newritual,” they were able 
                                                
28 See John 12: 1-11. 
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to live “in joy” with the knowledge that their actions would keep Mardiros alive 
in their feelings and behaviors (95). The encounter between Mardiros and the 
two Armenian women reveals that within the intellectual and emotional place of 
postmemory, the culture-affirming stories of memory—such as Biblical ones or 
ones about the martyrs—can be redeployed to generate, by way of contrast, 
something more than an acknowledgment or assimilation of haunting events. 
This “more” is the content and internalization of a “living truth” that includes 
both the pain that was inflicted and the self-asserting narrative that appropriated 
the power to designate what is “meaningful” because it is efficaciously “pained.” 
With his story reanimated by the women’s newritual, Mardiros enters the 
town without desiring revenge because he knows that his story continues to live 
on. Upon arriving at the army barracks where he had been tortured, Mardiros 
greets a guard: “I’m glad to be back. I still have several unanswered questions” 
(96). The men at the barracks were the ones who sliced away Mardiros’s testicles, 
who plucked out his hair, who chopped off his toes. It might seem unusual that 
Mardiros would happily return to the place where such pain was inflicted on 
him, but this is his story now. Why shouldn’t he express his longing for the place 
of his torture and for more information? It’s now his right to remain civil. Yes, 
Mardiros’s calm intimacy with the Commander and his cronies is, by the logic of 
victim and perpetrator, disconcerting. However, psychologically and narratively 
speaking, Mardiros is in control of what matters—his story, not his body parts. 
So the fascinating conversation with the Commander that follows begins from 
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Mardiros’ position of confidence. What he wishes, to improve his decisive 
position, is an explanation. 
Once he’s in the Commander’s office, instead of hurling himself at the 
Commander in a fit of rage, Mardiros “hunched down in front of” the 
Commander’s chair and asks: “What happens after this Story?” (97). As he had 
told the guards at the entrance to the compound, he came to get his “unanswered 
questions” answered. Mardiros’s first question is launched from an assumption 
about the meaning of his torture that he has already earned: there is an “after” to 
his story, that those living in the future will know what came before them. There 
is, after all, already a “newritual” in place. Further, by capitalizing “Story” in his 
question, Mardiros reveals how important he thinks his experience is for the 
future. He affirms his torture as a “Story,” one that can be told by generations of 
Armenians after he’s gone. There’s an “after” to Mardiros’s “Story” because he 
believes that the past has a place beyond the moment in which it was made. But 
the Commander’s response is aggressive: “This story will never have happened 
after it’s finished,” as the Commander refuses to acknowledge the relevance of 
the past; in fact, he doesn’t admit that a commendable past exists to be 
commemorated (though it most certainly did since it will be “finished” at some 
point) (97). He conveys his disdain for stories of the past by referring to 
Mardiros’s “Story” as “story” in the lowercase. To the Commander, the past of 
the genocide is a “story,” a malevolent fiction that shouldn’t be recounted and 
instead must and should be forgotten. The Commander’s response suggests that, 
if Mardiros wanted answers, he’s come to the wrong place. Speaking from 
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confidence in his Story, Mardiros, we now realize, is more precisely seeking an 
explanation that will clarify the role of memory in perpetuating his Story—that 
is, what in my inquiry is designated as postmemory. The Commander’s frank 
response about a “story” that never happened confesses his genocidal strategy, 
which is to ensure that once men like Mardiros are murdered, they will be, both 
in memory and in fact, dead and gone. What readers overhear, however, is that 
Mardiros, the tortured and dismembered man, has exacted a confession from the 
man who purportedly holds all the power. And this new archive of “confession” 
both informs and inspires the postmemorial Story of a post-genocide Mardiros 
who speaks to and for a future that includes his existence. In this way, Mardiros 
trumps what Marc Nichanian has called “the genocidal will.”29 
The conversation continues. The Commander elaborates on his genocidal 
strategy to erase all resources for memory in his response to Mardiros’s 
following question. When Mardiros asks, “And the Rumors, where will they 
go?”, the Commander responds, “With the marchers—the Mesopotamian has 
space enough for everything” (97). Ostensibly, to make sure that he heard the 
Commander correctly, but actually to push back against him, Mardiros tweaks 
the Commander’s refusal of “Story” by using a different term—Rumor—one 
loaded with the idea of transmission. After all, rumors are meant to be told. They 
only exist in their retelling, often in secret. Rumors proliferate and grow through 
transmission. If Mardiros’s story cannot be told in a situation of sanctioned 
storytelling, he wonders if the Commander would grant that it might be told in 
                                                
29 See Nichanian’s The Historiographic Perversion for details. 
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secret. The Commander again refuses to engage Mardiros’s rejoinder, but his 
response is revelatory nonetheless. He doesn’t use Mardiros’s key term, 
“Rumor.” Instead, the Commander denies the rumors any existence. If rumors 
are to be sent to the Mesopotamian, a literal desert with few inhabitants and not 
much life, they are being sent to their deaths as so many Armenian women, 
elders, and children had been during the Armenian Genocide.30 Without anyone 
alive to tell them, rumors will evaporate and pass into obscurity. By switching 
the issue at hand to transmission, rather than the fact that Mardiros already has a 
story in limited circulation, the Commander appears to have regained his power. 
In fact, toward the end of their conversation, it seems the Commander has 
denied Mardiros a voice to tell his story because when Mardiros realizes that 
“You’ve thought of everything, sir,” the Commander retorts, “Yes. We thought 
of you also” (97, 97). The scene of confrontation ends there. The Commander gets 
the final word, and we presume that Mardiros is killed. Yet we do not see his 
murder, and this is important. For its representation does not in fact end the 
issue now at stake in the conversation: how can the transmission of Mardiros’ 
story occur if, as the Commander intends, memory dies in the silent vastness of 
                                                
30 For more information, see Fuat Dündar’s “Pouring a People into the Desert: 
The ‘Definitive Solution’ of the Unionists to the Armenian Question” in the 
edited collection A Question of Genocide: Armenians and Turks at the End of the 
Ottoman Empire, Katharine Derderian’s “Common Fate, Different Experience: 
Gender-Specific Aspects of the Armenian Genocide, 1915-1917,” Vahakn N. 
Dadrian’s chapter “The Implementation of the Genocide” in his book The History 
of the Armenian Genocide, and Raymond Kévorkian’s chapter “Displaced 
Populations and the Main Deportation Routes” in his book The Armenian 
Genocide: A Complete History. 
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the desert? If Mardiros’s story is not allowed to circulate, Mardiros’s past is not 
allowed a future.  
Marcom ends the episode with an answer to this question, a solution to 
this predicament. In the first manuscript version of the novel that Marcom 
submitted in partial fulfillment for her Master of Fine Arts degree at Mills 
College in 1999, the chapter ends without the “three apples” convention 
(Marcom, “The Myth of Genocide” 137). However, in the version published in 
the novel, Marcom ends the chapter with the traditional Armenian storytelling 
convention: “And three apples fell from heaven, one for the storyteller, one for 
the listener, and one for the eavesdropper” (Marcom, Three Apples 97). This 
ending signifies the endurance of ancient narrative, which occupies the place of 
the “last word” here while also serving as the first words of rumor, the 
transmission of the Mardiros story by the uninvited outside world, those whom 
the perpetrators want to keep benighted, the eavesdroppers. If an unnamed 
storyteller—we don’t know Mardiros’s actual name—tells his story to a 
diabolically hostile listener—the Commander and everything sinister he 
represents—the reader is the eavesdropper, the consciousness contacted through 
a newly animated old narrative gesture that invites her participation in a 
narrativized future, a good rumor-mongering intended to break the genocidal 
will by denying its power to exterminate stories. The “three apples” ending is 
transformed from the formulaic into the inspirational, as it morphs from the 
words of a remembered past into an invocation to fulfill an obligation to spread 
the word. In this particular instance, that means contrasting the epic sacrifice of 
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the martyred hero Mardiros to the denigration of an ordinary Armenian man 
who becomes a “mardiros” because the narrative ennoblement of his 
brutalization sustains rumor, the very path to revelation and survival his 
torturers fear the most. The slenderest of archives—the nineteen words of a 
storytelling convention—possess defiantly generative power, when repurposed 
through the contrastive imagination, to define the genocidal present and the 
willful future it was meant to exterminate. Passionate remembering so construed 
makes it possible to resist genocide after its occurrence, and this is the enabling 
“truth” carried by the eavesdropper who assumes his role to pass on the word, to 
harbor a somber and resisting faith in ancestral narrative to encompass ancestral 
trauma. 
Tell me, Isquhee, what stories have you been telling? 
As “Mardiros” ends, so does Marcom’s second storytelling vignette, “The 
History of Bozmashen as Iterated by the Local Dogs”; both vignettes end with 
the same “three apples fell from heaven” storytelling convention. The similarities 
don’t end with their twinned final lines. Building on the enabling truth and 
invocation to narrative promoted in “Mardiros,” “The History of Bozmashen as 
Iterated by the Local Dogs” takes up the redeployment of folktales. The emphasis 
in the highlighted folktale is upon unfulfilled desire. Within the operation of a 
contrastive imagination, however, the didactically communitarian functions of 
the folktale are transformed to serve an affective purpose, to connect the 
emotional experience of genocide victims and the eavesdropper’s experience of 
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the appalling. In the end, postmemory generates a new archive—one that 
juxtaposes a folktale and a consul’s trivializing document of mass murder—to 
reveal the emotion of despair and then to transform it into a multigenerational 
anger that energizes contestation. 
The vignette’s plot is convoluted and curiously inspired by survivor 
testimony. In “The History of Bozmashen as Iterated by the Local Dogs,” an 
Armenian shepherd boy named Isquhee talks with his two dogs about his ideal 
wife, spends a night discussing stories with his mother, awakens as a 
transformed dog, survives the total destruction of his town of Bozmashen, and 
laps up his cousin Kurken’s blood after Kurken is murdered by a sickle-wielding 
policeman. At the end of the chapter, readers reencounter the terminal 
storytelling convention: “And three apples fell from heaven: one for the 
storyteller, one for the listener, and one for the eavesdropper” (145). As with 
“Mardiros,” this chapter is likely inspired by stories Marcom read in the 
testimonies she cites in her “Acknowledgements.” In Consul Leslie Davis’s 
accounts of the genocide in Central Anatolia, he recounts a time when he and an 
Armenian acquaintance, Krikor Maghakian, rode to Krikor’s native village of 
Bozmashen and “found it in ruins” with “a man digging near a spring under a 
clump of trees just off the road” outside the town (Davis 78). Consul Davis 
explains that the man was “a gendarme digging two shallow graves in the sand” 
for the two corpses lying at his feet (78). With a quick mention that he had 
“frequently rode past this spot since and seen the skulls of these women lying on 
the sand,” Consul Davis moves on to describe the ruined houses and a “few 
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hungry looking cats [that] were prowling around” in what was left of the town 
completely depleted of its Armenian residents (78). Consul Davis’s Bozmashen 
leaves much to the imagination. 
Marcom accepts the challenge to imagine Consul Davis’s destroyed town 
by redeploying both the style and plot of traditional Armenian folktales.31 These 
folkloric features often include fantastic plot inconsistencies, and Marcom 
maintains the tradition. For example, it’s not obvious that Isquhee turned into a 
dog overnight. In the morning when Isquhee wakes up, there are three dogs 
instead of the two that were described as Isquhee’s companions. And in the last 
two pages of the chapter, Isquhee’s name is omitted until the very end, when 
he’s described as drinking his cousin’s blood along with the other dogs. These 
kinds of inconsistencies are typical of tales of transformation, which leads me to 
interpret Isquhee’s transformation as one bearing strong similarities to Armenian 
folktales of transformation. According to philologist and folklorist Alvard 
Jivanyan, Armenian folktales have many instances of human-to-animal shape-
shifting. Jivanyan explains that Armenian tales of female children “[w]earing 
habits made of animal furs, skins or plants” can be interpreted as the character 
“renouncing also one’s own kind and even hints at a partial shape-shifting” 
(Jivanyan 94). In these tales, the “heroine chooses to show herself as a beast, a 
                                                
31 I’m supported in my reading here with the interesting cultural phenomenon of 
Armenians in the current diaspora being better versed in the ancient tales than 
they are in contemporary ones. As Khachig Tölölyan has explained, 
“Anglophone ethnics ironically know more of the older literature originally 
written overseas and in Armenian than of the work written in Armenian in 
America by their own grandparents” (“Armenian-American Literature” 27). 
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non-human” because “[w]here a human is under threat coming from his likes, an 
animal or a plant can survive” (Jivanyan 94).32 Isquhee’s transformation makes 
sense by Jivanyan’s explanation when taking into account the time period that is 
the setting of the chapter, the time of the Armenian Genocide in Central Anatolia. 
With a particularly Armenian name that means “truthful,” Isquhee is marked as 
an Armenian during a time when it was increasingly dangerous to be one.33 He’s 
also oddly marked with a female name though he is described as a “shepherd 
boy” by Marcom from the beginning of the chapter (Marcom, Three Apples 141). 
It’s the oddness of Isquhee’s female Armenian name that suggests Isquhee’s 
transformation is inspired in part by Armenian folktales. As mentioned in my 
summary of Jivanyan’s position above, shape-shifters in Armenian folktales were 
often young females who avoided violence by transforming into or hiding under 
the guise of an animal. Though Isquhee isn’t described as a female in the chapter, 
his name marks him as such. And though readers don’t see Isquhee directly 
threatened by any aggressors in the chapter, they do see what happens to 
Armenians when Kurken meets a “Turkish or Kurdish farmer who was or was 
not a policeman” as he searches for his destroyed town of Bozmashen: “the 
                                                
32 See Alvard Jivanyan’s article, “The Neutralization of Tropes in Armenian Fairy 
Tale Narratives,” for detailed explanations of the connections between tropes 
and their enlivened variants. 
33 In Armenian, the name Isquhee (Իսկուհի) is a female name because it ends 
with the suffix “ուհի” (“oo-hee”) that makes male names into female ones. It 
comes from the Armenian word “իսկական” (“ees-ka-gan”), which means “true” 
or “real.” See the entry for “իսկուհի” in Hratchyah Ajarian’s Armenian Names 
Dictionary (Հրաչեայ Աճառեանի «Հայոց Անձնանունների Բառարան»). 
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policeman in farmer’s clothing swiped Kurken’s head cleanly off” (145, 145).34 
The threat of violence is real, and Isquhee’s transformation into a dog allows him 
to escape the fate of so many Armenians like Kurken. As a dog, Isquhee hides 
out in plain sight; his name isn’t mentioned again until the very end of the 
chapter when it becomes safe again to say it. If readers interpret Isquhee’s 
transformation in this way, they would be reminded of shape-shifting’s positive 
potential to preserve and protect, just as it did in the Armenian folktales. 
However, though Marcom deploys the Armenian folktale’s conceit of 
shape-shifting, her chapter undermines the view of Isquhee’s transformation as a 
successful evasion by virtue of its canine connotations. Throughout survivor 
memoirs and eyewitness accounts of the genocide, dogs are consistently depicted 
as voracious consumers of human flesh.35 The image of dogs eating corpses has 
become so commonplace that Swedish filmmakers Peå Holmquist and Suzanne 
Khardalian simply titled their 2005 documentary about the reminiscences of an 
elderly genocide survivor living in France I Hate Dogs!.36 In the context of the 
                                                
34 Marcom uses the traditional Anatolian opening convention for fairy tales, 
“there was and was not,” in her description of the Turkish or Kurdish farmer. 
I’m not sure what to make of this observation besides note it here, but there 
could be something to this reference... 
35 For descriptions of the man-eating dogs, see, for example, Leyla Neyzi and 
Hranush Kharatyan-Araqelyan’s Speaking to One Another: Personal Memories of the 
Past in Armenia and Turkey (especially pages 84, 137-139) and Miller & Miller’s 
Survivors (especially page 23). 
36 A filmmaker from France, Serge Avedikian, made a cartoon about the 1910 
removal of over 30,000 dogs from Constantinople. His film, called Chienne 
d'histoire, won the Short Film Palme d'Or in 2010. Critics, namely Myrna 
Douzjian, have argued that the film allegorically tells the story of the Armenian 
Genocide by making literal one of its main stories about the dehumanization of 
Armenians by the Ottoman administration. 
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story, though Isquhee escapes genocidal violence by turning into an animal, he 
turns into the symbol of genocidal destruction as it is frequently employed by 
today’s Armenians living in the diaspora.37 
Isquhee’s transformation into a dog becomes even more sinister when 
seen in the context of the dehumanizing rhetoric used by the Ottoman 
perpetrators against their Armenian victims. It is as if Isquhee becomes what the 
Ottomans envisioned as his degraded destiny. Armenians were “dogs” and 
“gâvurs” (“infidels” in Turkish) to their Turkish oppressors. Numerous survivor 
memoirs documented scenes of Armenians dehumanized with the label of 
“dog.” Grigoris Balakian, in his survivor testimony of Armenian Golgotha, 
recounts when he overheard a Turkish gendarme say to his peers, “Don’t bring 
bread or water to these dogs. Let them starve so they will understand what it 
means to rebel” (131). In David Kherdian’s recounting of his grandmother’s 
experience of surviving the Armenian Genocide in The Road from Home, Turkish 
villagers taunted Armenians with the paired slur of “infidel dog” (60). The 
Armenian Museum of America in Watertown, Massachusetts even has “a ‘dog 
collar’ that was worn by a victim of the Armenian Genocide in 1915” amongst its 
collections of Armenian cultural artifacts (“AMA Museum Collections”). 
Inspired by the diaspora’s stories of this terrible slur, Marcom has many scenes 
in Three Apples Fell from Heaven where Armenians are called dogs. One Turkish 
gendarme who revels in torturing Armenians imagines how “[t]he dogs cry: 
                                                
37 Dogs are a symbol in writing about the Armenian Genocide writ large, as in 
the title of Peter Balakian’s memoir, Black Dog of Fate: An American Son Uncovers 
His Armenian Past. 
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Dear God Sir Please Have Pity for Me, Son of God, Please” (Marcom, Three Apples 
176). Another indignantly exclaims that he “dislike[s] waiting one minute for a 
dog” as he rounds up Armenian men to be jailed (160). These scenes, inspired by 
reminiscences of survivors, employ an iconic idiom to characterize genocide 
perpetrators as much by their mode of comprehension as by their homicidal 
intent.38 So what are we to make of the irony that the dehumanization that 
defined and justified violence ends by saving Isquhee from that violence? Put in 
terms of the imagination: what purpose is served by using the contrastive 
imagination in related fashion for ironic juxtaposition?  
In my view, Marcom is juxtaposing the consul’s feeble document and the 
folktale of transformation to create an internally conflicted archive. In this 
archive, the commonplace canine usage is employed to make a mockery of 
salvation—secular and religious—because the saving grace of shape-shifting 
only visits degradation upon Isquhee, and in a manner that saves biological life 
but not his lived life. Though Isquhee is “saved” from being killed, he’s not saved 
for what he was most concerned about. Isquhee is introduced in his vignette just 
as he’s discussing his “future wife” (143). He dreams about her “extra sweety” 
breath and her “breasts and thighs” (141, 143). The only goal he discusses in the 
                                                
38 This sort of dehumanizing rhetoric has been discussed by Bolinger and Hirsch 
& Smith using the example of Jews who were demonized during the Holocaust. 
Bolinger argues that nouns have a particularly strong effect because, “When 
speakers really want to be insulting, they produce disparaging nouns, not 
disparaging adjectives” (Bolinger 79). Hirsch & Smith posits that subjugated 
populations in genocidal conditions “will be called vermin, infidels, traitors, 
heretics, enemies of the people. […] Such terms prepare the victims for 
destruction by dehumanizing members of the group and providing a warrant for 
genocide” (Hirsch & Smith 388). 
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chapter is marriage. By turning into a dog and escaping his murder, Isquhee is 
no longer able to realize his singular goal of marrying. His physical salvation 
ruins his chances of finding domestic bliss. If Isquhee’s desire to marry the ideal 
woman is forever denied, he assumes he might be given a magical capability in 
consolation. He assumes he could “lick at the fountain of [his cousin Kurken’s] 
blood rushing from his neck” just like the magical, dog-shaped creatures called 
արալեզ or հարալեզ (“aralez” or “haralez”) from Armenian folktale who could 
lick the dead back to life (145).39 Isquhee is denied this magical ability to revive 
the dead as he’s denied the marriage he wanted when he is saved by being 
transformed into a dog. Isquhee’s exclusion from his own life as the outcome of 
being “saved” from the mass murdering is more than dismaying; it is grounds 
for existential despair. Remembering that Marcom’s inspiration for the vignette 
is likely Consul Davis’s report, the juxtaposition of Isquhee’s despairing situation 
with the consul’s frustratingly slender portrayal of the town’s destruction and 
the decimation of its population is also more than dismaying; it’s a provocation. 
The emptiness that is the Consul’s report, and doesn’t just afflict its content, is 
almost metaphysically empty for it speaks of a deed, an outcome, and a point of 
                                                
39 The pronunciations of արալեզ and հարալեզ are “ah-rah-lehz” and “hah-rah-
lehz.” In the story of Ara the Fair, a Babylonian queen, Shamiram, heard of Ara’s 
beauty and longed for him to be her lover. When Ara resisted her advances, 
Shamiram sent her troops to battle Ara’s and capture him for her purposes. Ara 
is fatally wounded, but Shamiram sends mythical hounds to lick him back to life. 
The majority of tales about Ara recount the success of this rejuvinating licking. 
For more information about “aralez” or “haralez,” see the epic of “Ara the Fair 
and Shamiram” in Agop Jack Hacikyan, Gabriel Basmajian, Edward S. Franchuk, 
and Nourhan Ouzounian’s The Heritage of Armenian Literature: From the Oral 
Tradition to the Golden Age (pages 37-38, specifically). 
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view without salvational promise. It is thus not the violence which the 
eavesdropper shares with the victims; it is the despair of an existence in which 
redemption is unavailable and, given the inevitably degrading dog image, 
unspeakable.  
What, then, can be productively expressed in the aftermath of 
eavesdropping on this episode? The answer, I think, can be found by noticing the 
extent to which the eavesdropper’s folkloric expectations—her birthright 
idiom—are violated and how these violations engender a narrative anger that 
connects the eavesdropper to the anger of the denied victim. Though Marcom 
doesn’t represent this, Isquhee should justifiably feel anger at the opportunities 
denied him by his escape. What’s the point of being saved if nothing like life can 
be lived after it? Eavesdroppers of Isquhee’s story feel anger, too, when they hear 
the storytelling convention at the end of the vignette without the marriage they 
were led to expect at the beginning of it. Their narrative expectations are further 
denied because Isquhee as an ostensibly magical dog cannot save his cousin 
Kurken by licking his blood, like the magical dogs of folktales. In both Isquhee 
and the eavesdropper, “anger” at the violation of unfulfilled expectations 
becomes anger at “violation” in all its grievous connotations. These alignments 
between fictional character and eavesdropper differ from other emotions felt by 
audiences of other stories. Ancient Greek tragedy supposedly produces pity and 
fear. The “tragedy” in the archive of folktale and consular report produces 
despair and anger, but in sequence—like causal historical narrative itself—
wherein resigned despair becomes implacable anger about stories not told so 
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that false stories can be uttered in their place. Admittedly, most forms of 
sustained anger are self-defeating. The persistent anger at genocide-denying 
stories, however, meets the requirements of self-affirmation and historical 
consciousness. And it does so because, in the Armenian diaspora, the living 
perpetrator is the denier, with whom there can be no willingness “to agree to 
disagree.” 
Blumpty blumpty 
The affective truths of despair-turned-anger in the preceding vignette now 
are expanded to historical truths in “As To Where Are the Bootmakers and the 
Town of Kharphert.” While a consul’s report and folktales were juxtaposed in the 
former, in the present vignette, the contrast between the said and the 
unspeakable reveals the answers to two ambitions for historical inquiry: (1) Why 
did Turkish citizens buy into the genocidal program against their neighbors? 
and, (2) How was the Armenian Genocide a prequel to the Nazi Holocaust? The 
contrastive imagination is used to establish a connection between the psychology 
that addresses the first question and the ideology that addresses the second. And 
the outcome differs from theses arguing that genocidal urges emerge from fear of 
“the other.” The archive that undergoes postmemorial transformation in this 
vignette is an extended metaphor—an allegory—that presents its eavesdroppers 
with their own worst natures instead of warning them of that danger. Through 
the operation of a contrastive imagination that establishes the past and the 
present as mutually constitutive, the allegory is transformed into an instructive 
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parable—an analogy that prompts critical thinking—which compels its 
eavesdroppers to acknowledge that they are embedded in an historical moment 
still very much co-present with the traumatic past. 
The complex plot of “As To Where Are the Bootmakers and the Town of 
Kharphert” requires summary. The vignette is an allegory about a troupe of 
traveling bootmakers who bring frenzied destruction to a small Anatolian town. 
At the beginning of the vignette, these bootmakers arrive in the small, mostly 
Armenian town of Kharphert to make and sell handmade leather boots. The 
townspeople pine for the chic pointy shoes shaped like “scythes” and spend all 
of their money acquiring them, such that when their money is all spent, they 
begin trading unconventional items for a pair (180). Though the bootmakers are 
initially willing to trade for household goods (hand-knitted shawls, embroidered 
silk pillows, and the like), the trading quickly becomes exploitative, as “family 
books, scraps of poetry, hoes, oxen, sheep, young daughters, chimneys, brick 
walls, tonnirs, and land titles” are bartered for boots (181-182). Nevertheless, the 
bootmakers’ craft is so popular in Kharphert that the entire town is demolished 
to make room for the bootmakers’ workshops and for their payment offices. In 
the remnants of the town, the bootmakers issue an edict to keep track of 
complicated new methods of payment, which include all manner of body parts. 
After having drained the townspeople of everything in the town (both material 
and familial), the bootmakers pack up and move to Munich, taking on “an 
ambitious street artist who quickly rose to the position of General Manager” 
(184). At the end of this vignette, the bootmakers destroy Kharphert and move on 
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to terrorize Germany and eventually much of Europe during World War II under 
the management of Adolf Hitler. As an allegory for the way that an entire 
population “buys in” to committing genocide against their neighbors, the 
vignette makes provocative comparisons between Anatolia and Germany in their 
darkest times. 
Though the allusions to Nazis and Hitler suggest otherwise, Marcom’s 
chapter likely emerged out of a particular archival document of the Armenian 
Genocide. I read the bootmakers’ edict (to be discussed in further detail below) 
as being inspired by the Official Proclamation of the Ottoman Empire that 
Marcom reprints elsewhere in her novel. In a chapter called “Official 
Proclamation,” Marcom reproduces a source she found in the appendix to 
Consul Leslie Davis’s chronicle of the Armenian genocide in the Kharphert and 
Mezre region, The Slaughterhouse Province. In Marcom’s novel, the document 
dated June 26, 1915, mandates “a literal obedience to the following orders, in a 
categorical manner” and goes on to order that Armenians ready themselves for a 
temporary relocation by entrusting their goods to the government for 
safekeeping; that they take comfort in knowing their route through the 
Mesopotamian will be comfortable because shelters have been prepared for 
them; and that they leave weapons behind because they will be protected by 
soldiers and gendarmes (126).40 “To assure their comfort during the journey, hans 
and suitable buildings have been prepared, and everything has been done for 
                                                
40 In Marcom’s novel, the source is dated June 26, 1915. In Consul Davis’s book, 
the source is dated June 25, 1915. 
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their safe arrival at their places of temporary residence, without their being 
subjected to any kind of attack or affronts,” the governing bodies insist (127). The 
nine other rules to be followed continue in much the same way. In sum, the form 
and tone of the Official Proclamation as reproduced in Consul Davis’s book and 
as reprinted in Marcom’s novel are decidedly bureaucratic, with the actor of the 
sentence obscured in passive sentence constructions. Legalese dominates in all 
ten of the rules to be followed in the proclamation, and Marcom took note of this 
aspect when she transformed the document in her vignette. 
Transforming the document into the bootmakers’ edict of the vignette 
mimics the source material’s legalese, a mode of discourse that makes ideology 
more visible. In this case, the document establishes the legalities, norms, and 
practices of civilization in a manner that destroys the sense of connection that 
“being civilized” presupposes. The bootmakers declare: 
AS of today, July 5, blumpty blumpty, plucked out nails (in their 
entirety, please, no slivers or scraps), pulled-out hairs (bulbous 
roots also intact, please, this is a business), hands, fingers 
(allowable but of lesser value), feet (toes ineligible), fully intact 
soles, noses, breasts, testicles (with penis, an added pair), secondary 
internal organs (minus the spleen, which can be given no exchange 
value), eyeballs (intact with blue given a slightly higher value), and 
all water sources will be accepted as official currency. Currency 
rates will change daily dependent on availability and circulation. 
Look for the signs in the Currency At A Glance in the north wing of 
the marketplace. (183) 
The bootmakers want blood in exchange for their boots. Almost all of the items 
the bootmakers list in their new rules of exchange are body parts that are 
typically extracted in torture: the nails they want are “plucked out,” the hairs 
they desire are “pulled-out” (183). In one sense, the bootmakers’ operation is an 
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allegory of the Ottoman Empire’s orchestration of genocide under the auspices of 
temporary exile. The last item of the bootmakers’ list, the only one that is not a 
body part, “all water sources,” further supports this view (183). As oral 
historians Donald E. and Lorna Touryan Miller remind us in their decades of 
work collecting Armenian survivor stories, during the Armenian Genocide, the 
men were often outright murdered, but the women and children were sent on 
“deportations [which] were highly organized so that only a fraction of those who 
began the marches completed their journey. The rest died of thirst, hunger, 
disease” (Miller & Miller, “Armenian Survivors” 55). In other texts, survivors 
told stories about Turkish gendarmes who refused water to the deportees, even 
when the Euphrates was in sight and the beggars were green-black with 
dehydration.41 These civilization-ending practices are obscured in both the 
fictional edict and the historical Official Proclamation in language that affirms 
the legalities which uphold civilization. The bootmakers assert their business 
acumen with parenthetical comments in passive voice. They won’t accept partial 
or halfhearted efforts at payment. Certain body parts are “ineligible” while 
others are “allowable but of lesser value” (Marcom, Three Apples 183). They 
assure the townspeople that they are not running an amateur operation, but a 
verified “business” with clear terms and conditions for the exchange of boots. 
The Proclamation likewise assures its listeners that everything is under control, 
that the terms of the relocation are clear. Both edict and Proclamation use the 
                                                
41 For information about the dehydration of exiles, see Rouben Paul Adalian’s 
excellent entry “The Armenian Genocide” in Century of Genocide: Critical Essays 
and Eyewitness Accounts. 
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norms of governance and business to call for the methodical destruction of 
civilization.  
And yet, what is the source of the bootmakers’ conviction that its audience 
will agree to the arrangement? This is the point where the allegorical edict 
starkly differs from its historical source document. The difference inheres in the 
realm of the symbolic. If body parts are being exchanged for boots, what do the 
boots symbolize in the allegory? What were the Ottoman Turks and Kurds 
promised in exchange for killing their own neighbors? Why did they buy in to 
the deal? 
These questions about the terms of the allegorical edict can be answered 
by focusing on the comical “blumpty blumpty”—its “hear ye hear ye”—that 
announces the advent of the proclamation. In my view, the nonsense throat-
clearing contrasts what is said with what is unsayable. Yes, “blumpty blumpty” is 
the sound of the town crier clearing his throat to ensure that the villagers are 
listening. But the confidence of these words bespeak that the villagers will listen 
and obey—that nonsense will gain attention and motivate action—and enables 
the vocalization itself. And, therefore, possesses actual semantic content. The 
symbolism of boots reveals the content and thereby answers the first historical 
question: Why did the villagers buy into the bootmakers’ scheme? Why did 
nativists murder their neighbors? The boots are “beatific” to the villagers who 
see them as necessary for their blissful happiness (183). Essentially, they elevate 
the boots to the status of life-affirming object. The edict ratifies this belief: in 
hearing that they could make exchanges to gain more of the “beatific” object, the 
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listeners of the edict are ennobled. They think themselves important enough to 
be given the opportunity by the bootmakers to own even more of their “beatific” 
goods. This feeling is key because it suggests that the boots improved the 
villagers’ psychological state. If they became blissfully happy as a result of 
obtaining the boots, they must have been less happy before. I argue that the 
source of the villagers’ sense of insufficiency without the boots explains why 
they agreed to exchange life and civilization for the beatific objects. The 
bootmakers know that the villagers are afflicted by the insufficiency of their 
individual and collective lives. Any disciplinary, take-charge program that 
includes them also, by implication, honors them. So the opportunity for the 
villagers to assent offers enhanced stature and organizes practical and emotional 
commitments. “Blumpty blumpty” both announces and concludes the message, 
for to grant that it has semantic content is to perform the intention and act to get 
with the program. Nativists killed their neighbors from fear of their own selves 
being insufficient, as needing a method and purpose from elsewhere to cherish 
their own lives.42 This is the unspeakable truth that answers the first question. 
                                                
42 Historical and sociological examinations of the period of Nazi collaboration by 
millions of ordinary Germans against their Jewish and Roma neighbors supports 
my argument that collaboration was viewed as a “deal” that promised the 
survival and success of those who agreed to the terms. Michael Burleigh argues 
that ordinary Germans who tacitly supported the Nazi regime were “bathed in 
narcissistic ethno-sentimentality, enjoying a brief improvement in their standard 
of living and vistas of national greatness” (812). For Burleigh, the rise of Nazism 
by the support of ordinary Germans was a “dystopian ‘quick fix’ to Germany’s 
manifold problems ultimately resulted in the deaths of some fifty million 
people” (1). Similarly, William Brustein offers an “interest-based” hypothesis for 
the rise of Nazism. He argues that “According to the theory of interest-based 
affiliation, the act of joining a party (especially an extremist party) is a two-stage 
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Now the second question: How are events in Germany and Anatolia 
connected? The answer to this question emerges from the transformation of the 
allegory into a parable during the vignette. Having overheard a critical insight 
gained from contrasting the voiced portions of the edict with the confidence 
beneath the nonsense “unsaid,” the eavesdropper is positioned for an historical 
extrapolation which rests upon the perpetrator psychology of insufficiency, the 
desire for someone or something outside the self to provide substance, worth, 
worthiness. This desire occurs not only in the past histories of Turkish and 
German nationalism; it is in all aspects of human existence in history. This desire 
constitutes that aspect of historicity that defines the “fearful” in present 
consciousness. This realization is different than the historical understanding of 
George Santayana: “Those who cannot remember the past are condemned to 
repeat it.” Santayana’s piece of wisdom comes from memory exercised in the 
interests of historical understanding; parables of the danger of forgetting its 
advice abound. But the parable of the “blumpty blumpty” scheme of the 
bootmakers communicates the wisdom from postmemory as enabled by the 
historical imagination: self-reflexive and self-reflective critical thinking emerge 
from the acknowledgment that the present is inflected by the transformation of 
the past into the ever-present past. And this transformation, this keeping trauma 
alive, is the way we reveal our historical selves to our living selves for moral and 
humane purposes. These purposes underlie civilization.  
                                                                                                                                            
process. Correlation of interests between individuals and party programs 
constitutes the first stage; the second stage consists of response to incentives or 
disincentives for joining” (178). 
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GOING HOME: SENTIMENTAL POSTMEMORY AND 
DIASPORIC RETURN IN THE DAYDREAMING BOY 
After the success of Three Apples Fell from Heaven, Micheline Aharonian 
Marcom set her sights on a different postmemorial experience, that of a fictional 
Armenian boy orphaned by the Armenian Genocide who ends up in Beirut. As 
she had done with Three Apples Fell from Heaven, Marcom began to research the 
time period she chose as the setting for her book. With her first novel, Marcom 
worked from a number of survivor memoirs and her family’s own personal 
stories of the genocide to create a polyphonic novel. In her second, 2004’s The 
Daydreaming Boy, Marcom noticed she had much less published work to sift 
through. In exasperation she admitted in interviews that “there’s nothing written 
on these orphans. There’s nothing. On orphans in general, there’s so little it’s 
unbelievable. I was sort of mining these first person accounts to write this first 
book and here, I found two things” (Marcom, Interview with Michael Silverblatt 
on The Daydreaming Boy).43 As she had in Three Apples Fell from Heaven, Marcom 
would have to take the source material she was given through the usual channels 
                                                
43 Marcom’s two “things” here are Andranik Zaroukian’s memoir, Men without 
Childhood about life as an orphan after the Armenian Genocide and James L. 
Barton’s chronicle of a humanitarian organization that helped Armenian 
orphans, Story of Near East Relief (1915–1930): An Interpretation. Marcom includes 
Barton’s description of an orphan who had been Turkified in one of her chapters. 
Marcom scholar Shushan Avagyan also disclosed in a personal communication: 
“Marcom acknowledged that she had made use of Zaroukian’s book in an email 
to me. This is also clear from the descriptions of the orphanage, the rules and the 
punishments. For example, adopting the words ‘mairigs’ and ‘hairig,’ which 
Zaroukian uses to describe the wardens and the director of the orphanage. The 
passages with the sea and the walks on the Corniche are also inspired from 
Zaroukian’s book. Finally, many of the experiences that Vostanig has at the 
orphanage are nearly identical with those of Boghos in Zaroukian’s book” 
(Shushan Avagyan, personal communication, 22 July 2015). 
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of memory (in this case, the two paltry “things” of the Armenian orphan archive) 
and turn them into a novel. In my chapter on Marcom’s second novel, instead of 
analyzing the way that Marcom transforms the source material she was working 
with such that she is able to passionately remember the past in the present—a 
method I used in my chapter on Three Apples Fell from Heaven—I analyze how the 
singular protagonist of Marcom’s second novel does so himself with his own set 
of memorial source materials. The novel’s focus on a single consciousness, 
Vahé’s, is a departure from Marcom’s previous focus on multiple characters in 
Three Apples Fell from Heaven. Because of this shift in focus from plural to singular 
storytelling, I analyze Vahé’s attempt to imaginatively transform a fragmentary 
archive in order to productively keep a feature of the trauma alive. His ambition 
for existential plentitude is indeed impelled by the sense of frustration which I 
have posited as an informing psychic condition of postmemory. However, Vahé 
attempts to transform his slender archive by employing a “sentimental 
imagination” whose operation cannot produce life-enriching effects and affects. 
The novel makes its points about postmemory by telling the story of a 
single fictional orphan of the Armenian Genocide, Vahé Tcheubjian. Vahé, a 47-
year-old carpenter during the 1964-1965 setting of the novel, grew up in Beirut’s 
Bird’s Nest Orphanage during the 1920s without ever knowing who his parents 
were, nor how he was orphaned, nor why he spoke only Turkish when he 
arrived at the orphanage, nor how he managed to survive the genocide that 
likely claimed at least one of his parents as victims. With constant shifts in time 
and setting, the novel follows Vahé through reminiscences of his education and 
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disciplining at the Armenian orphanage; his strained relationship with his wife, 
Juliana; his archival hunt for personal connections to the past of the Armenian 
Genocide; his denial of Vostanig, an abused and tormented fellow orphan from 
the Bird’s Nest Orphanage; his fantasies about and eventual rape of Béatrice, a 
Palestinian maid who lives in the same building as Vahé; his imagined scenes of 
his unnamed and unknown mother; and his eventual murder at the hands of 
militants during the Lebanese Civil War in 1986. Because of Marcom’s sustained 
focus on the character of Vahé and his thoughts and experiences, I see The 
Daydreaming Boy as Marcom’s reflection upon the character of Vahé’s 
imagination, particularly its unsuitability for producing the kinds of affective 
and intellectual contents successive generations need to internalize as passionate 
remembering.  
I begin by focusing on Vahé’s education at the orphanage. Emphasizing 
how Vahé receives and perceives the memories of the Armenian Genocide that 
are passed down to him at the orphanage, I describe how Vahé is afflicted by 
feelings of belatedness, loss, and lack of personal connection to the genocide, 
which colonizes his imagination. As a result, Vahé’s diasporic experience is one 
in which he is distanced from, what he takes to be, a lost self. For Vahé, 
expressions of emotion are impossible because his emotions don’t have recourse 
to a recognizable self. Sadly, Vahé projects his raw emotional urges onto his 
source materials. Such projection is not transformation, and so Vahé does not 
passionately remember as an existential investment in his present life; rather, he 
revisits versions of the trauma upon himself and others, finally repeating its 
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deadly outcome. Vahé’s desire to “return home” becomes nothing more than his 
drive to repeat, as an individual, the genocidal victimization. The big “truth” of 
the unfulfilled postmemorial experience depicted in the novel is one that Vahé 
misunderstands. He tragically never realizes that the “home” of diaspora is the 
non-idealized past enlivened in the different time and place of the present. 
Thus far, The Daydreaming Boy has not been discussed in the context of the 
postmemory phenomenon. In the only academic journal article on the novel, the 
approach is largely Foucauldian in focus. That article, “(Un)Disciplining 
Traumatic Memory: Mission Orphanages and the Afterlife of Genocide in 
Micheline Aharonian Marcom’s The Daydreaming Boy” by Rebecca Saunders and 
Shushan Avagyan, appeared in Contemporary Women’s Writing in 2010 alongside 
articles on Margaret Atwood and Alice Munro.44 Saunders and Avagyan explain 
that Marcom’s novel reveals “the ways in which mission orphanages attempted 
to ‘discipline’ trauma,” ultimately arguing “that Marcom’s narrative 
demonstrates that the disciplinary space of the orphanage succeeded less in 
‘curing’ subjects from trauma than in repressing traumatic symptoms, that the 
regulatory practices of the orphanages not only were unable to efface traumatic 
memory by discipline but also often retraumatized the children in their charge” 
(200). Marcom’s novel about Vahé’s experience offers Saunders and Avagyan the 
opportunity to add the orphanage to Foucault’s list of disciplinary spaces (along 
with the school, the prison, the hospital, the barracks) that simultaneously create 
                                                
44 It’s interesting to note that Marcom’s second novel is the only one, as of the 
writing of my dissertation, to be analyzed in an academic journal article. 
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subjects who are “disciplined on the surface while bearing another unruly self 
they strive ceaselessly to discard or disguise” (205). They call Marcom’s work a 
novel of “traumatized realism” and argue that we need to combine trauma 
studies with a critique of modernity to understand it (217). While Saunders and 
Avagyan share my interest in Marcom’s novel as one that “explores the painfully 
intimate, quotidian, and often obscure aftereffects of the genocide in the lives of 
survivors and their descendants,” we focus our attentions on different causes for 
the aftereffects (199). Saunders and Avagyan are concerned with revealing the 
dominating force of the orphanage as a place that retraumatized the orphans 
through harsh discipline, creating subjects who could at times “have been able to 
function ‘normally’ in society but who remained haunted by traumatic 
memories, incomprehensible impulses, and an unspeakable self” (217). I, too, 
identify the orphanage as one of the sources of Vahé’s problems, but not in the 
way that Saunders and Avagyan see it. Instead of seeing the depravations of 
speaking about the Armenian Genocide at the orphanage as leading to Vahé’s 
turmoil, I will focus on how the orphanage administrators and other people in 
Vahé’s life introduce him to the trauma of the Armenian Genocide by way of a 
fragmented archive that revisits the aftermath of trauma upon him. Saunders 
and Avagyan hint at the phenomenon of transferred historical trauma in which 
they see victims as “haunted by an amnesia of origins, exilic dislocation, 
traumatic (post)memory, and the melancholia of cultural and linguistic loss,” yet 
their scholarship engages debates within the field of trauma studies as inflected 
by theories of discipline (199).  
 87 
The method that Saunders and Avagyan use is the first of two major 
analytical entry points suggested by the novel’s two epigraphs. One of these dual 
epigraphs, a Biblical verse, promises punishment to those who “offend one of 
these little ones” (The Daydreaming Boy iii). Yes, this epigraph suggests a 
discipline approach to the novel. The other epigraph, an excerpt from William 
Faulkner’s Absalom, Absalom!, suggests another route. In the epigraph, the 
character of Sutpen discovers that he must do “not what he wanted to do but 
what he just had to do, had to do it whether he wanted to or not” to serve both 
his ancestors and his future descendants (iii). This epigraph emphasizes 
generational ties, familial legacies, and the presence and importance of the past 
in the present. 
In Marcom’s second novel, the eponymous “daydreaming boy” of the 
novel, Vahé, inhabits a postmemorial psychic condition, but his insufficient 
imagination confines him within its frustrations, its self-alienations. Though 
Vahé refuses to believe that his encounters with stories of the past have any 
resonance in his present, he becomes consumed by undigested fragments of the 
past that he is unable to assimilate or “own” in his own life. His desperation is 
fueled by his precarious state as an orphan in the Armenian diaspora in Beirut 
immediately following the Armenian Genocide. Poised between feelings of loss 
and abandonment, he seeks “the authentic,” some self-affirming soulmate or 
image or story that will validate the fact of his sentient and historical existence. If 
he can construe such an enabling object of self-ratification as an embodiment of 
an authentic past, he reasons, then his attachment to it will center and amplify 
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his sense of being. But psychic and existential emptiness cannot be remedied by 
fattening up the self with memories of the past. It is postmemory’s 
transformations that are required to meet this challenge and the imagination 
Vahé is capable of deploying proves insufficient because it only recycles loss 
through the heart and the mind. It is neither cathartic mourning nor 
postmemorial truth-internalizing nor diasporic “home-making.” It is sadly a 
prescription for repeat victimization. It is self-annihilating daydreaming. 
*** 
Vahé arrives at the Bird’s Nest Orphanage in Beirut after traveling there 
on an orphan transport train from Turkey as a preschool-aged child.45 He lacks 
knowledge of his family members and what happened to them, for “[a]s for 
records there are none” (The Daydreaming Boy 64). Without records, Vahé chooses 
his own birthdate, one that is tellingly two years after the start of the Armenian 
Genocide (24).46 When Vahé chooses to place his conception and birth after the 
date of the massacres that likely contributed to his orphaning, he reveals his 
reflex to distance himself from the monumental historical event that comes to 
                                                
45 Along with Saunders and Avagyan’s article and James L. Barton’s book about 
the Near East Relief, scholars interested in the historical plight of orphaned 
children after the Armenian Genocide should refer to Nazan Maksudyan’s 
“Being Saved to Serve: Armenian Orphans of 1894-1896 and Interested Relief in 
Missionary Orphanages,” Vahakn N. Dadrian’s “Children as Victims of 
Genocide: The Armenian Case,” Uğur Ümit Üngör’s “Orphans, Converts, and 
Prostitutes: Social Consequences of War and Persecution in the Ottoman Empire, 
1914–1923,” Isabel Kaprielian-Churchill’s “The Armenian Genocide and the 
Survival of Children,” and Keith David Watenpaugh’s “‘Are There Any Children 
for Sale?’: Genocide and the Transfer of Armenian Children (1915–1922).” 
46 He doesn’t even know his own name, so the orphanage administrators dub 
him “Vahé” (64). Vahé takes his “family name” from “the store vendor who sells 
the best candies” (32). 
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define his life at the orphanage and everywhere thereafter. And yet, though Vahé 
wishes he were born in 1917—two years after the start of the genocide—his life 
in Beirut is inflected and afflicted by a history he can’t remember, a past largely 
transmitted to him through the pedagogy he receives at the orphanage. 
Vahé listens to the lessons of the orphanage administrators, the Mayrigs 
(“the Mothers”) and the Hayrig (“the Father”), and overhears the conversations 
of his elder orphaned peers about the exile, torture, and massacre of Armenians. 
In his summary of what he learned, Vahé explains that, “During our years of 
school at the Nest we were told the stories of before, of the boys from Kharphert 
orphanage, the Danish House, arrived in this place (the desert exodus, extracted 
fingernails, our fathers in piles)” (64). The abbreviated items Vahé lists in his 
parenthetical comment reflect the fragmentary archive of Vahé’s pedagogy. From 
his surrogate parents and brothers, he learns that Armenians were marched 
through the Deir al-Zor Desert, that they were tortured if captured trying to 
escape, that Armenian men (possibly even the orphans’ real fathers) were 
murdered en masse and thrown into mass graves. The truncated stories teach 
Vahé that he and the other orphans arrived at the Bird’s Nest because something 
horrible had happened in the old country.  
Though Vahé is given a kind of knowledge about the Armenian Genocide 
from the fragmented oral archive passed down to him in the orphanage, he 
perceives this pedagogy negatively because of the nature of its transmission. The 
memories that get passed down to Vahé at the orphanage come to him through 
an oft-repeated script. When Vahé verbatim repeats the ordered list a few lines 
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later in the same chapter, he admits that “As for the histories (the desert exodus, 
extracted fingernails, our fathers in piles) they are as foreign to me as any foreign 
country: my life began with the sea’s panorama as the train wound its way down 
the mountains of the Lebanon into the city of Beirut” (64). Whether the stories 
were meant to teach Vahé a moral, political, or historical lesson, or whether they 
were stories told by survivors for their own coping purposes, the stories fail to 
resonate with Vahé who interprets them only as “foreign.” His “foreign” 
experience with received genocide pedagogy suggests that the stories are strange 
and unfamiliar in spite of (and maybe even because of) the many repetitions he 
has performed of the ordered list. In this sense, “foreign” is a way for Vahé to 
mark his dissatisfaction with the pedagogy that was supposed to inculcate him 
to “never forget” the past. To Vahé, the list unsatisfactorily preserves a history he 
cannot own as a personal inheritance, and so, must be judged as such with the 
label of “foreign.” The label deliberately creates and marks Vahé’s distance from 
the past he says he cannot remember, yet the rest of his sentence reveals that 
Vahé desires a connection with the past he is distancing himself from. By using 
“the” instead of the personalized alternatives of “my” or “our,” Vahé reveals that 
the transferred memories are not his nor his personal inheritance. The stories 
don’t resonate with him, their very insufficiency frustrates him. In this way, 
Vahé exhibits postmemory’s psychic condition of dissatisfaction that comes from 
feeling disconnected from the past. He wants, simultaneously, to distance 
himself from this past and find a means to own it in a self-defining way. 
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Dissatisfied with the transmitted past of the orphanage, Vahé begins 
searching for “authentic” self-affirming soul mates, images, and stories in the 
diaspora that he can latch onto instead of the “foreign” ordered list that he’s 
made to repeat at the orphanage. 
*** 
Vahé’s marriage to Juliana and his interactions with a fellow orphan 
named Andranik exemplify his dilemma for a self-presence that embraces and 
internalizes a past from which, intellectually, he’d prefer to escape. Initially, 
Vahé seeks a personal connection to the past in the physical features of his wife, 
Juliana. A singular trait drew Vahé to her—“the dark hollows beneath [her eyes]. 
[The] black shadows beneath her eyes like some women wear rouge and lipstick, […] this 
preeminent and permanent black specter” (127, emphasis in original). Vahé sees this 
“irreversible sad nightmark” as “a bold truth in the mendacious decorous world with its 
unsaid unsayable things” (126, 127, emphasis in original). The dark circles beneath 
Juliana’s eyes are physical markers of the sad past of the Armenian Genocide, 
stories that were often “unsaid unsayable” because of various reasons in the 
diaspora (127). Some reasons were “mendacious” because of genocide denial that 
had already begun as early as the decade following the genocide (127).47 Other 
                                                
47 According to Belinda Cooper & Taner Akcam’s research, “Atatürk himself 
admitted and decried the killings of Armenians several times in the early 
postwar years, and his Ankara-based nationalist movement even agreed that 
accountability was necessary. At the urging of the occupying Allies, abortive 
trials of those responsible for the Armenian genocide were held in 1919, and they 
provided important factual evidence. But after the founding of the republic, 
denial set in. The actions of Ottoman forces were framed as a courageous defense 
of the empire against Western and Russian ambitions and the encroachments of 
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reasons were “decorous” because of embarrassment, shame, propriety, or even 
just a desire to move beyond the pain (127).48 Despite these reasons for silence, 
Vahé believes that the dark circles under Juliana’s eyes reveal the past’s painful 
“unsaid” truths and allow him access to that past. So, when “Over the years she 
covered it up and he lost this thought of her, he lost her darkness, her difference, and she 
farther away now and he unable to see back, to find his way back to the twenty-two-year-
old girl with a black belt beneath her eyes like dark sunlight,” Vahé loses his 
connection to Juliana (127, emphasis in original). Before, the darkness under her 
eyes paradoxically illuminated her face for Vahé as he searched for connections 
to the past that tied all Armenians together. Now, Juliana’s face without its dark 
                                                                                                                                            
Christianity. A number of the republic’s founders had been involved in the 
Armenian genocide; they were glorified as heroic founding fathers, and their 
crimes disappeared from official histories” (Cooper & Akcam 83). For more 
information about the Republic of Turkey’s policy of denial, see: Taner Akcam’s 
From Empire to Republic: Turkish Nationalism and the Armenian Genocide, Belinda 
Cooper & Taner Akcam’s “Turks, Armenians, and the ‘G-Word,’” Ara 
Sarafiyan’s “The Ottoman Archives Debate and the Armenian Genocide,” 
Samantha Power’s A Problem from Hell: America and the Age of Genocide (especially 
pages 10 and 14-16), and Vahakn N. Dadrian’s “Ottoman Archives and Denial of 
the Armenian Genocide.” 
48 Armenian Genocide survivors had many reasons to stay silent about the past. 
In their research, oral historians Donald E. Miller & Lorna Touryan Miller 
explain that “One reason events are repressed is surely that they are too horrible 
to contemplate. But we also suspect that in some cases survivors’ life histories are 
tinged with guilt and shame: memories of rape, forced nudity, humiliation of 
parents, the abandonment of siblings, coerced conversion to Islam, and so on” 
(“An Oral History Perspective on Responses to the Armenian Genocide” 192). 
For more information about the different responses of Armenian Genocide 
survivors to tell their stories, see: Donald E. Miller & Lorna Touryan Miller’s 
“Typology of Survivor Accounts” (particularly pages 60-62 for “Repression”), 
Donald E. Miller & Lorna Touryan Miller’s “An Oral History Perspective on 
Responses to the Armenian Genocide,” Flora A. Keshgegian’s “Defining 
Testimonies: Narrative Remembrances by Armenian Survivors of Genocide,” 
and Jennifer Rinaldi’s Survivor Song: The Voice of Trauma, and Its Echoes (especially 
pages 154-159). 
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circles is a face like anyone else’s, a face without the difference that made him 
love her. Without Juliana’s paradoxical “dark sunlight” to shine a pathway into 
the dark past, Vahé returns to the feeling he had after hearing the stories of his 
caretakers at the orphanage. He again feels disconnected from the past he didn’t 
personally experience, though he had a tenuous connection with it in the face of 
his wife. Further, Vahé’s estrangement from Juliana is marked by the text, since 
the italicized portion of the chapter marks Vahé’s inner thoughts in reference to 
his and Juliana’s initial acquaintance. The typographic shift echoes how Vahé 
never felt comfortable enough to tell “her in all of these many years how [he] hated it 
when she began to cover up this beautiful darkness” (127, emphasis in original). 
Without Juliana’s physical darkness to tether him personally to the past of the 
Armenian Genocide, Vahé must seek other methods to forge the connection. 
If Juliana’s face was a failed method for personally connecting to the past, 
Vahé sees the totality of their relationship as another method. Initially, Vahé 
hoped that his marriage might offer him a connection to his lost past. In an 
imagined conversation with his unknown mother, Vahé asserts the surviving 
generation’s responsibility and ability to “remake the unremembered the 
unhistoried because the progeny can do it, our durance at its end, we all of us 
break the wind with our bodies put the light off its course with enough of our 
forms” (132). Fighting against the metaphoric elements of wind and light, Vahé 
expresses his belief that the diaspora’s new generation can fight off the 
disappearance of Armenians and their community outside of the homeland after 
the events of the genocide. They could rescue the lost members of their group, 
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allowing Armenians to endure despite their diminished numbers when it would 
have been easy, as natural as succumbing to the twin natural forces of wind and 
light, to let the group die out. Further, the new generation can free the surviving 
generation from its “durance,” its imprisonment inside mounting obligations 
and expectations to ensure the endurance of the race. The words that Vahé 
speaks pile up, unpunctuated, as the bodies of the survivor generation might 
multiply with the procreation he craves. With Juliana, Vahé could have added to 
these numbers by fathering a child “willing to bear and bear the rest of the clan 
down through into History, thicken the blood and bring it home and gather it 
together and saying ‘We are here!’ and by this she means we can return” (132). 
As part of the diaspora of “dispersed and attenuated blood,” Vahé lives outside 
the ancestral Armenian homelands of Central Anatolia (132). If he had 
procreated, that spread out and uncharacteristic weakened blood might have 
been thickened by another member. Juliana and Vahé’s marriage could have 
produced a child that would “make what [Vahé’s mother] gave [him] not in vain 
and somehow a small victory, an unhistoried vanquish, made so by the blood’s 
continued rush through veins and artery into out of a pumping heart to 
remember you” (132). The blood of his mother flows through Vahé’s veins, and it 
would have continued to flow through the veins of his children. Their lives 
would have been reminders of and testaments to those that were lost.49 Their 
lives would have been small victories against the destruction that had been 
                                                
49 Children born after a traumatic event have been called “memorial candles” by 
scholars of the Holocaust. See Dina Wardi’s Memorial Candles: Children of the 
Holocaust. 
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planned for Armenians in the genocide. Had he and Juliana procreated, Vahé 
could have forged his desired personal connection to the past by continuing the 
family line. In this scene, the dominant desire is a sentimental one—Vahé wants 
to create a child with Juliana who would allow him to “remake” the family 
members that he lost in the genocide and reunite with them in a prelapsarian 
homeland. 
Despite the hopes that Vahé had for making a family with Juliana that 
might help him connect to the past through a bloodline, his ruminations on the 
topic elsewhere in the novel reveal that he interprets the task of procreation as a 
futile trap for the generation living in the diaspora after the genocide. He 
remembers when he first met Juliana, how he thought to himself, “the attenuated 
blood flows in you, stretched out across the Der-el-Zor and the Lebanon because we all of 
us here adrift and because the past is always unspoken heavy and ever-present like some 
invisible unfurled ribbon and we entangled in it as we are in our own blood” (127, 
emphasis in original). In this version of their relationship, Vahé isn’t as optimistic 
about their pairing. Just as in the previous scene, the Armenian race’s blood in 
this version is also “attenuated,” unnaturally thinned by being dispersed across 
the Middle East after a genocide diminished its ranks’ numbers. But this time the 
blood cannot be thickened, strengthened, and reinvigorated with newly-borne 
members. The blood this time is like the entangling ribbon of the past that stifles 
and constricts. Both Juliana and Vahé are entangled by this ribbon of blood and 
the past—they are both removed from their ancestral homes, “adrift” in the 
Levant, but tethered still to the past that their parents left behind in Anatolia 
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(127). Yet instead of seeing this connection as a positive aspect of the diaspora,50 
Vahé remarks on the ribbon’s invisibility because members of the diaspora do 
not speak about this “heavy and ever-present” past (127). Largely because Vahé’s 
desire to strengthen his group’s numbers and ensure their continuation is a 
desire particular to a diasporic generation borne out of genocide, he doesn’t see 
his efforts to start a family as a way to personally connect to the past.51 He sees the 
instrumentality of his and Juliana’s marriage for preserving and enriching the 
Armenian community, but he questions how useful their family creation would 
be for his desire to connect to the past on a personal and intimate level since 
everyone is entangled in the past of their race. The entangling nature of what 
Vahé perceives as obligatory procreation is echoed in one of the novel’s two 
epigraphs. This epigraph, from William Faulkner’s Absalom, Absalom!, frames 
Vahé’s predicament exactly:  
All of a sudden he discovered, not what he wanted to do but what 
he just had to do, had to do it whether he wanted to or not, because 
if he did not do it he knew that he could never live with himself for 
the rest of his life, never live with what all the men and women that 
had died to make him had left inside of him for him to pass on, 
with all the dead ones waiting and watching to see if he was going 
to do it right, fix things right so that he would be able to look in the 
face not only the old dead ones but all the living ones that would 
come after him when he would be one of the dead. (iii)  
                                                
50 For example, diaspora scholar Robin Cohen, in his Global Diasporas, argues for 
the “positive virtues” of living away from the homeland in diaspora. He posits 
that “The tension between an ethnic, a national and a transnational identity is 
often a creative, enriching one” (Cohen 24). 
51 See “Coping with Ottoman Turkish Genocide: An Exploration of the 
Experience of Armenian Survivors” by Anie S. Kalayjian, Siroon P. Shahinian, 
Edmund L. Gergerian, and Lisa Saraydarian for more information about the 
urge/obligation to procreate after a traumatic event. 
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Vahé’s predicament aligns with the character in Faulkner’s novel, Sutpen, whom 
Quentin’s grandfather explains had much pressure to “fix things right” in light 
of the past. Like Sutpen, Vahé feels obligated to do something to honor the dead 
and to make sure the future progeny remember him fondly. This obligation 
makes Vahé feel the weight of responsibility for keeping his line going when so 
much had happened during the genocide to make sure that he and his people 
were wiped out. With the obligation weighing him down, Vahé assures himself 
that his relationship with Juliana could never yield a personal connection to the 
past because it is mired in expectations of instrumental diasporic survival. 
As he had with Juliana, Vahé has similar unsatisfactory attempts with 
other members of the diaspora to personally connect to the past. He looks to his 
fellow orphans to show him the way. In two separate chapters, Vahé describes a 
chance meeting over drinks years after he had left the orphanage, started his 
career as a carpenter, and married Juliana. This meeting with another orphan 
named Andranik leaves Vahé reeling because his connection to the past of the 
genocide is revealed to be extremely personal and painful. Over glasses of arak, a 
sweet licorice liquor popular in the Middle East, the men catch up on their lives 
since the orphanage. The conversation starts with the usual pleasantries about 
wives, families, professions, summer plans. Then Andranik asks probing 
questions about Vahé’s arrival at the orphanage and his harsh treatment by the 
other orphan boys. He “wondered about it, the things we could not ask when we 
were boys—about how you came to be dropped off at the orphanage in 
Kharphert; how you spoke not one word of Armenian and your unintelligible 
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cry for months that we couldn’t understand until you slowly began to 
understand us and the boys wanting to beat that Turkish out of you like one 
might beat a pet dog for disobeying and shitting the carpet and you there shat 
upon and pissed by the boys in those hot boxcars” (137-138). If Vahé had been 
searching for a personal connection to the past of the genocide, Andranik gave 
him a significant one. By Andranik’s account, when Vahé arrived at the Bird’s 
Nest, he couldn’t speak Armenian. He only spoke Turkish. His circumstance was 
a common one during the years of the genocide and shortly thereafter. There are 
several documented accounts of Armenian children and women who had been 
bought by Turkish or Kurdish families as servants or concubines.52 As Middle 
East historian Keith David Watenpaugh describes in his 2013 article for the 
Journal of Human Rights, these women and children are “[d]escribed 
euphemistically as kılıç artığı (‘remnants of the sword’)” by Turkish society today 
(291). Though he hadn’t been murdered by the sword for being Armenian, Vahé 
had been a victim of the genocide himself because he was forced into a Turkish 
household where he lost his language and culture. His connection to the 
genocide is extremely personal—he was one of its victims in his infancy. The 
genocide stories he had heard at the orphanage might not have felt personal to 
Vahé, but this story should feel extremely personal. And yet Vahé doesn’t allow 
                                                
52 For more information about Armenian women and children being adopted or 
enslaved in Turkish homes, see Keith David Watenpaugh’s “‘Are There Any 
Children for Sale?’: Genocide and the Transfer of Armenian Children (1915–
1922)”, Vahakn N. Dadrian’s “Children as Victims of Genocide: The Armenian 
Case,” and Lerna Ekmekcioglu’s “A Climate for Abduction, a Climate for 
Redemption: The Politics of Inclusion during and after the Armenian Genocide.” 
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himself to feel anything in response to Andranik’s revelations. He keeps asking 
“Pardon?” and even thinks to himself “no no no” when Andranik poses these 
questions to him about his past (The Daydreaming Boy 138, 139). Instead of 
realizing that the emotional truth he had learned from the stories he heard at the 
orphanage—that he is temporally and geographically distant from the Armenian 
Genocide, that his condition is one of belatedness and disconnection—isn’t 
actually true, Vahé rejects the real personal connection he had to the Armenian 
Genocide as one of its victims. He rejects that his victimhood actually made him 
a target of hatred and violence at the orphanage, where the other orphans abused 
the “vile black mark of Cain, that Turk mark” out of him (138). In these 
interactions with other members of the Armenian diaspora in Beirut, Vahé 
cannot sate his desire for authentic and personal connections to the Armenian 
Genocide. In each case, Vahé thinks that he wants to embrace the past, but he 
cannot get himself to do it and, in fact, repels the past when confronted with it 
head-on. Though he had the opportunity to accept that he actually has a strong 
personal connection to the past, he denies the past and his feelings about it. He 
must look elsewhere for embodiments of the past that would affirm his own 
limited idea of selfhood. 
*** 
Vahé’s stunted efforts to embrace the past that he simultaneously wants to 
leave behind lead him to take refuge in archival documents. Sadly, Vahé’s 
imaginative capabilities do not transform the archival sources for purposes of 
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passionate remembering. As he imagines the stories behind archival documents, 
he merely projects himself onto the picture.  
The archival documents that Vahé discovers only serve as sites for him to 
project his own feelings. Chapter 34 of Book II reproduces one of Vahé’s 
historical sources—the chapter is plucked from James L. Barton’s chronicle of a 
humanitarian organization that helped Armenian orphans, Story of Near East 
Relief (1915–1930): An Interpretation. In a novel mostly narrated by Vahé, the 
chapter speaks in the voice of an orphanage administrator, rendered in a 
different printed font than the rest of the novel.53 Vahé doesn’t describe where he 
found the excerpt, how he found it, nor what he thinks of it. And yet his 
influence is everywhere in it because Vahé’s version of the scene in Barton’s book 
is not exactly the scene that Barton describes. In Barton’s version, a young girl 
arrives at an Armenian orphanage without any knowledge of Armenian or her 
parents’ names, with a Turkish name of Salema, and with a vague knowledge of 
the Christian “Heavenly Father” when asked about her parents. Barton 
concludes that the girl “had come from a Christian home but where that home 
was or who her parents were we never found out” (Barton 225). In Vahé’s 
version of the same scene as printed in The Daydreaming Boy, the sex of the 
foundling is changed to male, the Turkish name for him is changed to Mustafa, 
and the orphanage is named as the Danish House orphanage in Kharphert, 
Turkey. All other details are unchanged. The changes that Vahé makes to the 
                                                
53 The only other chapter with this font is another “archival” source, an article 
from Beirut’s The Daily Star paper about the similarities between the brains of 
early man and gorillas (88). 
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original report are telling, in that he inserts himself into the history that he’d read 
about in an archival text. In other chapters of the novel, Vahé admits that he 
knows that his group of orphans came from the Kharphert region of Turkey.54 
While he knows he came from Kharphert, Vahé does not know for certain how 
he ended up at the orphanage. At points throughout the novel, Vahé offers 
possibilities for his orphaning. In one possible explanation, he imagines that he 
might have been sold to a Turkish woman who renames him “Mustafa” and he 
has to relearn the Armenian language because he’d forgotten it in a Turkish 
home.55 These details correspond to the version of Vahé’s past that his fellow 
orphan, Antranig, reminds him about during their alcohol-fueled meetings and 
that Vahé fundamentally rejects with his repeated “no no no Pardon? Pardon? 
Pardon?” (The Daydreaming Boy 139). When Vahé rewrites the historical 
document from Barton’s chronicle, he puts his story at its center. In doing so, 
Vahé doesn’t acknowledge the presence of the girl, Salema, whose story he co-
opted for telling his own narrative. Taken together, the meeting with Antranig 
and the projected archival document mark Vahé’s simultaneous reflex to 
embrace and repel the past. He meets with Antranig to “reminisce” about their 
past, but he is horrified by Antranig’s all-too-real reminder of the traumatic past 
Vahé experienced; he searches for the authentic past in archives, but doesn’t 
allow the victims of the past a chance to speak as themselves because he 
supplants their story with his own. 
                                                
54 See pages 64, 126-127. 
55 See pages 95-98, 137-139, 133. 
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A similar push-and-pull motion animates Vahé’s interactions with an 
archival photo. As Vahé scours books and journals looking for references to his 
own family’s past, he finds a “photo of a Kharphertsi boy, black and white, 
Ottoman Empire 1915” (58). By Vahé’s description of the photograph, the boy 
from Vahé’s own home village is “covered head to toe in rags, in layers of torn 
cotton and wool,” with “too long sleeves” that make his hands look “invisible” 
(58). His “feet splay as if they have done much shoeless walking” (58). The boy’s 
rags and stance preserve his long journey through, presumably, the Deir al-Zor 
desert. But it is the orphan boy’s stare that draws Vahé in: “the look of sadness—
in this photograph I can see it. It is not the rags that tell of it, his stance with the 
bared knee slightly bent, or the invisible hands, I assume he has hands. What 
marks the public sadness for this boy? I think it is his look to the German, what 
he must have hoped for in the European soldier; he stopped walking or begging 
and stood still for the foreigner, looked up at him calmly—see me, he doesn’t 
say, I am the sad boy” (59). It seems that Vahé has found the archival document 
that allows him to feel a personal connection with the past and that allows the 
past to come alive as itself for productive effect in the present. 
Yet Vahé’s description of the importance of the photograph reveals that 
the photograph is important to Vahé only because he sees himself in it, albeit in 
relief. In the photograph, Vahé sees “a sad boy, he misses what he had known, 
the heat of the hearth, the open orchard with the figs hanging low and the 
pomegranates dipping to the ground from too heavy boughs, the soft voices at 
night, a lullaby” (60). The boy’s sad look is a physical reminder of all that the boy 
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lost in his ancestral home of Kharphert: the homes, the orchards, the family life. 
Vahé, who was ostensibly born two years after the genocide, in 1917, claims he 
never experienced these markers of Armenian life in Central and Eastern 
Anatolia. They had already been dismantled, destroyed, and disappeared by the 
time he thinks he was born. That lost world also wasn’t preserved in the faces of 
Vahé and Vahé’s fellow orphans at the Bird’s Nest because “the boys that were 
raised up in the Nest never wore the orphan’s mask of sorrow and despair. We 
wouldn’t have lasted out a week” (60). Taught by the cruelty of the other boys in 
the orphanage to act tough or be punished for showing weakness, Vahé and his 
peers at the orphanage in Beirut were disciplined into ignoring all vestiges of 
their former lives, even if they were too young to remember it anyhow. Vahé is 
denied, by the conditioning of his circumstances, the possibility of expressing a 
sentimental response. The photograph that Vahé carries around in his wallet is a 
record of Vahé’s own feelings, sentimental feelings that he was not allowed to 
physically express on his own face. The orphan in the photograph shows Vahé to 
himself by highlighting the emotions that Vahé hid that the boy made visible. 
Further, as Vahé imagines how the photograph was taken, he projects his denied 
emotions onto the scene. Just as the orphan boy remains silent about his sadness 
(“see me, he doesn’t say, I am the sad boy”), Vahé too hides his emotions (59, 
emphasis mine). Vahé connects the photograph to his denied negative affects in a 
later scene. He imagines apologizing to Juliana, and he uses the photograph to 
express his emotional state: “I’m sorry for that also: this notfeeling. But I’m sure 
it lives in me, like a kidney or like a lost photograph of a boy: he is an orphan boy 
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from the time before; he is clothed in rags and his hands (if he has them) are 
hidden by too-long sleeves and his feet are bare and he has the look of the 
orphan, the look of sorrow and despair; and I never had it, only carried it inside, 
invisible” (185). Instead of enlivening the past by imagining the story behind the 
photograph, Vahé uses the photograph to affirm his own projected sense of self. 
The photograph and the boy’s look make visible Vahé’s sentimental desires to 
have a family and a home, desires that Vahé was forced to hide at the orphanage. 
The photograph in the billfold and Vahé’s imagined scene of its creation serve as 
a venue for Vahé to project his own emotional state. Instead of passionate 
remembering of the past, Vahé makes the past as seen in the archival materials 
mirror his present hidden feelings. 
*** 
Though Vahé fails to enliven the past in his projections, he intuitively 
understands that his imagination can offer him the existential plentitude he 
desires. Unfortunately, the particular kind of imagination—the “sentimental 
imagination”—that Vahé deploys is doomed to failure. In his efforts to restore 
the prelapsarian family, Vahé denies and perverts the monumental event that 
makes his fantasy of reunion impossible. 
At a moment of strife, when Vahé tells Juliana about his “love” for 
Béatrice, the Palestinian maid who works for another couple in the same 
apartment building, Vahé find some comfort by escaping into his imagination. In 
his fantasy, he attempts to rescue a fully-intact family that would be reunited if 
he and Juliana were able to  
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rise from our beds as black crows and we will fly out our balcony 
doors and head northward then east and we’ll return to those 
villages surrounding the rocky outcroppings and mothers await us, 
fathers and uncles till fields with hands raised and openhanded to 
welcome us back. Our houses as we left them, our siblings play in 
the orchards. We’ll make mulberry taffies we’ll eat flat bread we’ll 
slaughter a young lamb and cook its flesh. (And we’ll never again 
eat grass for our dinner.) And we’ll fly out of this place and when 
we arrive we will say: the seasons have turned on their head and 
time is illusory, take off your wristwatches, take off the sun 
calendar, and hold it hold it, we’ll follow the moon’s light: we are 
here and returned. (153) 
The ancestral home of Kharphert is restored in Vahé’s fantasy: the family 
members that died in the genocide are all alive, the houses are not destroyed, the 
mulberry trees are still alive and producing, the traditional rituals of lamb feats 
for marked days are continued.56 The idealized Anatolian village is “frozen” by 
Vahé in a photograph: his “hold it hold it” sounds like the orders of a 
photographer to his subjects to remain in their places until the final take (153). In 
a sense, Vahé wants to deny that the traumatic past ever happened in his 
prelapsarian fantasy; there is no need for wristwatches or sundials in his 
imagined version of the past because time stops before the impending genocide 
can sweep through to destroy everything. Vahé’s sentimental imagination 
renounces his present (where he has to admit that he can never be reunited with 
his family whose names he cannot remember) in favor of rescuing an imagined 
past from destruction (where the family members are still alive and well). He 
desires a past devoid of the violence that brought him to Beirut. Essentially, he 
                                                
56 As Irina Petrosian & David Underwood describe in Armenian Food: Fact, Fiction, 
& Folklore, “The climax to every religious festival was the ritual slaughter of a 
large number of animals including bulls, cows, sheep, goats, and oxen” (71). 
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wants to pretend the traumatic event never happened. Despite Vahé’s desire to 
restore the prelapsarian past, a singular reference to the genocide creeps in with 
a parenthetical about the survival strategy of eating grass in the Deir al-Zor 
desert where there was no food to be found.57 Even in his imagination Vahé 
cannot find total refuge—the historical realities he tries to erase from the 
sentimental, idealized scene sneak in nonetheless. 
Vahé attempts to gain control of his imagination and assert his selfhood in 
response. The most disturbing example of this assertion is when Vahé imagines 
his absent mother telling him about her experience of sexual victimization. The 
unnamed mother speaks:  
I can still fuck it and the children grow in my belly not of my volition and 
my volition doesn’t inhibit the seed its latching onto the walls of my womb 
and grows. I did not will it and they ate at my table uninvited and they 
are born into it with no one sense of themselves than sheep for the 
slaughterer, good laborers. Every year I bore a child (not of mine) and I 
can kill him because he can never be mine. This is how I do it (68, 
emphasis in original) 
Before she can explain how she would kill the children that were the product of 
her continual rapes by an unnamed aggressor, Vahé interrupts her with the story 
of his own feelings of abandonment: “How is it that we can suffer and it keeps 
on, […] perhaps you never loved me. You hated my father because he made the 
child you didn’t want, the bastard, the Muslim, the Turk he forced into your 
                                                
57 According to Miller & Miller’s research on Armenian survivor stories of the 
forced marches across the Deir al-Zor desert, “Local Turks were apparently 
prohibited from giving food to passing caravans of Armenians, and after the 
Armenians had been plundered, they lost not only the supplies they were 
carrying but also the means of purchasing more. As a result, they were forced to 
eat the grass that grew alongside the road” (Survivors 86). 
 107 
womb and created what you now hated” (68). Vahé’s imagined scene begins 
with his mother explaining her plight as one of the Armenian women who were 
abducted by Turkish or Kurdish men and forced to raise children borne of 
violence.58 She admits that she despised the children that could “never be mine” 
because they were the products of forced copulation. Vahé begins his imagined 
scene by allowing his mother a chance to speak about her victimization, but he 
cannot bring himself to imagine how she would have permanently abandoned 
him by infanticide. At heart, Vahé’s description of his mother here emerges from 
his sentimentalization of family—he wishes she loved him and his imagined 
father, that they were able to live as a happy nuclear family. The imagined scene 
with his mother becomes a way for Vahé to express his own feelings, not the 
feelings of his imagined mother whom he silences once she begins speaking of 
actions he would rather not hear. If at the start of the scene Vahé desired a self-
affirming story about the mother he never knew, the monologue that he creates 
in his head takes him to a self-destructive position instead. 
In the rest of the chapter, Vahé continues to use his imagined version of 
the past not for the purposes of passionate remembering, but in order to allow 
his present desires and concerns a venue for expression. Once Vahé interrupts 
his mother, she no longer speaks and he takes control of the scene to satisfy his 
                                                
58 Historian Lerna Ekmekcioglu’s research uncovered memos from Ottoman 
Interior Minister Talat Pasha that mandated the forced marriage of young 
unmarried and widowed Armenian women (527). In her article, “A Climate for 
Abduction, a Climate for Redemption: The Politics of Inclusion during and after 
the Armenian Genocide,” Ekmekcioglu explains that these women often bore 
children from their rapes or forced marriages, and oftentimes these children 
would be willfully ignored or abandoned (547). 
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own twisted desires. After expressing a belief that he was unloved, Vahé narrates 
the unfolding scene of his mother’s sexual violation. In describing the rape, Vahé 
admits that 
The blood is bright on your lips and nose and I am aroused, like my 
father[, a Turkish man]. Slap her, he slaps you. Force her legs open, 
he opens your legs and the ecstasy of it! Mother, he is fucking you 
and you scratch his face again and he slaps you again. Fuck her, 
and he does. (Bua bua bua) I am holding my cock now (it’s hot 
today) my shirt is off and my trousers are open to my hips. (69) 
Vahé shapes his fantasy, almost like a movie director, by yelling commands to 
his imagined father as he rapes his mother. In taking violent control of the 
violent scene, Vahé becomes the aggressor telling the rapist what to do. The way 
that Vahé takes control the scene means that he is restored as the dominant actor 
in his imagination. Further, in taking pleasure and becoming aroused by the 
scene he sees, Vahé’s emotional state corresponds to the rapist’s. He aligns 
himself with the aggressor, and not with the victim who had denied him the self-
affirming story of his conception. In this reversal of roles (Armenian as victim, 
Turk as aggressor), Vahé can become the more powerful party oppressing both 
his father (whom he directs to enact violence) and his mother (who is victimized 
by both Turkish aggressor and bastard son). His mother’s nonsense screams of 
“bua bua bua” in “the dead language” of the dominated Armenian don’t stop 
Vahé from ending the chapter with a cryptic, unfinished sentence: “I don’t like to 
kill her but I do what makes me” (68; 70, emphasis in original). The violence of this 
scene diverts attention from Vahé’s desire to assert his selfhood. In directing his 
father to rape his mother in a scene that might have been the imagined version of 
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his own conception, Vahé simultaneously completes the nuclear family—the 
father, the mother, and the son are together in a single cinematic shot—and 
ensures that he is “born” as a result of the rape. 
Vahé’s imagination unwittingly ensnares him. In some scenes of his 
imagination, he “saves” his family members from oblivion. In others, he enacts 
violence against the very family he wanted to rescue. In both cases, the past is 
not transformed in the present for enablement. In the first, Vahé idealizes the 
prelapsarian past and denies the event that tore his family apart. In the second, 
Vahé inserts himself into imagined scenes in order to enact violence against the 
family members that have scorned him. 
*** 
In the absence of an imagination that transforms the “archive” and 
preserves an enabling and enriching feature of the trauma in and for the present, 
two disturbing and significant events—a rape and a “suicide”—explain the 
misguided diasporic logic of Vahé’s violence. Unable to see that the diasporic 
subject creates “home” in each new location in which she find herself by 
imaginatively transforming memories of the homeland to enrich living in the 
present, Vahé’s desire to “return home” becomes none other than a drive to 
repeat genocidal victimization at an individual level.  
Vahé’s rape of the Palestinian maid Béatrice is the violent effect of his 
desire to regain what he believes he had lost by being the orphaned progeny of a 
likely sexual violation. Having lost his mother to death or abandonment, Vahé 
admits that he desires the “map of your body, Mother. In your body I could find 
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everything I need. The man who has no mother’s form to form him is a sad man” 
(62). Missing the body of his mother to give his life the meaning and direction he 
thinks it will give him, Vahé first imagines violating his mother’s body but later 
finds a physical body—Béatrice’s—with which he can ground his identity. The 
connection between the bodies of Vahé’s imagined mother and Béatrice emerges 
in his graphic and problematic description of the sexual violence he commits 
against Béatrice. Like his mother who screams “bua bua bua” in “the dead 
language ([the Turkish aggressor] heard your syllable-sounds like a sheepherder 
hears the latent ram),” Béatrice screams in “her southern gutturals” that Vahé 
stop his violent act (68, 205). He cannot stop, because he believes that “The sooth 
flesh I required to get a little bit of it back, a small immeasurable ineffable return: 
inside that girl’s flesh I was (say it!—Says): home” (206). Given the memories of 
the Armenian Genocide that were passed down to him, given the idealized past 
that is constantly interrupted by violence, given the violence that he imagines as 
his own conception, Vahé believes he can only be at “home” if the past is 
restored in the present in all its violence. Vahé even uses the language of 
recovery of the past here, framing his rape of Béatrice as a “return” to the origins 
that he had lost and as getting “a little bit of it back.” But Vahé’s “return home” 
is a distortion of the successful achievement of postmemorial effects. When 
describing his reasons for violating Béatrice, Vahé uses language that, 
disturbingly, echoes my own definition of postmemory’s existential outcome. He 
admits that “to not fuck it with Béatrice was to be dead and I needed to live” 
(204). Vahé wants the life-enabling payoff of postmemory—the feeling that life is 
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worth living when a particular feature of ancestral trauma is productively kept 
alive in the present—but he problematically inflicts violence in the process of 
trying because his imagination was unable to transform the past in ways that 
would not revisit the past’s violences on others. 
Vahé’s efforts to reach the existential outcome of postmemory are 
misguided because of his imagination’s limitations and his own 
misunderstanding of what it means to create a “home” in the diaspora. Vahé’s 
murder by the hands of militant Muslims during the Civil War in Beirut marks 
his fundamental misunderstanding of “home.” While his decision, as a nominal 
Christian, to stay in West Beirut after it was made into an exclusively “Muslim 
district” could be read as a rebellion against systemic violence, Vahé actually 
ends up revisiting the past’s violence on himself with his refusal.59 He says “I’ll 
not go, not leave this place; my home” and is shot in the head for it (211). He 
takes on the victimized role of the Armenians during the Armenian Genocide by 
refusing to leave. Though his decision stems from his desire to not repeat what 
he knows about Armenians who “had followed the demoniac policemen, the 
moving caravans—had walked out of their villages” in Central Anatolia, Vahé 
still ends up murdered like his ancestors (33). The word Vahé uses here to justify 
his decision to stay—“home”—connects the scene of his murder with the scene 
of Béatrice’s victimization. In both, Vahé affirms his actions uphold the new 
                                                
59 For more on the history of the Civil War in Beirut, see Farid El-Khazen’s The 
Breakdown of the State in Lebanon, 1967-1976, Edgar O’Ballance’s Civil War in 
Lebanon, 1975-92, Theodor Hanf’s Coexistence in Wartime Lebanon: Decline of a State 
and Rise of a Nation, Marius Deeb’s The Lebanese Civil War, Robert Fisk’s Pity the 
Nation: Lebanon at War, and Itamar Rabinovich’s The War for Lebanon, 1970-1985. 
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home he manages to create in Beirut. But, the violences inflicted are 
misunderstandings of a diasporic tenet: Though you might not be able to 
physically return “home,” you can always “return” in passionate remembering.  
Diaspora theory has long made connections between dispersed 
populations and the homelands to which they still align. One of William Safran’s 
six characteristics of diaspora is that the members of a diaspora “regard their 
ancestral homeland as their true, ideal home and as the place to which they or 
their descendants would (or should) eventually return—when conditions are 
appropriate” (Safran 83-84). Others, like Robin Cohen, have theorized how even 
diasporas created from violent upheavals desire to maintain this connection to 
the homeland. Per Cohen’s coinage, “victim diasporas” are those that 
“experienced a decisive ‘break event’ in their histories” that “widely dispersed” 
the population yet allowed its members to cling “on to a collective memory and 
myth about the homeland, its location and its achievements” (Cohen 57). Cohen’s 
articulation of victim diasporas suggests that dispersions of populations are often 
involuntary, and that the connection to the homeland can be complicated by 
never being able to return as a result of exile and violence. Safran concedes that 
“homeland” is complicated by the fact that many diaspora members never 
“return” to their homelands, that the “‘return’ of most diasporas (much like the 
Second Coming or the next world) can thus been seen as a largely eschatological 
concept: it is used to make life more tolerable by holding out a utopia—or 
eutopia—that stands in contrast to the perceived dystopia in which actual life is 
lived” (Safran 94). For these populations, then, “home” does not necessarily 
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mean returning physically to the homeland. Another diaspora scholar, Avtar 
Brah, reinterprets “home” to mean “a mythic place of desire in the diasporic 
imagination. In this sense it is a place of no return even if it is possible to visit the 
geographical territory that is seen as the place of ‘origin’” (Brah 192). Both 
Safran’s and Brah’s work suggests that the importance of returning to the 
homeland is more about its affective power, where real geographic movement is 
secondary. 
If return is so important an idea and if it is often impossible to achieve in 
reality, recent diaspora scholarship has shown that the imagination emerges as 
the preferred way to “return.” Diaspora scholar Khachig Tölölyan has already 
posited that “a diaspora that is born of catastrophe inflicted on the collective 
suffers trauma and usually becomes a community to which the work of memory, 
commemoration, and mourning is central, shaping much of its cultural 
production and political commitment” (“The Contemporary Discourse of 
Diaspora Studies” 649). In a diaspora created from violent events, its members 
must rely on staged events of memory transfer to maintain a link to the 
homeland instead of physically returning to it. As Hamid Naficy, a film scholar 
who analyzes diasporic movies, posits, “For many political exiles, return [to the 
homeland] is impossible, making a metaphoric, imaginative, or filmic staging of 
it a viable option” (Naficy 236). For these populations, imaginatively creating a 
scene of return to the homeland are substitutes for physical visits there. This 
development is a logical conclusion of diaspora scholars’ founding belief in the 
importance of memory in maintaining the diaspora. In a special issue of 
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Thamyris/Intersecting detailing the connection between memory and diaspora, 
Marie-Aude Baronian and her collaborators assert that “memory is at once the 
condition and the necessary limit of diasporic identities” (Baronian, et. al 12). In 
other words, these scholars insist that there is “No diaspora without memory” 
and that “Every form of memory […] depends on re-articulations and re-
enactments. Its contents are necessarily modified and invented as they are 
remembered” (Baronian, et. al 12, 12). Memory scholar Andreas Huyssen echoes 
these remarks linking diaspora, memory, and imagination by arguing that 
“Diasporic memory in its traditional sense is by definition cut off, hybrid, 
displaced, split. This fact grounds the affinity of diasporic memory in the 
structure of memory itself, which is always based on temporal displacement 
between the act of remembrance and the content of that which is remembered, an 
act of recherche rather than recuperation” (Huyssen 85). Both Huyssen and 
Baronian et. al concede that the diaspora built on memory is always also 
dependent on imagination, since each memory is “modified and invented” as it 
is redeployed in times and places that diverge from their origins. In recent 
diaspora scholarship, imagination is described as the preferred method to access 
the homeland when it’s impossible to literally return. 
The imagination’s ability to create home wherever the diaspora member 
resides is the ability that Vahé lacks by relying on his sentimental imagination. 
The prelapsarian Anatolian town he imagines is his ancestral home denies the 
history that led him to his present in Beirut. The Palestinian girl in whose flesh 
Vahé finds “home” is violated in the process just like the victims of the past. The 
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home that Vahé refuses to leave is the avoidable location of his “suicide” by 
murder. Vahé misunderstands one of the founding tenets of diaspora and “goes 
home” at great human cost as a result. 
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“HE SOUGHT THE DEAD SO THAT HE MIGHT LIVE”: THE 
PROMISE OF ANALOGIC POSTMEMORY IN DRAINING THE 
SEA 
Micheline Aharonian Marcom’s third novel, 2008’s Draining the Sea, 
appears to tell the story of a character very similar to the afflicted protagonist of 
The Daydreaming Boy. Like Vahé, the unnamed man of Draining the Sea initially 
refuses to admit that stories of the past affect him in his present.60 The five 
phrases his mother passed down to him about his ancestors’ experiences during 
the Armenian Genocide initially fail to resonate but ultimately prove significant 
to his sense of self. But the two protagonists diverge in what they do with their 
inherited memories of the past: Vahé eventually defines himself and becomes 
consumed by the past’s narratives of loss, and thus can only revisit victimization 
upon himself and others. The man in Draining the Sea interrogates the malaise 
that characterizes his prosperous American life by way of an analogic 
imagination, ultimately acknowledging his diasporic existence in a manner that 
invigorates his conscience, his sense of his life’s implication in his own Armenian 
history and in genocidal massacres in the contemporary world. The man 
eventually recognizes the ever-present sadness of the past that lurks beneath his 
comfortable malaise and then transforms that sadness into an emotional portal, 
one that opens him up to a sense of connection and a call to principle that 
encompasses a pan-ethnic and pan-national attention to human rights. 
                                                
60 Throughout this chapter, I will refer to Marcom’s narrator in Draining the Sea as 
“the man.” 
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 The unnamed man who narrates most of the novel’s five “Books” is a 
half-Armenian American man who lives in modern-day Los Angeles. Feeling the 
malaise of being disconnected from and dissatisfied with his knowledge of his 
Armenian heritage and the insatiable frivolities of his fellow Americans, the man 
retreats to his green armchair and begins to write looping, meandering, and 
disordered prose in an attempt to know the ancestral past transmitted to him by 
his mother’s five phrases. The man’s entry into this world comes by way of an 
Ixil woman who appears to him as a projection of his analogic imagination. This 
woman, Marta, is a contemporary voice for a living trauma, a voice immanent in 
but inaccessible as the five phrases. With Marta’s arrival, the man builds a new 
“archive” by combining his inherited five phrases with the imagined person of 
Marta herself. The analogic imagination which created Marta now works to 
transform the newly-combined archive which had earlier marked the man’s 
malaise into that which prompts self-recognition and awareness. Marta helps the 
man turn malaise into self-recognition by vocalizing the sadness of trauma; 
picturing the fact of violence; demanding the attention of conscience; and 
revealing the man’s past and present entailments to himself in a way that defines 
him as sentient and principled. The man’s analogic imagination transforms his 
gained sense of self-recognition into animating internalized truths about the 
relation of sentience to conscience by way of teaching him about the usefulness 
of synecdoche, of inventing an auditor, of skepticism of the “image,” of self-
stereotyping in popular media, and of creating a genocidally-hybrid self-defining 
narrative. By the fifth and final Book, the man successfully gains knowledge and 
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understanding of himself and both his Armenian inheritance and the experiences 
of others who have lost much. He transcends the individual and arrives at a 
place of pure love, understanding, and hope. The payoff is a postmemorial one, 
since the man gains it only after he realizes that “[h]e sought the dead so that he 
might live” (Marcom, Draining the Sea 302). At the very end of the novel, so that 
they too might live, the man urges the readers of his narrative to follow his lead: 
they too must realize that emotion underwrites conscience. In this way, analogic 
postmemory offers opportunities for achieving, in print, the greatest promise of 
affect theory—a new mode of intimate interaction that can change the present 
and the future. 
*** 
The man of Draining the Sea lives in a comfortable house in Los Angeles, 
diligently works at his office job, watches too much television, and eats too many 
sweets. Firmly planted in a prosperous American lifestyle, the man seems to 
have achieved notable success. Indeed, he asks himself, “Who could be happier 
than me? I am a man who drinks coffees, eats and drinks and buys and works 
and all of his desires fulfilled when his desire says this thing thatthing now” 
(229). The man’s desire drives him to do all that he can to satiate it, but his desire 
becomes increasingly demanding and unsatisfied, breathlessly desiring 
“thatthing now.” By the man’s own admission elsewhere in the novel, though he 
is able to materially satisfy his desire, “I have never been a happy man and it is 
my knowing without knowing” (206). What knowledge does the man have that 
he doesn’t fully understand? In a series of musings and ruminations in the five 
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Books that he writes, the man finds that his unhappiness partly emerges from his 
conflicted relationship with the past, one for which he feels little but nonetheless 
regards as an inheritance. All the half-Armenian man knows about the genocide 
has been transmitted to him by his Armenian mother through five phrases 
referring to the man’s grandmother: “They came for her father in the middle of 
the night. / She never saw him again. / Her mother and sisters were sent on the 
march to the Der Zor. / They passed beneath her window. / She never saw them 
again” (268). These five terse phrases provide the man with an abridged version 
of his family’s painful past, one which inflicts another kind of pain. As he 
explains it:  
my own foreign mother who made for herself an American boy, 
and tried to cut the sadness histories of her memory and family-
history like fat and unattractive ulcers (but for the five bare 
phrases, which fell out of her mouth and into English, as if without 
volition, the bones of the story). The American man is made into a 
modern monster; a man without a place or any of a history’s heft 
(its rage perhaps?), filled with raw unmapped places which could 
be like rats […]—but whence his maladie? malaise? He does not 
know its past as if the past were still devouring him; the rats (252) 
When the man’s Americanized mother shed her past and embraced the frivolity 
of America, she attempted to cut the “sadness histories […] like fat and 
unattractive ulcers,” but her surgery isn’t completely successful since the phrases 
slip out of her mouth and transfer some of that sadness to her son through the 
“bones of the story” preserved in the “bare” phrases (252). And yet, the man 
does not have “any of a history’s heft” because he had decided to shed the 
weighty bones of his inherited story as his mother had decided to cut the sadness 
from her family’s life (252). Renouncing the phrases leaves the man only with 
 120 
inexplicable “maladie” and “malaise” without a specific origin (252). Not 
knowing the reason for his ill health and his unease, the infirm modern 
American man without the phrases is consumed by them though he doesn’t 
recognize it. 
The man’s malaise leaves him wanting, and his imagination projects a 
figure named Marta to help him recognize the source of his malaise. She appears 
to the man at “night in Los Angeles, three a.m. in Los Angeles,” fifteen years 
after her death in Guatemala, to whisper stories into his ear about the massacres 
of 1977-1986 in which she perished (88). She arrives because “the bones have 
been shut-up shut-out and the dead will have their return willy-nilly, like a 
carnival in the moment just before I fall to sleep at night” (288). The man’s refusal 
of the “bones” of his mother’s five phrases prompts a representative from the 
world of the dead to return in a manner that approximates the religious 
celebration before the austerity of Lent. The contrast between the raucous days of 
carnival and the grim stories that Marta tells couldn’t be more striking, but the 
man’s comparison hinges on the similarity of their uses. As one of its major 
anthropologists argues, because carnival is “a celebration of release from the 
constraints of the social order it would attract those who are under endless 
pressure, the dispossesed and the oppressed” (Cohen, Masquerade Politics 154). 
The man who feels unfulfilled by his prosperous life and dissatisfied with his 
historical inheritance craves the freedom of his “carnival” of the imagined dead, 
and he imagines that the massacred dead like Marta are attracted to the 
gathering because they have been silenced by violence and need a venue to voice 
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their dispossession. Appropriately, the carnival also “generates relationships of 
amity even among strangers and allows forbidden excesses” (3). The visit of a 
massacred woman who can tell her story of genocide is a cause for celebration 
for the malaised man who cast off the past he inherited but couldn’t embrace. 
Because Marta appears to the man as a contemporary voice for a living trauma, a 
voice immanent in but inaccessible as the five phrases, the man realizes that she 
“could only be a thing of my imagination” (172). 
As a projection of the man’s own imagination, Marta provides the man 
with the source material he needs to enrich his initially-slender “archive” which 
began with five unsatisfying phrases. Throughout the novel, the man refers to 
the phrases that his mother gave him with dissatisfaction. His disparaging 
references alternate between “five paltry phrases” and “pitiful five” (32, 60). The 
phrases comprise a “paltry five phrase history for a lost clan and place” and are 
meant to “recall [the dead] afterwards in Los Angeles” (231, 32). With the weight 
of preserving the legacy of all those who perished in a genocide that even the 
storyteller didn’t survive, his mother’s phrases bespeak impossibility: the task of 
preserving an entire “lost clan and place” is too large for five phrases to 
encompass and for the man to remedy. As a “history,” they aren’t able to 
encompass the entirety of what was lost in the Armenian Genocide. He believes 
that the phrases “did not give him the full of it, the it of it, but merely the faintly 
outlined heft” of the past (268). He wants to know more about the past and the 
phrases are only just able to mark the outlines of a huge, unwieldy story. The 
marks that the phrases make around the past aren’t even completely legible to 
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the man, who sees them “faintly.” In both these cases, the man describes the past 
with words that suggest its largesse and the phrases’ inability to contain that 
largesse. Whether “paltry” or “pitiful,” the five phrases of his mother don’t 
satisfy the man because he believes that the phrases he inherited can never 
adequately capture the entire past that was lost. In other words, the man focuses 
his attention on the phrases’ semantic content. His focus on the words of the 
phrases that describe a lost people from a lost time inevitably leads him to 
bemoan their inability to capture the whole picture. He wants more from the 
phrases because the content in them is unsatisfactorily too little. The man’s 
imagination invents a helpmeet for him: he “half-listened for years to his 
mother’s phrases and then notlistened and then forgot them, for years, until you 
arrived, Marta, […]: girl from the ether, made of ether also” (245-246). If the 
bones of the man’s inheritance were dissatisfying because they were “pitiful,” 
“paltry,” and “bare,” using his analogic imagination to create Marta and her 
stories “from the ether” of the past could provide him with meat to add to them. 
With Marta’s arrival, the man realizes that he has to convert his beliefs 
about the phrases from merely feeling them as a lack to feeling the lack of them. 
In an early scene, the man begins to deplore the meager knowledge he has of the 
past by saying “I am a man who would like to know better than I do,” only to be 
interrupted mid-sentence by a parenthetical comment from Marta: “(you are 
whispering in my ear: it has not been for lack of knowing, and the five phrases of 
your inheritance, man?)” (47, 47). Though the man thinks that he doesn’t know 
about his heritage or even the various other terrible events of history he 
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mentions in his Books, Marta reminds him to look into the five phrases he had 
been given by his mother.61 She points to the phrases because she wants the man 
to realize that the phrases he had cast aside as “paltry” are the key to the man’s 
goal of “knowing better” than he does. If the man’s problem with the phrases 
centers on his belief that they are not enough, that they were never a complete 
and stable inheritance, Marta challenges him to rethink his damning judgments. 
She encourages the man to appreciate the phrases for providing him with a kind 
of “knowing” of the past. With this encouragement to embrace the phrases along 
with Marta’s own stories, the man’s imagination transforms his inexplicable 
malaise to a justified sadness. 
*** 
Once the man feels a sadness that is no longer malaise, he can open wide 
the emotional “portal [he] made in History” by expanding his “archive” (188). 
Through the portal, the man listens to Marta as she vocalizes sadness, pictures 
the fact of violence, demands the attention of conscience, and reveals the man’s 
entailments to a sentient and principled self-definition.  
Marta tells her story in order to give voice to the sadness of the massacred 
victim. Through Marta, the man learns of the physical deprivation of the 
Guatemalan massacres. Marta tells the man that, while hiding from the 
Guatemalan Army in the Cuchumatanes Mountains for fifteen months, the 
                                                
61 Some of those terrible events of history that the man mentions in his Books 
include the following: the Armenian Genocide, the lynching of an African 
American man as documented in a photograph, the Guatemalan massacres, the 
death of Hektor in the Trojan War, the colonization of the Los Angeles Basin by 
Spanish explorers, and the Lebanese Civil War. 
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“children and the old men the women and all of us colder, hungrier, […] the 
days of cold of hunger of we are sick do not make the hours move and although 
the mountain saved us, it did not save all of us, and the dead there unburied” 
(100). Marta describes the bitter cold of the mountains, where not much beyond 
potatoes can grow.62 She describes how the women, children, and old men—
“old” men because the young had already been executed by the Army for being 
subversive Communist sympathizers—became so hungry on the mountains that 
they ate grass and roots to sustain them.63 The deprivation took its toll, as many 
of the escaped victims couldn’t withstand the conditions and died on the 
mountain without a proper burial. Marta hammers home her message of 
deprivation by the way she tells it in a run-on sentence that has no expected 
end—she continues to list their deprivations in the next lines, where her 
                                                
62 According to the geographers Michael Steinberg and Matthew Taylor who 
studied the agricultural activities on the Cuchumatanes Mountain range, “All 
our informants were still involved in potato production, and 21 were involved in 
sheep ranching (at various scales). The harsh environment of the high plateau in 
the Cuchumatanes simply cannot support other forms of agriculture” (260). 
63 Numerous documents recently released by the National Security 
Administration (NSA) document the brutal targeting of civilian Ixil populations 
by anti-communist forces in Guatemala. See National Security Archive Electronic 
Briefing Book No. 11, “U.S. POLICY IN GUATEMALA, 1966-1996,” by Kate 
Doyle and Carlos Osorio for specific documents outlining the operations in 
Guatemala. Document 14, “Counterinsurgency Operations in El Quiché,” a secret 
cable from the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) sent February 1982 which 
describes how a “sweep operation” was implemented with the goal to “destroy 
all towns and villages which are cooperating wit the guerrilla army of the poor 
(EGP) and eliminate all sources of resistance” (Central Intelligence Agency 1). 
With total destruction as the goal, the army “found that most of the villages [had] 
been abandoned before the military forces arrive[d]” (Central Intelligence 
Agency 2). With the belief that “an empty village is assumed to have been 
supporting the EGP, […] it is destroyed,” “there are hundreds, possibly 
thousands, of refugees in the hills with no homes to return to” (Central 
Intelligence Agency 2). 
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structure mirrors an observation she made that, on the harsh mountain, nothing 
makes “the hours move” (100). Her words drag on as time draws itself out in 
torturous physical deprivations.  
Marta and her family endured terrible physical deprivations on the 
mountain, but none of these deprivations were as devastating as the destruction 
of family feeling. On the mountain, when “the men said that the children do not 
contribute, when they said without saying it that we must take these bones of 
our dead and close the crying mouths of our youngest boys and girls (which 
bring the Cessna A37-B onto our heads; bombs) […]. The children were died, or 
killed, or abandoned up in the mountain and more bones only made more 
bones” (100). Hunger and deprivation weren’t the only killers on the mountain. 
Because the group of escapees were pursued by the Army with light attack 
aircraft the entire fifteen months they found refuge on the mountain, any sound 
loud enough to catch the attention of the slow-flying aircraft developed to be 
used on guerrilla forces in Vietnam’s jungles would mean bombings.64 The men 
in Marta’s group see the children as doubly unnecessary—the children’s cries of 
hunger draw the Army’s bombs to them, and the children cannot contribute to 
the meager supply of foodstuffs that the group could find on the mountain. To 
the men, the unsaid solution to the problems the children cause on the precarious 
mountain is to get rid of them. Though they never say it, the men force the 
                                                
64 According to aviation experts, though light attack aircraft could fly in narrow 
and treacherous terrain, they still relied “on vulnerable, relatively immobile 
ground units for initial detection of irregular forces” that used the typical means 
of visual and aural detection of enemy combatants (Rath 106). 
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women into killing their own children with their own malnourished hands. 
Because the situation is so painful for Marta to recount, in her description here, 
she cannot bring herself to say outright that she was one of the ones who snuffed 
out the sound of the crying children. Instead, she uses passive forms like “were 
died,” “killed,” and “abandoned” without naming the actor of the sentence. 
Further, she pushes responsibility away by using a synecdoche, where bones 
stand in for the bodies of the reluctant, murderous mothers and the 
unsuspecting, murdered children. With this obfuscation, Marta signals that the 
mountain erased the maternal instinct and the family ties of those that were 
hiding on it. Her sentence structure, which moves from concrete with “the 
children” to abstract with “bones,” reflects the disintegration of family structures 
in response to mounting pressure to survive in a terrible situation. She continues 
to describe her experience of the massacre by telling the man about what 
happened before a small number of Ixil ran into the mountains. The reason why 
there were only old men on the mountain lies in the sad fact that “the old men of 
the village dug the burial pit (my father also)” and “the father was made to kill 
his son, the brother his brother, made by fear” (100, 101). Forced to dig a pit that 
they thought was meant for them, the old men instead were “made by fear” of 
the Army to kill their own relatives and bury them in the pit. The massacre that 
pushed Marta to kill her own child in order to save others had forced her own 
father to destroy his family, too. At all stages of the massacre, the Guatemalan 
Army rent Ixil families apart, often by forcing the hands of mothers and fathers. 
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Along with the physical deprivation and the dissolution of families, the 
final description Marta gives the man expands his knowledge of the massacres to 
include what came before the destruction. Marta says “and yet there is more than 
this—our own sweet tongue and the beauty of the girls who run laughing, and I 
look around the room and the room is filled, in the old days, with all of my 
mother and father’s children, the eight of us like a sword for what was possible 
in the future” (101). Collectively, the family was “a sword for what was possible 
in the future” because they were made into the Army’s unlikely mercenaries, 
paying for the chance to stay alive by killing their own family members. But the 
sword could cut both ways: Marta’s reminiscences preserve her family’s full and 
sweet social world, too, though she realizes that some of her family members—
herself included—were forced to contribute to its destruction. She praises her 
people’s individuated branch of Mayan language, a language that broke off from 
Eastern Mayan sometime between 300 and 650 AD that is currently spoken by 
roughly 50,000 villagers in the northern region of Guatemala.65 She wistfully 
describes the “beauty” of the “girls who run laughing,” likely because the 
running she did during the massacres was not accompanied by laughter, but by 
an intense fear and desperation. Marta heightens the destruction that the 
community was forced to inflict on itself by positively describing the time before 
                                                
65 For individuation information, refer to page 5 of J. Kathryn Josserand and 
Nicholas A. Hopkins’s “Chol Ritual Language.” For speaker information, refer to 
page 330 of Thomas E. Lengyel’s “Toward a Dialectology of Ixil Maya: Variation 
across Communities and Individuals.” 
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the massacres. In her description of the deprivations and deaths of the massacres, 
Marta voices the victim’s devastating sadness. 
Marta’s vocalization of sadness primes the man to visualize the violences 
that she endured. Throughout the novel, she demands that the man “see” what 
he couldn’t before. When describing her torture in the basement of the 
Polytechnic School in Guatemala’s capital city, Marta implores the man to “See 
her lovely wrists the long brown hands with vein-ridges like covered rivers upon 
the skin see her smile the browneyed look of sadness it is a fragile thing, you 
think, so easily rent, so easily turned aside (no blackened cheekbones); see how 
shame despair pain can be made as easily as dough or maize cakes” (180). Marta 
also uses visual orders, repeating “see” thrice here, to force the man into 
imagining the scenes she describes. She wants him to imagine how her wrists 
look as they are bound, how the “vein-ridges” bulge like hidden, covered rivers 
which course more vigorously as her blood pressure rises.66 She wants him to 
imagine her facial expressions at various moments during her torture. She wants 
him to imagine her “browneyed look of sadness” that her torturers just as 
quickly tear off her face by mutilating her face and removing her bruised cheeks. 
She wants the man to imagine the combined emotions of “shame despair pain” 
in visual terms by likening the forced creation of her emotional states to the 
creation of Guatemalan foods, the corn or dough cakes she used to make with the 
very hands she asks him to imagine. She wants the man to imagine the emotional 
                                                
66 Covered, hidden rivers are another recurrent image of the novel. The man is 
obsessed with the Los Angeles River’s previously verdant and lively banks that 
were concreted up and hidden below the city’s streets. 
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roller coaster that she experiences during her torturous time at the Polytechnic 
School. At heart, she wants the man to see her. 
Visualizing the violence of massacre allows Marta to make demands to 
conscience. Her focus on seeing might stem from a crucial historical fact of the 
Guatemalan massacres that the man comes to realize through Marta’s telling. 
During the entire time that Marta and her Ixil people were being persecuted, 
Marta wonders “And who wouldn’t save the innocent? a child? our thousand 
children who die already in Acul Nebaj Chajul Cotzal Xix? Why is there no one 
to see us? Why are we, as ourselves, so invisible? Don’t the Christian nations arrive 
on a steed; we are Christians; see our pink and blue churches” (161, emphasis in 
original). Marta’s questions here point to her anger that no international powers 
halted the slaughter of thousands of innocent people, especially children, who 
were killed in Mayan villages around Guatemala. Marta thinks it worse that her 
people’s suffering was never even seen by the international community. The 
italicized phrase, taken from Jennifer Harbury’s 1995 collection of survivor 
testimony from the Guatemalan massacres, Bridge of Courage, highlights the 
absolute invisibility of Marta’s indigenous people.67 No one stopped their losses, 
no one acknowledged their massacre. In her questions, Marta demands the 
attention that her experience deserved.  
Marta’s demands to conscience encourage the man to see how he, too, is 
entailed by the past to be both sentient and principled. In his final Book, the man 
                                                
67 The quote appears on page 79 of Harbury’s book, in a section narrated by a 
Guatemalan revolutionary named Gabriel. 
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tells Marta that “He is half-Armenian, which could be something like five 
phrases in the place of origin and a language and a knowing (of the old places 
and desert marches to the Der Zor) in his blood, of who he is was may have been: 
not adrift, not always alone, entailed by his blood—o sorrow, he was given it by 
his mother, despair for her children like an amulet, like the five phrases pulled 
from her mouth” (268). The five phrases bestow the man with certain inalienable 
possessions, such as a community, a people, a place. They ground the man in 
something beyond himself, since with them at his side, the man is “not always 
alone.” They tie him to the past though before he had found them lacking in their 
ability to tie him to anything. They imbue him with “a knowing” of the place his 
ancestors inhabited in Anatolia and of the forced marches through the Deir al-
Zor desert that likely killed his grandmother’s family. They shed light on the 
man’s own life, giving him knowledge of the tangled web of “who he is was may 
have been” as a result of realizing the ancestral history that is a part of him. 
*** 
The analogic imagination transforms self-recognition into animating 
internalized truths about the relation of sentience to conscience. These truths 
include the power of synecdoche, the invention of an auditor, the skepticism of 
the image, the self-stereotyping of popular media, and the creation of a 
genocidally-hybrid self-defining narrative. 
By exercising his analogic imagination, the man comes to understand that 
collapsing larger things into smaller ones can generate a great expansion of 
comprehension. At heart, the appearance of Marta and the knowledge the man 
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gains from her about the world at large is a definitive example of the power of 
using the small to understand the large. He summarizes their relationship with 
the story of “my memory of my mother recalling her mother (two of her five) 
divides, abates, disappears back down into the river, until later you appear to 
me: demanding, irascible, handless and tired. And I began to remember?” (155). 
After imagining a scene where he travels down to Marta’s capital, Guatemala 
City, and hears an elderly Guatemalan woman saying two of his mother’s five 
phrases (“They came for my father in the middle of the night. We never saw him 
again.”), the man still cannot hold on to the phrases of the past (154-155). He says 
that his memory of the phrases “divides, abates, disappears” back down to the 
river of his memory after this imagined scene. His memory might have divided 
because it cannot hold the two different women (the elderly Guatemalan woman, 
the man’s Armenian grandmother) whose very similar memories it preserves 
together in tension. In this reading, the man’s mind becomes a finite 
battleground for the memories of others—he has room for only so many, and the 
memories of the elderly Guatemalan can’t be held together with his 
grandmother’s memories though the memories are so very similar.68 Perhaps the 
man’s memory “divides” because he cannot keep his attention on both at the 
same time. In this sense, his memory “abates” because he loses focus. Instead of 
sharpening the image of his grandmother, the man’s imagined scene with the 
elderly Guatemalan woman diminishes the power of his grandmother’s 
                                                
68 This could be related to what Michael Rothberg has called “competitive 
memory” in his seminal book, Multidirectional Memory. 
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transferred memories. The two stories compete for the man’s attention, and it 
becomes too much for the man to handle. The memory “disappears” under the 
pressure. But even as the memory disappears into the man’s consciousness, the 
singular figure of Marta arrives and demands that he remember and see it in 
another light. She appears to the man, “demanding, irascible, handless and 
tired,” an imagined victim of the Guatemalan massacres who tells him about her 
experience so that he can enliven the traumatic pasts of Anatolia and of 
Guatemala (155). She provides a center for his imagination to do the enlivening 
work he could not do otherwise in his overwhelmed state. Marta allows the man 
to collapse, productively and not just simplistically, the experience of a victim 
such that when he is able to understand her experience, he can better understand 
the others he could not grasp before. In knowing the one, he can better know the 
others. 
Collapsing meaning in a singular figure like Marta proves helpful to the 
man especially in his desire to be heard. The man’s analogic imagination invents 
an invaluable auditor for him. Reflecting on his luck, he asks Marta: 
How I would speak with the dead—for what purpose: for 
company, perhaps, accompaniment, because the whiskeys and girls 
and highs and Shows make this small space where you could 
reside, come in and speak with me, tell me whence I come and to 
where to what I might travel; speak me and speak to me; […] and 
seeing and a slight knowing of what has been and before the 
sorrow river can overtake me, kill me, deaden me, you take my 
hand and walk with me in the mountains, whisper in my ear of 
what is possible and you are with me, holding my ephemeral 
hands (265)  
 133 
The man assumes that speaking with the dead is a questionable endeavor and 
one that must be justified. The action is most significant because it provides the 
man with someone who listens to him—Marta. The entertainments and pleasures 
available in the man’s life cannot do what Marta does since they are meant to 
distract him. With Marta as auditor, the man gains a confidante, a helpmeet, a 
travel guide, a savior, a creator. This companion is a great source of emotional 
strength for the man who would drown in his “sorrow river” without her to hear 
his cries. Her hand-holding saves him so that he may think (in the absence of 
crude entertainments) and feel (without feeling alone).  
With the company of an auditor, the man could reassess his relationship 
to the entertainments he had enjoyed mindlessly before. His analogical 
imagination reveals that he should be skeptical of the images that he consumes. 
Marta’s exhortations to “see” her force the man to come to terms with why she 
had been invisible and why he hadn’t been able to see her previously. Initially, 
the man’s life in Los Angeles bars him from understanding what Marta recounts. 
As he sits in front of his television, he tells Marta that “I cannot bear to see it; I’ll 
watch TV and not see it; there are no pictures on the television of Acul that day 
or yesterday or fifteen years from now: you are never in the news, darling; in the 
Shows” (171). Neither Marta nor her fellow Ixil people were depicted on screen 
for the man to see in the 1980s, and they are certainly not on the network 
television shows (capitalized because they are the man’s main entertainment) 
that the man watches fifteen years later as he writes his Books. The man points to 
a few problems he encounters when trying to visualize Marta’s story. First, the 
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scenes Marta describes are unlike the ones he’s seen on television; second, the 
scenes are too hard to imagine without any models; and third, television easily 
distracts the man into ignoring the scenes that Marta asks the man to visualize. 
Without the help of television to help the man know about the Guatemalan 
massacres, the man knows nothing about them before the imaginary figure, 
Marta, came to speak to him. And yet, television also allows the man an easy exit 
out of her story. But, through the operation of his analogical imagination, the 
man shifts from excusing his behavior to criticizing it. In a long list of the things 
he’s come to learn about her experience because she came to tell him about them, 
the man admits that “there are the mountains and there is the neighbor girl you 
carried on your back and the boy you carried in your belly and the child whose 
hand you held dragging her running up the mountains, and there are more and 
there is more (a palm which kills your son nine months later; a breast which 
cannot save Doña Ana’s boy five months after that (the milkless worthless titty)), 
and I couldn’t see it, Marta, and I was watching the television” (247). During the 
time of the Guatemalan massacres of 1977-1986, the man was busy watching TV 
and paid no mind to events that were not a part of his regularly-scheduled 
programs. But, when Marta arrives to speak to the man fifteen years later, the 
man has a chance to see what he couldn’t before. In fact, the list he provides of 
the tortures that Marta endured while he was being entertained at home reflects 
the man’s newfound concern about “seeing” the suffering of others. Each item in 
the man’s list evokes cinematic scenes that might be filmed for a movie. The man 
cuts from a shot of mountains to a shot of Marta carrying a wounded refugee to 
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close-ups of her hand holding her child’s, the same hand snuffing out a life, and 
a breast unable to provide sustenance. If earlier, the man had refused to see 
Marta’s scenes of suffering, the cinematic shots of this scene allow the man to 
make up for the lack of similar images on his television screen and speak to the 
importance of “seeing” the past passionately remembered in the present through 
an imaginative visual recreation in the mind. His skeptical assessment of 
television images opened up the space in his mind for him to imagine Marta’s 
experience. 
The man’s realizations about the images he sees on screen lead him to 
recognize that we stereotype ourselves, a process simply reproduced in our 
popular media. The man comes to this new insight a hundred pages before he 
writes the cinematic description I discuss above when he tells Marta, “We’ll 
movie you up if you are dead, darling, there is no doubt that I could write a 
movie about you, a small and censored love story which will not show your 
hands—brown and tired and blooded and boned and removed—covering the 
mouths of babes in the mountains, these invisible uncinematic wounds, or how 
they are removed later with a coffee cutting implement, and untenable for the 
telling in America” (140). Here, the man proposes a movie about Marta’s 
experience, but the proposed movie’s plot revolves around a conventional love 
story between the man and Marta. He believes that he would never be able to 
write scenes that include Marta’s hand, hands that were agents of death for the 
screaming children who would give away their hidden location in the 
mountains, hands that were severed later by her Guatemalan Army torturers in 
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the Polytechnic School. The man’s hesitation to visually describe how Marta 
endures and makes “invisible uncinematic wounds” is slowly chipped away 
after the man writes two more Books filled with increasingly more cinematic 
descriptions of Marta’s experience. In the latter description of Marta’s hands 
discussed above, the man’s focus on visual representation aligns with the man’s 
newly acquired visual knowledge of the Guatemalan massacres as a result of his 
imaginary visits with Marta. By his own admission, he hadn’t been able to see (or 
even visually describe) Marta’s suffering before because he was busy being a 
stereotypical American watching television shows, but his cinematic list reveals 
that he can move beyond that initial shortcoming to see her experience. The 
stereotypes that the man uncovers are the ones reproduced in the popular media 
he consumes. 
The man becomes well-provisioned to learn and implement the last 
“truth” he gains from his analogic imagination. This “truth” is that there is great 
existential worth in creating a genocidally-hybrid self-defining narrative. After 
the man learns of the physical deprivation of Marta’s people, he can begin 
imagining similar circumstances that his ancestors might have endured in the 
Armenian Genocide. If Marta’s people ate grass in the mountains, the man 
surmises, maybe his ancestors did as well. He imagines that his grandmother’s 
“young mother ate the old grasses of the Der Zor in the summer 1915 in a 
different war” (252). He adds to the story that he inherited by imagining what 
might have happened to his grandmother’s kin when they were “sent on the 
march to the Der Zor” (268). Knowing nothing about what they experienced, the 
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man assumes they might have experienced something much like what Marta 
experienced during her exile on the desolate Cuchumatanes Mountains. In fact, 
the man intuits that the two situations have so much in common, he purposefully 
mixes them up at times. While addressing Marta, the man tells her, “trudging up 
into the hills and looking seeking the day long for some small kind of edible fruit 
or green plants because you are always hungry, you ate grass in the 
Mesopotamian desert stories of summer 1915, will eat anything offered you, […] 
while the bombs rained down on your head from the Cessna A37-B” (283). 
Though the man begins the sentence addressing Marta, the sentence he speaks 
muddles his addressee halfway through. The beginning aligns with the story the 
man has heard from Marta: it describes Marta’s deprivation on the mountains, 
since she is “trudging up into the hills” and looking for food. But the man slips 
into another description, of his ancestors in the Armenian Genocide, in the next 
part of his address. He says that she “ate grass in the Mesopotamian desert 
stories of summer 1915,” clearly locating his addressee in the Deir al-Zor desert 
of the Middle East during the Armenian Genocide. The man might have shifted 
to addressing his ancestors here, but the rest of the sentence complicates this 
reading. The man continues to add to the sentence, saying that the previous parts 
of the sentence all happened “while the bombs rained down on your head from 
the Cessna A37-B.” As we heard earlier, Marta named the aircraft, the Cessna 
A37-B, that terrorized the Ixil who had taken to the hills for protection from the 
Guatemalan Army.69 Further, the Cessna A37-B was not manufactured until 1967, 
                                                
69 See Marcom 100. 
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so this particular reference to the aircraft in the man’s address cannot historically 
refer to his own ancestors.70 The sentence, then, is an example of the man’s belief 
that the connection between the deprivation of Marta’s experience and of his 
own ancestors is so strong that they might be justifiably conflated. 
The strength of the analogy between the Guatemalan and Armenian 
massacres allows the man to see connections between the dissolution of family 
structures during both historical events. The man’s inherited phrases actually 
preserve much information already about how the Armenian Genocide affected 
the man’s grandmother’s family life. “She never saw them again” repeats twice, 
to refer separately to the grandmother’s father and her mother and sisters. But 
even these seemingly simple phrases can be expanded with knowledge the man 
gained about Marta’s massacre. In Marta’s case, she explained that the 
perpetrators of genocide forced the hand of their victims to destroy their own 
families. With this knowledge of Marta’s experience in mind, the man imagines 
that  
I can see my own grandmother who stands at the window of her 
home in Kharphert, Turkey, it is the summer 1915, sees her mother 
and sisters and cousins walk by her on the deportation march to the 
Der Zor, those whom she could not save, for whom the gods did 
not intervene (the husband stands behind her, pleads, ‘Please,’ he 
says to her, ‘we can do nothing for them’; waves their French 
national papers in front of her nose, their two passes, like tickets for 
a solitary ride) (140).  
                                                
70 See the U.S. Air Force Fact Sheets on CESSNA A-37 DRAGONFLY, CESSNA 
A-37B, and CESSNA A-37A for more information. They can be found on the 
National Museum of the United States Air Force website. 
 139 
In this imagined scene, the man appends the phrases he inherited with a scene of 
his surviving grandmother feeling guilty for sending her family to their deaths 
while she and her husband saved themselves by leaving the country with foreign 
passports. Like Marta whose shame at killing her own children doesn’t allow her 
to name the actor of her children’s death, the man’s imagined grandmother feels 
great shame for abandoning her family to go on a “solitary ride” to safety in 
Lebanon. The man even imagines how his grandmother’s shame further affected 
her life in Beirut. In a parenthetical aside after the scene where the grandmother 
and the grandfather allow family members to be taken away, the man thinks: 
“And later in the Lebanon she cannot forgive the husband who could not save 
her mother and sisters (a coward, she thought)” (140). Years after the genocide, 
the grandmother thinks of her own husband as part of the reason why her family 
perished. Though not a literal destruction of family by murder, the 
grandmother’s negative opinion of her husband as “a coward” destroys the 
marital love that might have existed between them. In this extension of the 
analogy, the man adds to the family dissolution that genocides can bring by 
imagining effects on surviving populations. With Marta’s experience to guide his 
analogies, the man can add to the phrases he inherited and enrich them with 
imagined description. 
The man also begins to add to the phrases by imagining the rich life pre-
genocide that his grandmother might have lost as Marta had. If Marta 
remembered the language and the laughter of her life before the Army 
descended on her village, the man imagines “an ancient city where my 
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grandmother once walked the dirt paths and played in the shadows of the 
seventeenth century maple tree, a girl who saw her town ruined” (286). Like 
Marta’s scene of domestic bliss with laughing girls, the man’s imagined scene of 
his grandmother in her hometown of Kharphert in Eastern Anatolia has a girl at 
play. Both scenes highlight the levity of life before violence. And both also 
highlight the long-standing claim each subjugated population had to their homes 
for centuries. In Marta’s telling, the Ixil language marks the claim, since it has 
been spoken in the same general area of Guatemala for centuries.71 The city of 
Kharphert in the man’s imagined version of his grandmother’s life pre-genocide 
makes two references to the long history the Armenian villagers had in the area. 
The city is “ancient” and the maple tree under which his grandmother plays was 
planted in the seventeenth century. The man further extends his comparison 
between Marta’s and his ancestors’ histories by excitedly telling Marta about “the 
artifacts we could find together: baskets bowls painted tombstones the stela and 
stone grave markers in Anatolia in the jungles of the Péten” (300). The man and 
Marta can find artifacts in their respective places of origin: Anatolia for the man, 
and the Péten for Marta. Both geographic terms are the historic names for regions 
now called something else: “Turkey” replaced “Anatolia,” “Guatemala” replaced 
“Péten.”72 The man joins himself and Marta across time and space here. He also 
                                                
71 See page 5 of J. Kathryn Josserand and Nicholas A. Hopkins’s “Chol Ritual 
Language.” 
72 See William L. Rathje’s “The Origin and Development of Lowland Classic 
Maya Civilization” for renaming of the Péten. See Kerem Öktem’s “The Nation’s 
Imprint: Demographic Engineering and the Change of Toponymes in Republican 
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joins the artifacts syntactically by omitting the commas needed between them. 
The list of artifacts starts with items used in daily life (“baskets bowls”) and ends 
with artifacts made to commemorate the dead (“painted tombstones the stela 
and stone grave markers”). This progression could reflect the man’s beliefs about 
the artifacts’ creation: his ordered list of unpunctuated artifacts might highlight 
their continuous creation in each area until violent upheaval disrupted their 
creation. Using Marta’s people’s experience as an inspiration, the man fills in the 
stories of his ancestors’ prior lives hidden in the five phrases he inherited. He 
creates a genocidally-hybrid story that helps him define his own alignments with 
himself and with others. 
The genocidally-hybrid narrative inspires the man’s realization of the 
relation between sentience and conscience. He admits to Marta that “There is 
nothing more terrible than this story you are relating, its cover-ups” by both 
Guatemalan and United States governments (253). Further, the man realizes that 
“when the Army said that they hadn’t done it: they equipped with the UH-1H 
helicopters, the Cessna A37-B, computer keyboards, telephones, Galils—they are 
writing Guatemalan History (and the victors wrote their History of Turkey also, 
undid the Armenians there[)]” (192). Marta allows the man to see that the 
weapons and machinery the Guatemalan Army used against its own people 
were sold to them by the US government after an embargo against selling arms 
                                                                                                                                            
Turkey” and Emrullah Bayrak’s “Official Changes to Turkish Place Names 
Sometimes a Hard Sell” for shirking “Anatolian” names in favor of Turkish ones. 
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to the country suspected of human rights violations was lifted in 1983.73 Based on 
what Marta told him about the denial of the Guatemalan massacres, the man 
understands that his own ancestors’ deaths were also denied. The man connects 
the fact that the Guatemalan Army denied that they had done anything other 
than protect the country from traitorous troops of Communist sympathizers with 
the fact that the Turkish government actively promoted Turkification of Eastern 
Anatolia after the Armenian Genocide to deny Armenians any claim to the area 
they had inhabited for centuries.74 In both cases, a subjugated population is 
written out of History and denied recognition of their losses. This comparison 
between the two populations allows the man to remember something from his 
own personal history that extends the relation. The man remembers that, like 
Marta, “he too unfolio’d in America, the disavowed god in things and the dead 
of before, and he has not found it in the books, in shops, behind closed doors, in 
ledgers (Armenian? Massacres?)” (268, emphasis in original). The man’s 
                                                
73 For more information on US involvement in the Guatemalan massacres, see 
Document 14 by the Central Intelligence Agency and Bernard Gwertzman’s 
article for the New York Times about the lifting of the embargo. President 
Reagan’s comments at a meeting in December 1982 with Guatemala’s President 
at the time, General Efraín Ríos Montt, covered up the massacres that the CIA 
had informed the Administration about by assuring listeners that Ríos Montt 
was “a man of great personal integrity and commitment. His country is 
confronting a brutal challenge from guerrillas armed and supported by others 
outside Guatemala” (Reagan). For further information on Guatemalan denial, see 
Debra H. Rodman’s “Forgotten Guatemala: Genocide, Truth, and Denial in 
Guatemala’s Oriente.” 
74 For information on Turkification after the Republic of Turkey was founded in 
1923, see Joost Jongerden’s The Settlement Issue in Turkey and the Kurds: An 
Analysis of Spatial Policies, Modernity and War and Kerem Öktem’s “The Nation’s 
Imprint: Demographic Engineering and the Change of Toponymes in Republican 
Turkey.” 
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parenthetical aside here reveals what might have happened to him when he 
visited a bookstore to ask if they carried any books about the Armenian 
Genocide. In answer to his inquiry, the bookstore employee expresses confusion 
about who the Armenians are. The second question of “Massacres?” reveals 
another confusion. Instead of “genocide” as the man might have expected given 
his family’s experience, he’s met with “massacres,” delivered again as a question. 
A possible reference to the Library of Congress’s categorization system which 
files books about the Armenian Genocide under “Armenian massacres, 1915-
1923,” the question shows the man that he can’t find what he is looking for 
behind the phrases in books that cannot recognize the Armenian Genocide as a 
genocide in their classification.75 The man’s ancestors’ stories aren’t in the books 
he has encountered, but Marta’s stories are a way into them. Marta’s experience 
of denial helps the man see the present reality of his people’s own denied 
genocide. 
As Marta’s related stories of denial forced the man into remembering that 
he had forgotten how his efforts at finding out more about the Armenian 
Genocide from books were met with disappointment, so too, does Marta’s 
experience force the man into acknowledging another hard truth: that of the 
underlying justification of genocide by its perpetrators. Marta had already told 
                                                
75 Armenian scholars have reached similar insights in their work. Marc 
Nichanian, for example, has posited that all archival material of the Armenian 
Genocide is put to the service of proving the genocide occurred in the face of 
denial, a task which demeans the documents and testimonies to the burden of 
proof. See his The Historiographic Perversion, translated from the original French, 
for details. 
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the man that the Guatemalan Army “killed us like dogs” (266-267, emphasis in 
original). He knew that Marta’s people had been slaughtered like animals. But in 
extending Marta’s experience to his own ancestors’ experience, the man achieves 
another realization. In this comparison, the man hears: 
a thousand year Ixil girl who says to the soldiers in Spanish that We 
are not dogs. In my language which is not my mother’s tongue I 
listen across the mountains, your foreign words fall into the 
tympanum, down the river reveries, these dream-cities, razed 
nightmares (burnt) villages—We also were not dogs, we also 
would have liked a slow siesta in the mid afternoon haze beneath 
the Anatolian skies of Kharphert […]. 
Now I know it, what I have always known and not wanted to 
(know) remember that: we have been dogs, darling, you and I: 
Armenian Ixil curs; and a thousand years of history can be burnt, 
can be razed. (185, emphasis in original) 
The man hears Marta’s story of how she refused the categorization she and her 
fellow Ixil villagers had been given by the Guatemalan army forces that had been 
sent to decimate them. She refuses to be a “dog” by their dehumanizing 
definitions. The man hears Marta’s words (said not in Marta’s native language, 
Ixil, but in Spanish, the language of the conquerors) across time and space. He 
can understand them despite the language barrier between them (she speaks 
Spanish here, he hears English “which is not [his Armenian] mother’s tongue”) 
because they fall directly into his eardrum, which transfers sounds to the inner 
ear and on to the brain. Marta’s phrase reaches the man despite the many 
linguistic barriers and forces him to see the connection between Marta’s 
experience and the experience that was preserved in the phrases that he 
inherited. Marta’s experience reminds him so strongly of his own grandmother’s 
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that he even asks Marta, “Are you my grandmother?” (276). Again, the analogy 
seems so strong to the man that he cannot help but see the two women as one.  
In creating the genocidally-hybrid narrative above, the man makes 
realizations about his own conscience. He realizes that he pushed Marta’s story 
and his own family’s story away because:  
This the sad truth of it, of us,—Marta. That the damned exiled races 
(now roam these Americas) care no more for the damned unexiled 
races of these Americas than Priam’s dogs for their master’s corpse. 
And for this I am sorry and bereaved even; for what is us, human I 
suppose, that does not make a man more likely or likely to love 
another and hated man if he—this man in the deserts of 
Mesopotamia in the mountains of Guatemala—has known pain 
and sorrow and the soldier’s cut and fist upon his brow: 
compassion is not the child of suffering. (282) 
He realizes that although his family’s violent subjugation should have made him 
more attentive to the subjugation of others, “compassion is not the child of 
suffering” (282). In seeing how the “damned exiled races” that immigrated to 
America to escape persecution do not feel for the suffering of the “damned 
unexiled races” of the indigenous Americans, the man realizes that there’s 
something horribly wrong. They’re both “damned,” but they don’t see the 
similarities. Further, the man makes a comparison between Priam’s dogs who 
inadvertently drink the blood of their own master and the victimized 
populations who don’t see that they have more in common than in difference. In 
his comparison, the man makes the implicit argument that both Priam and the 
unexiled indigenous populations are done a disservice by those who forget them: 
Priam’s body is desecrated and the indigenous populations are massacred with 
nary a peep from those whose own ancestors had been the victims of racial 
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violence. It is this problem that the man ends up solving in seeing Marta, hearing 
her story, and forging connections between her experience and his own 
grandmother’s. The man proudly claims, “Marta, I refused, finally, the mean 
separateness of things. Of every thing for this modern: the mind his laughs and 
loves machines, his grandmother in Turkey then Lebanon, and an Ixil girl in 
Acul then Guatemala City and how he feels thinks” (304). He realizes that 
asserting the differences between the massacres is “mean” because it’s both 
callous and intellectually lazy. He sees that there’s much he can understand (in 
both how he “feels” and “thinks,” conjoined here in his phrasing) if he sees the 
connections between them. He can intellectually understand that “here and there 
and here and there it is the same” (243).76 If he is able to feel for Marta and her 
losses, his conscience would be invigorated. Fortunately for the man, he achieves 
this invigoration through his analogic imagination which revives Marta’s losses 
and his grandmother’s losses such that his feelings of sadness translate into a 
conscience to be exercised. By the end of the many analogies the man makes 
between Marta’s story and his own family’s, the man realizes that the foreign can 
be familiar, too. In feeling so strongly for Marta and her losses, the man comes to 
                                                
76 The man’s “feels thinks” can be something like the Latin word, sentire, which 
literally means “think feel.” 
 
The man’s realization that the massacred can commiserate and find solidarity in 
their shared experiences offers a solution for a problem Michael Rothberg brings 
up in Multidirectional Memory, where he talks about the battle over attention 
between “competing” memories. There is no battle if the rememberer feels 
solidarity for the other whose memories he takes along with his own. 
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feel for the phrases he had inherited by analogizing between the two genocides. 
In the man’s case, his sentience led to the invigoration of his conscience. 
*** 
The man comes to realize that sentience undergirds conscience in the 
analogies he makes. The realization leads him to understand that he had not 
been living life the way a conscionable man should and that his analogical 
imagination had shown him the way out. It is this profound takeaway that the 
man wants his own readers to understand and to live by.   
If earlier in the novel, the man deplored his undefinable and 
unidentifiable “malaise” and “maladie,” his experience of analogizing from 
Marta’s experience offers him an alternative way of living (252). In a single 
axiomatic takeaway, the man asserts that “to see the dead is to remember that I 
am alive” (310). The man begins truly living and appreciating his life after he 
passionately remembers as a result of his analogizing from Marta’s experience. 
Only after spending time with Marta does the man feel that “an Ixil girl made 
this boy real, I could turn the TV on off, and sit with you awhile longer in my 
house” (289). The deadening effects of the perpetually cheery Shows that the 
man watched to tune out Marta’s story no longer have any sway over him. In 
fact, he now seeks the low emotions he had been scared of before. “Let us speak 
of your brother. Let us speak of your mother,” he says, “This pains me and I am 
glad (happy!) for this pain, a sadness like a cancer” (300). For the man, choosing 
to feel pain instead of ignoring and denying it though it might eventually 
consume him like a metastasized cancer is preferable to living in a false, 
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saccharine comfort. Without Marta to steer him away from the Shows and into a 
place where he can instead see connections between his painful past and the 
pasts of others, the man isn’t fully living his life. 
The man knows that his life is worth living because he lives with 
knowledge of the past now. And along with that newly discovered knowledge of 
the past, the man realizes that he knows how he and others can remake the 
world for the better. In remembering Marta and his own grandmother, the man 
gained knowledge of the solidarity of subjugated populations. This knowledge, 
too, carries with it a political correlative, that: 
Perhaps you can never entirely hide the blood, Marta, or bind what 
cannot hold—it cannot be erased, the nation-state dream has its 
leaks and holes and interstitial lives, rivers: we are here, we have 
survived, and the half-Armenian boy, the Ixil girl, are blooded 
now, bolder now that we can know it, that I have known you: see 
my nene in the sunlight, her glorious brown hair; see my corpse 
and her yellow teeth—they have lost their hair and teeth in my 
dream and I awake and think that I can hear children in the back of 
the house: they are laughing; they are playing. (278) 
The man’s understanding of the similarities between Ixil and Armenian allowed 
him to passionately remember both pasts such that he and Marta are “blooded” 
with life where before they had none—the man was “dead” because he was 
lulled into a stupor by American television, Marta was dead because she had 
been killed during the Guatemalan massacres and because her death was denied 
after the fact. The man realizes that in making himself and the past come alive, he 
resists the homogenizing assimilation of the nation-state which erases all traces 
of the past in favor of “binding what cannot hold”: its own glorified story of 
progress which ignores all those who were in the way. Like the Historical 
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Materialist of Walter Benjamin’s “Theses on the Philosophy of History,” the man 
comes to realize that viewing the past anew opens up the possibility of forging 
new futures from their examples. Benjamin’s “historical materialism supplies a 
unique experience with the past” by “blast[ing] open the continuum of history” 
instead of subscribing to a teleological narrative favored by Traditional 
Historicists (Benjamin 262). As David L. Eng and David Kazanjian astutely point 
out in their discussion of the Historical Materialist, the work of Benjamin’s heroic 
figure hinges on “a creative process, animating history for future significations as 
well as alternate empathies” (Eng & Kazanjian 1). This belief is echoed in the 
novel’s epigraph, an Ixil phrase, “lakoj oon ve’t uma’t u ak’la tiichajil tetz u 
tenam Ixil,” a phrase that is best translated as “Maybe now a new future will not 
arrive for the Ixil” (Draining the Sea i).77 The phrase suggests that the potential of 
the past can be used to change the future. The epigraph rejects the “new future” 
which disrupted centuries of development and life for the indigenous Ixil. 
Instead, the phrase promotes a future built out of the past as imagined in the 
present, which is not “new” in the sense of a radical change from the promise of 
the past. This future lives up to the past’s potential and can affect the course of 
the future by allowing those in the present to create new affective “empathies” 
from it. As the man realizes, these “alternate empathies” often include feelings 
that are neither merely happy nor positive. The man sees his own corpse and his 
nene’s (his grandmother’s) yellow teeth in his vision because these things that 
                                                
77 I am indebted to María Luz García, expert anthropologist on the Ixil in 
Guatemala, for this translation (María Luz García, personal correspondence, 27 
Feb. 2015). 
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mark sadness, pain, and ignorance “cannot be erased” and instead make life 
“bolder.” The man’s realization here that remembering pain doesn’t necessarily 
mean being held down by the past has reverberations of current turns in affect 
theory. As Sara Ahmed reminds us, it’s time to move beyond the staid notion 
that “Bad feelings” are “orientated toward the past, as a kind of stubbornness 
that ‘stops’ the subject from embracing the future” (50). In Ahmed’s view, seeing 
imagined versions of the past as more than just “melancholia” means admitting 
that “These histories have not gone” but instead “persist[] in the present” (50). 
Ahmed even sees the stubborn rememberer as providing “an alternative model 
of the social good,” one that makes claims for the value of passionately 
remembering painful pasts (50). The man’s ability to hear the laughter of 
children comes after seeing his own corpse and seeing the “leaks and holes and 
interstitial lives” of the nation-state (Draining the Sea 278). The holes here are 
openings for resisting the complacency and amnesia of modern life with its focus 
on progress and forgetting the past in favor of constant improvement. It’s in 
making the painful past a living part of the present—it’s about what Sara Ahmed 
calls “bad feelings” and it’s about what Benjamin’s Historical Materialist does, 
too. 
And the man in Draining the Sea wants his readers to come to these 
realizations alongside him. He addresses his unmarked “Reader” in his five 
“Books” to underscore how the dual roles of reading and writing can help forge 
these new affective relationships. In his apostrophic addresses, the man asserts 
that his experience of analogizing can be extended to the novel’s readers as well. 
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He asks his readers: “Will you, dear Sirs Madams, take the phrases inside your 
crania and let them live awhile longer than Marta me, and you perchance a little 
less lonely today on your drives across the city?” (313). He offers his readers—
the “dear Sirs Madams” of his apostrophe—his own experience of finding 
solidarity with another as a model for combating the loneliness of the modern 
man. Though his address is a formal one that echoes the salutations used in 
official business documents, the structure of the man’s question is more intimate 
and underscores his message of human interaction. The two parts of the sentence 
rhyme, “me” with “city,” making the question more singsong than demand. 
Further, the content of his question is one concerned with forging community, 
since his logic is that readers will always have company if they can allow the 
consciousness of the fictional characters to take up residence in their mind. 
When, on the last page of the novel the man ends with an exhortation to his 
reader, he wants his advice to become undeniable: 
the American half-Armenian boy and his Ixil girl—he half-dead 
and trying for life light before his own death alighted, and you? to 
live here for the breathy moments that I said you, and that 
someone, someone else in ether, reads your name. Dear Reader, 
please do it. 
Taa. (315, emphasis in original) 
In this final passage, the man urges his readers to do as he did: to see Marta, to 
feel for her, and to keep her alive in their present by passionately remembering 
her though she is not their relation. By addressing both the Reader and Marta 
(the “you” of this passage) in an apostrophe, the man does as Lauren Berlant 
says apostrophe strives to do: it “permits subjects to suspend themselves in the 
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optimism of a potential occupation of the same psychic space of others, the 
objects of desire who make you possible (by having some promising qualities, 
but also by not being there)” (Berlant 26). While Berlant, per Barbara Johnson, 
reads apostrophe as a method for using the supposed desires of an absent other 
to satisfy your own personal desires, I read the man’s apostrophes as emerging 
mainly because of unselfish reasons. I grant that the man improves his own life 
by addressing and imagining Marta, but the novel’s final sentence here shows 
that he’s invested in preserving Marta’s story and allowing it to positively 
influence the lives of others. He makes clear that, in reading Marta’s name in the 
man’s final Book (“Taa,” in Ixil), the readers call her into their lives and allow her 
story to affect them. As Marta’s story had shown the man how he could make his 
life worth living, so does Marcom hopes her book will do the same for her 
readers. Finally, the novel’s last line offers an alternative to the alienation of the 
present moment’s “cruel optimism”—per Berlant, if the prevailing structures, 
beliefs, and models have only brought us disappointment yet we cling to them 
nonetheless because casting them off means losing our entrenched ideas of 
selfhood, we need a new method of interacting with the world that expands 
ideas of selfhood behind the individual. In a sense, the man’s final exhortation to 
his Readers is one that calls for what Carolyn Dinshaw calls “a more just and 
more attached nonmodernity” (39). This is postmemory’s promise—a connection 
with the past such that the present and the future are transformed with its 
passionate remembering. Marcom’s decision to write the Reader into her novel 
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with the man’s apostrophes to them highlights how intimately tied postmemory 
can be to the processes of reading and writing. 
Interestingly enough, because in Draining the Sea the fictional book 
emerges as the method for creating these alignments, the literary is reinvested 
with profound meaning in the realm of postmemory and in that of progressive 
politics. Marcom tells the man’s story with the frame that he is writing five 
“Books” that have a particular “Reader” he refers to explicitly. With this frame, 
Marcom highlights how important the twinned processes of writing and reading 
are to identifying with the stories of other victimized populations. She’s echoed 
this feeling in various public talks she’s given throughout the last decade. In one, 
Marcom argues that, with Draining the Sea, “I wanted in a way to collapse history 
in that book, make a book that collapsed space and even time and put two things 
side by side so that their relationship to one another could be felt and 
experienced. [….] And in the book these relations, I hoped, could be seen. Could 
be felt” (Davis-Van Atta 139). The writing of the book allowed Marcom to bring 
two separate pasts together such that the relationship between them could be felt 
by her readers who are reminded of their task by a character they encounter in 
Marcom’s novel. The felt alignments are marshaled for the purposes of a more 
just and less cruel world. Fundamentally, Draining the Sea teaches us that 
sentience and conscience are intimately joined. 
  
 154 
AFTERWORD: LITERARY STUDIES AND THE PEDAGOGY OF 
POSTMEMORY 
In the course of my analysis of Marcom’s novels, I discovered that these 
texts made important insights about the mediation of the imagination between 
memory and passionate remembering. These insights included how postmemory 
does its work, when it might be problematically achieved, and what its most 
positive outcomes can be. All along, I kept postmemory at the center of my 
dissertation in the field of literary studies. After stepping back to see the project 
as a whole, it’s become obvious to me that Marcom’s trilogy and my analysis of it 
lead to the same fundamental takeaway: literary studies is a discipline well-
suited for theorizing and analyzing postmemory because it is a discipline deeply 
invested in and best-equipped for paying scholarly attention to the imagination’s 
greatest feats. In fact, since imagination is the forte of literary scholars, literature 
departments are best suited for teaching courses centered around postmemory, 
as my own experience attests. In this short afterword, I explain the disciplinary 
utility of my dissertation by briefly summarizing Marcom’s trilogy and its 
concerns with reading and writing. After this discussion of the trilogy’s larger 
concerns as related to the discipline of literary studies, I add a pedagogic 
dimension to the utility of my project by arguing that a course centered around 
postmemory allows for productive, personal engagement by students with both 
canonical and emerging texts.  
When seen together as a trilogy, Marcom’s novels offer literary scholars a 
sustained and progressively more difficult exploration of the writerly 
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imagination as mediator between inherited memories and their passionate 
remembering in postmemory. In other words, my analysis of the trilogy reveals 
that Marcom increasingly highlights the importance of writing for creating 
postmemory and for getting others to understand it as a phenomenon. As I 
argued in my chapter about Three Apples Fell from Heaven, Marcom’s storytelling 
vignettes allow eavesdroppers to vivify features of the past as a result of reading 
imagined stories of the past that contrast older pasts with a more recent past. 
This contrastive approach is one able to be created in the novel form, since “[t]he 
novel (especially, perhaps, the post-modern novel) can,” by Marcom’s 
estimation, “embrace any kind and all kinds of narratives: the historical tracts, 
the newspaper article, letters, myths, etc. as does Three Apples Fell From Heaven. It 
is perhaps a more-inclusive narrative than the historical one, more truthful, even, 
if I can be so bold” (Marcom, in Merjian 8). Novels like Three Apples Fell from 
Heaven can include documents of history yet they needn’t be hemmed in by 
history’s claim to objectivity. In the novel, Marcom’s characters—notably, Rachel, 
Sargis, and Anaguil—decide to write down their experiences as affirmations of 
self in the face of historical annihilation. If the novel is unlike the books of 
history, it also differs from other sources it borrows from, namely, those from the 
oral record. While hearsay and family stories are juxtaposed with written 
documents and imagined scenes in Marcom’s first novel, the novel does more 
work than the oral story can by undercutting the “official” record of a document 
like the “Official Proclamation” reprinted in the book that serves as source 
material for the murderous bootmakers that Marcom imagines releasing an 
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“Edict.” By including both history and hearsay in her novel, Marcom creates a 
combined form that transcends both. The combined form of Marcom’s novel is 
what invests unsatisfactory memories of the Armenian Genocide with personal 
meaning for those who want to passionately remember the past they never 
experienced, and it is a form that is imaginatively written. Marcom continues to 
focus her attention on the novel’s imaginatively written form in her second and 
third books. In The Daydreaming Boy, she brings together the Lebanese Civil War 
and the Armenian Genocide to tell a story about an afflicted man who cannot 
take comfort in his own imaginative renditions of the past. Vahé’s predicament 
of being unable to access the productive and life-affirming insights of 
postmemory as created in the imagination is contrasted with the situation of the 
man in Draining the Sea who explicitly engages in the imaginative process by 
writing five “Books.” It is in the process of writing that the man learns about 
Marta and his ancestors’ experience. And the man urges his Readers to use their 
imaginations to see the connections he himself realized in the writing, since he 
believes that “the real resides in books, where we can, finally, loafe and invite the 
soul” (Draining the Sea 313). Marcom’s writing of a novel so deeply invested in 
the writing process affirms how the imagination can be used to create writing 
which itself can teach readers how to achieve postmemorial effects and 
affiliations. Essentially, Marcom’s novels depict a wonderful feedback loop: 
Marcom’s imagination (inspired by other written works and overheard stories) 
created her novels, and the novels inspire the imaginations of Marcom’s readers. 
In its most successful creations in creative works, postmemory perpetuates its 
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creation in the audience. For these reasons, literary scholars are well-suited for 
exploring postmemory and postmemorial narratives. 
I’ve tried to argue that literary studies is a productive venue for discussing 
postmemory by tracking writerly concerns in Marcom’s trilogy, but I want to 
push this point through another context: pedagogy. My claim here is that, if 
postmemory can be productively discussed in literary circles, it has a great role 
to play in pedagogical venues as well. I can confidently make this claim because I 
taught a successful upper-division literature course on the topic myself at the 
University of Texas at Austin last summer. I titled the course “Not Even Past: 
Imagining Painful Histories” and promoted it on the course schedule with a 
description that included the class’s main units anchored by texts of personal loss 
and historical trauma. The creative works of the authors we analyzed in the 
course—Russell Banks, Micheline Aharonian Marcom, Art Spiegelman, Saidiya 
Hartman, and Jonathan Safran Foer—were just a few of the many texts I wished I 
had the time to include. In making my long reading list, I realized that canonical 
American literature is populated with passionate rememberers. Well-known 
characters like William Faulkner’s Quentin Compson, along with distinguished 
writers like Toni Morrison, Nathaniel Hawthorne, Tim O’Brien, and Cormac 
McCarthy, have grappled with productively making the haunting past come 
alive in their narratives. Amongst these giants of the canon, the mixture of 
canonical and less-canonical texts I chose to include on my syllabus were not the 
sometimes light fare of a summer course, but the class filled up quickly anyhow. 
On the first day, I realized why while students explained their reasons for 
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choosing my class from the list on offer. One student disclosed that she enrolled 
for the class because she noticed that we were going to study creative works on 
the Armenian Genocide, the genocide that her own great-grandfather had 
survived before settling in a border town in Mexico. Another shared that she was 
eager to read Maus so that she could understand her grandmother who fled 
Poland during the Holocaust but never talked about the experience. Still another 
said that, while growing up in the Rio Grande Valley, he had heard about the 
bus crash that inspired Russell Banks’s The Sweet Hereafter and that he wanted to 
finally read the novel with the support of a class. These stories were just a few of 
the painful pasts that my students brought to our classroom, and I see them not 
as isolated instances, but as emblematic of the human desire to reinvigorate the 
past in the present through creative means. America is full of passionate 
rememberers like my students. The recent controversy over the confederate flag 
is just one instance in a long line of varied efforts to reinvigorate features of the 
past in the present. If my class’s success and popularity is any indication of the 
state of postmemory, the American university and America at large need to take 
interest. 
Postmemory as a product of the mediation of the imagination between 
memory and its passionate remembering is often enacted and explored in 
literature and literature courses, but it is at heart a reality of our contemporary 
moment. As time attenuates the personal connections various afflicted groups 
have to their ancestral traumas, postmemory will become more and more 
prevalent. Since this is the case, I sincerely hope that future work in the field of 
 159 
postmemory will take my point that imagination mediates between memory and 
postmemory as a given. With this understanding of the phenomenon, literary 
scholars can contribute much to the field of postmemory studies and the 
burgeoning study of postmemory-enabled and -invested productions. 
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